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U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET. TASK FORCE 86.

OPERATIONS AND ACTION OF THE SUPPORT FORCE

EIGHTH FLEET DURING INVASION OF SOUTHERN FRANCE

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UNITED STATES EIGHTH FLEET
Commander Support Force
(Commander Cruiser Division Eight)

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U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Task Force 86

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From: Commander Support Force (CTF 86)
(Commander Cruiser Division Eight).
To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Via : Commander Eighth Fleet.
Subject: Operations and action of the Support Force Eighth Fleet during Invasion of Southern France, 15 August 1944 and attack on Defenses of Toulon and Marseilles in support of the Allied Armies, and support of the Right Flank, 18 August to 25 September, 1944; report on.

Reference: (a) NCWTF OpPlan 4-44 (Anor-1).
(b) ComSupFor Training Plan 6-44.
(c) ComSupFor OpPlan 3-44 (Sitro One).
(d) ComSupFor OpPlan 5-44 (Flare One).
(e) ComSupFor desp. 231146B of Aug. 1944 (Flare Two).
(f) ComSupFor OpPlan 6-44 (Flare Three).
(g) NCWTF desp. 231200A of Sept. 1944.
(h) CCD 7 ltr. A16-3, serial 0088 dated 20 Aug. 1944 covering assault phase of operation DRAGOON.
(i) CCD 7 ltr. A16-3, serial 0090 dated 29 Aug. 1944 covering period 18 to 22 Aug. 1944.
(j) CCD 7 ltr. A16-3, serial 0092 dated 30 Aug. 1944 covering period 23 to 27 Aug. 1944.

Enclosure: (A) Part IV - Communications.
(B) Part V - Gunfire Support Notes.
(C) Part VI - Chronology.
(D) Part VII - Battle Damage.
(E) Part VIII - Performance of ordnance material and ammunition expenditures.
(F) Part IX - Personnel performance and casualties.

GENERAL NARRATIVE

Part I

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Preparation and Planning

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1. Introduction

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The operations of the Support Force under the command of Rear Admiral L. A. Davidson, USN, designated by the Naval Western Task Force under the command of Vice Admiral H. K. Hewitt, USN, during the Invasion of Southern France, fall naturally into three periods, the Assault 15-17 August, which covers the landing and establishment of the beachhead; the Post Assault 18-30 August, which covers the naval attacks on the defenses of Toulon and Marseilles in

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support of the advance of the Allied Armies, and the third, the Support, 30 August to 25 September (and is still continuing), which covers the support of the seaward flank of the Allied Armies holding on the Franco-Italian border.

2. Tasks assigned by reference (a) were:

(a) During the Assault period:

(1) Establish the First Special Service Force on the Islands of Levant and Port Cros. Neutralize all enemy batteries on these islands threatening assault shipping and operational forces.

(2) Establish the First Groupe Commandos d'Afrique in the vicinity of Cap Negre for the purposes of destroying enemy defenses at Cap Negre, blocking the coastal highway, seizing the high ground two miles north of that cape, and protecting the left flank of the main assault forces. Destroy or neutralize enemy batteries at Cap Negre (if uncaptured) and Cap Benat which threaten Cavalaire assault.

(3) Conduct bombardment and support military operations in the Sitka Area.

(4) Reassign gunfire support ships to meet special situations.

(b) During the Post Assault period:

(1) Support the westward advance of the Army.

(c) During the Support Period (Static):

(1) Reference (g) directed support of Army right flank in vicinity of Italian frontier.

(2) Prevention of small craft raids from enemy held territory to the eastward.

3. Composition and Distribution of Forces:

(a) Assault Period:

(1) Landing Forces:

First Special Service Force (1365)
First Groupe Commandos d'Afrique

Colonel Walker, USA
Lt-Col. Bouvet, FA

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(2) Gunfire Support

Rear Admiral Davidson, USN

AUGUSTA (F)	1 CA
DIDO	1 CL
LORRAINE	1 BB
SOMERS, GLEAVES, LOOKOUT, THEMISTOCLES	4 DD

(b) Post Assault Period: Vessels assigned to other task forces
which came available to Commander Support Force.

(1) ALPHA Gunfire Group (CTG 84.7) Rear Admiral Mansfield

RAMILLES	1 BB
QUINCY	1 CA
ORION (F), AURORA, AJAX, BLACK PRINCE, GLOIRE	5 CL
LIVERMORE, EBERLE, KEARNY, ERICSSON	4 DD
TERPSICHOE, TERMAGANT	2 DD

(2) DELTA Gunfire Group (CTG 85.12) Rear Admiral Bryant

TEXAS (F), NEVADA	2 BB
PHILADELPHIA	1 CL
GEORGES LEYGUES, MONTCAIM	2 CL
FANTASQUE, MALIN, TERRIBLE	3 DL
ELLYSON, HAMBLETON, RODMAN, EMMONS, MACOMB, FORREST, FITCH, HOBSON	8 DD

(3) CAMEL Gunfire Group (CTG 87.7) Rear Admiral Deyo

ARKANSAS	1 BB
TUSCALOOSA (F)	1 CA
BROOKLYN, MARBLEHEAD	2 CL
ARGONAUT	1 CL
DUGUAY TROUIN, EMILE BERTIN	2 CL
PARKER, KENDRICK, MACKENZIE, MC LANAHAN, BOYLE, CHAMPLIN, NIELDS, ORDRONAU, X, WOOLSEY, LUDLOW, EDISON	11 DD

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(c) Support Period.

(1) Support Group One,

Rear Admiral Davidson, USN.

PHILADELPHIA (F)
BROOKLYN
LORRAINE
H.P. JONES
MADISON
WOOLSEY (F)
EDISON
LUDLOW

2 CLs
1 BB

5 DDs

(2) Support Group Two,

Contra Amiral Joujard, FN.

MONTCAIM (F)
GEORGES LEYGUES
GLOIRE

3 CLs

(3) Support Group Three,

Contra Amiral Auboyneau, FN.

EMILE BERTIN
DUGUAY TROUIN
LE MALIN

2 CLs
1 DL

(4) Bombardment Group (S.O.P)

Ships as assigned from Group one, Two or Three for
active bombardment of the enemy.

4. Detailed Planning and Preparation:

(a) Planning and study commenced in December 1943 but could not be carried on consistently and regularly due to the interjection of other operations namely, Anzio in January and the advance of the Allied Armies in Italy from the Garigliano Valley and from the Anzio Beachhead in May and June. The excellent Advance Planning Memoranda issued from time to time by Commander EIGHTH Fleet presented the mass of information in doses that could be digested served as reminders and formed a sound basis for the final detailed planning.

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(b) Resolved to improve technique and profit from lessons learned through mistakes in previous operations steps were taken to assure efficient and adequate aerial observation of fall of shot; to improve the Bombardment Code; establish a standard spotting procedure; improve training and equipment of shore fire control parties; equip screening vessels with efficient and adequate smoke making equipment and to advance the training in night observation of gunfire by aircraft and through employment of the Beedex. In the course of advancing these aims two weeks were profitably spent with the French Navy in early March in indoctrinational training in gunnery and communications, followed by a trip to the United States where conferences were held with commanders of cruisers, battle-ships and destroyer units designated to augment the gunfire support forces in the Mediterranean and with Rear Admiral Durgin relative to aerial observation. Arrangements were made for intensive training of pilots and gunnery personnel of ships and for the early delivery of nine Beedex units. The use of gasoline gel in air bombing was discussed with the Staff of Cominch and the prosecution of experimental development urged as it appeared an excellent weapon for use against the tunnel, turret and trench type of defenses to be encountered in Europe.

(c) In May and June the Support Force was engaged in supporting the advance of the Allied Armies in Italy from their positions in the Garigliano River Valley and from the Anzio Beachhead. In these operations much was done to improve and standardize the technique of the SFCP and naval gunfire liaison and to impress the Army command with the value of attack on targets of opportunity by air observation although the requirement that the Army must make request for fire on specific targets hours in advance of their intended movement still was the rule for Navy participation and a requirement of the 225 Recco Squadron to permit briefing of their pilots.

(d) A visit to the beachhead in Normandy was made by the Support Commander on D plus ten with Commander G.K. Williams, U.S. Navy, Gunnery Officer of the BROOKLYN who for the Invasion of Southern France served as Staff Gunnery Officer. The party returned impressed by the strength of the defensive concrete gun emplacements, the ingenuity exercised in their location and concealment; the lack of dependability of aerial bombing in prelanding neutralization; the demand for volume of naval gunfire; employment of AP projectiles against concrete; the possibilities presented by the use of fire against beach

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defenses; and the absolute necessity for maintaining naval gunfire until the last moment of the landing with aerial observation or offshore observation from a landing craft. The possibilities in the enemy use of underwater obstacles appeared to pose an almost insurmountable problem in the Mediterranean where through lack of tidal range the obstacles never were exposed. Employment of the pontoon causeway to accept the damage of underwater explosion and bridge the defended area appeared to offer a possible solution if enough could be spared for this purpose. The effects of storm and the possibilities of disaster of resulting were again forcibly in evidence.

(e) Upon return from this visit the Support Force Commander found detail plans for the Invasion of France in progress although the forces, ground, naval and air, to be made available were still not firm. On 1 July verbal orders were received to set up a tentative gunfire support plan for the operation on the assumption that forces released to Overlord would be available in the Mediterranean and on 6 July Operation Sitka was assigned to the Support Force implementing the decision to effect an advance landing on the Isles d'Hyeres and in the vicinity of Cap Negre to secure the left flank of the main assault.

(f) A training plan, reference (b) was prepared and issued to U.S. forces as they arrived in the Mediterranean. The plan was not approved by CinCMed for British and French forces until 3 August owing to other employment demands and then with the proviso that the training of the French be under U.S. and British commanders. The allocation of gunfire support ships to the several amphibious assault commands having been made by this time and the ships having been delayed in reporting by material and logistic demands the training fell naturally under the several Gunfire Support Group Commanders. Fortunately the majority of the battleships, cruisers and destroyers reporting had had bombardment experience either in action or in target practice. Special directives were issued to forward the training of all ships and observation planes in communications and the use of the Mediterranean Bombardment Code distributed about 22 July.

(g) An operation "Preview" was arranged and carried out on 7 August to provide a communication exercise for the air control units. Combined with this, several ships were afforded an opportunity to conduct bombardment practice and exercise was had in control of fire by SFCs and fighter spotters. The exercise brought out many weaknesses in communications principally interference between channels.

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(h) The assignment of Commanders of the several gunfire support groups having been approved, namely Rear Admiral Mansfield, R.N., to Assault Force Alpha, Rear Admiral BRYANT, U.S. Navy to Assault Force Delta, Rear Admiral DEYO, U.S. Navy to Assault Force Camel and Rear Admiral DAVIDSON, U.S. Navy to Assault Force Sitka, the assignment of ships was made firm on 27 July and the detailed planning of the gunfire in support carried out under the respective Task Force Commanders in consultation with and coordinated by the Support Force Commander. The French Flag Officers, namely Contra Amiral AUGOYNEAU and Contra Amiral JAUIARD were assigned as Deputy Group Commanders in the Camel and Delta Forces respectively. The OMAHA, MARBLEHEAD and CINCINNATI of Cruiser Division TWO with Rear Admiral CHANDLER in command were made available at such late date that only one ship the MARBLEHEAD was assigned to gunfire support duties. OMAHA was held in reserve, CINCINNATI was under overhaul in ORAN as a result of a turbine casualty. The French training ship, JEANNE d' ARC, was also held in reserve. H.M.S. RAMILLES joined on the night of the fourteenth of August enroute to the assault area. Operation orders and plans had been forwarded to meet her at Gibraltar.

(i) Rear Admiral CHANDLER arrived without a staff on 2 August and without a background of previous experience in amphibious warfare or in naval support of troops. He was welcomed and assigned as the Commander Assault Group in the Sitka operation where his services were urgently required in coordination of the two widely divergent landings to be carried out on the Isles d'Hyeres and in the vicinity of Cap Negre and in the adjustment of personal differences and to act as a curb on controversies engendered by the positive personalities of the Special Service Force Commanders and Captain MAYNARD and thus permit the Support Force Commander to devote his time to study and joint planning with General de LATTE la TASSIGNY, Commanding French Armee B for the assault on the defenses of Toulon and Marseille.

(j) The early stages of the planning period were spent in getting settled in Naples. Commander EIGHTH Fleet moved forward from Algiers on 10 July. Commander Support Force established a headquarters on shore in order to have space in which to operate, to secure security, and to facilitate conferences with Army and Air commands. Quarters were secured in the vicinity of those of the Seventh Army termed "Flambeau".

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The Support Force HQ was dubbed "Flare". The personnel of the Planning Staff consisted of the following officers:

Captain G.E. MAYNARD, USN, COMTransDiv 5 with staff of four, Sitka Assault.
Commander J.N. HUGHES, USN, ComTransDiv 13, Sitka Assault.
Captain S.H. NORRIS, RN, with staff of 3, Romeo Assault.
Commander G.K. WILLIAMS, USN, Gunnery.
Lieutenant Commander A.G. STANFORD, USNR, Diversion Group.
Ensign J.H. BABYAK, USN, Assistant Secretary.
Lieutenant Commander P. WOOD, USNR, Communications.
Lieutenant C.G. LAVIN, USNR, Intelligence.
Lieutenant D.A. LIANE, USN, Aviation.
Lieutenant T.M. CLEMENT, USNR, Mines.

Capitain de Fregate M.J.B. BATAILLE, F.N., Liaison and Gunnery.

Captain R.K. DAVIS, USN, Chief of Staff and Lieutenant D.W. SMITH, USNR, Logistics and Lieutenant Commander H.M. McLELLAN, USNR, remained on the Flagship to handle communications and operations connected with the training program.

(k) The planning and training for the assaults were handicapped by the late arrival of four of the LSI(S) and (M) from the United Kingdom. The PRINCE BAUDOUIN, the last to arrive, on 3 August reported that just prior to departure the entire boat flotilla had been exchanged for one manned by Royal Marines with little experience in amphibious warfare. Three required fittings for hoisting LCM and all required additional radio equipment. The OSMOND INGRAM arrived on 1 August with no background of experience and with faulty boats without underwater exhaust.

(1) It was planned to effect the landings on the islands from rubber boats in order to attain secrecy, to overcome the handicap of poor maneuverability of the LCV(R) with which the APDs were equipped and to make it possible to debark all of the assault troops without waiting for boats to return for a second load. A technique for launching, loading and towing rubber boats was developed by the Commander Transport Division Thirteen in which three boats were secured in tandem to a single towline and towed by a LCV(R) three abreast. Type M, army assault boats were secured and tested but were found to be less seaworthy and maneuverable than the ten man rubber boat which it was found on test could be towed at a speed of

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7 1/2 knots in a smooth sea and which towed well at lesser speeds in a chop.

(m) The eleven mile trip from the transport area to Cape Negre demanded a modification of this technique to allow for the possibility of rough seas being encountered and to provide for the timing of the assault with that of the landings on the islands. In this approach of the advance party PT boats were employed to tow LCA in order to increase the speed and gain a time interval in advance of the main assault. Part of the advance party were embarked in the PT which stopped two miles off shore and off loaded the scouts and security party into rubber boats from which point they proceeded to the landing towed by LCAs which carried a rubber boat in addition for use of the assault troops embarked in the LCA in event of difficulties being encountered on rugged shores. In the landing on Elba and in this operation the LCA has been found to be an excellent boat for use in scramble landings. It is quiet, rugged and maneuvers well but lacks power to retract. The LCV(R) is noisy, maneuvers poorly and is easily damaged.

(n) Despite the handicaps and short period for training the rehearsal, conducted on the eighth of August was successfully carried out. There were many points requiring readjustment and further training was desirable but with the ninth spent returning the troops to their encampment area, replenishing water and fuel at Naples and with a critique to be held on the 10th little opportunity was afforded as the embarkation and departure from the mainland was scheduled for the 11th. Installation of hoisting arrangements on the LCMs was completed and boats hoisted for the first time on the 9th after excellent work on the part of the British repair unit at Castellamare. The First Special Service Force loaded at Castelabatte and the First Groupe Commandos d'Afrique at Agropoli on the morning of 11 August and sailed for Propriano where they were staged on shore, briefed in the operation and reloaded on the 14th.

(o) The landing sites on the Isles de Port Cros and du Levant were selected by the Commander Special Service Force from aerial photographs and later confirmed by reconnaissance from a submarine. The trip was made by Lieutenant Colonel BURHANS and a scout officer in a British submarine on 28 July. Despite the assertions of French Officers and others with local knowledge that a landing over the south coast of the islands was impracticable or impossible Col. WALKER had supreme confidence

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in the ability of the troops. It was the desire that the Sitka landings be accomplished in secrecy, with stealth, and not be the cause of arousing the area selected for the main assault. To attempt to land on the north shore of the islands where the only natural beaches existed would have entailed the employment of gunfire against enemy defense installations as it seemed improbable that a force of the size of the Sitka Force should be able to approach and take station inside the Rade d'Hyeres undetected. The Task Force Commander concurred in the selection as he too had confidence that the training and experience of the Special Service Force assured success.

(p) The planning and preparation for aerial observation of gunfire involved the training of the pilots of VCS-EIGHT to fly fighter planes. The BROOKLYN Unit was trained in P-40s under Army tutelage at Bertaux, Algiers and the PHILADELPHIA in F4Fs in the United States. Later the BROOKLYN Unit qualified in P-51s and five pilots transferred to temporary duty with the XIIth Tactical Air Force in the 111th Reconnaissance Squadron where they were joined by the five pilots of the PHILADELPHIA Unit upon their arrival in April. En additional planes were secured for the squadron in late July and navy mechanics having experience with in-line engines were drawn from the battleships to service them. With ten pilot spotters operating from Corsican fields and with the two squadrons of Hellcats and Seafires on the CVEs it seemed that the problem of aerial observation might be solved. This did not meet the demands, however, so cruiser planes were returned aboard PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN and QUINCY, ships having the gasoline stowage aft and AUGUSTA and TUSCALOOSA pilots used as replacements in the CLs. In view of the expected enemy air opposition and operational losses the CVEs were to be withdrawn immediately after the assault leaving the 111th the only source of spotters. To provide for employment of Seagulls and Kingfishers in event of need, plans were made to base these planes removed from AUGUSTA, TUSCALOOSA and the battleships at Ajaccio, and place the TEXAS as a floating seaplane base within operating range of the assault area to replenish fuel and catapult the planes and thus permit their carrying a full load of fuel which is impracticable on water take-off. This last expedient was not, however, necessary. The air opposition proved to be very light so the CVEs remained on station until the fall of Toulon and Marseille furnishing observation for the ships engaged on the left flank in support of the westward advance of the Armies.

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(q) It was early apparant in the study of the defenses of Toulon and the Army scheme of maneuver and of the composition and equipment of the follow up forces that the French Armee B would require a maximum of naval support to make up for the lack of heavy field artillery; the Isle de Porquerolles, Presqu'ile de Giens and Saint Mandrier must be reduced or neutralized in order to position the ships; and that the clearance of mines and the opening of the anti-torpedo net in the Rade d'Hyeres must be accomplished as soon as practicable in order to conserve the high velocity charges and long range munitions which were in short supply for ships reporting from the Invasion of Northern France. Mandrier, with its 340 mm turreted guns having 40,000 yds. range dominated Porquerolles and Giens and the last two named were inter supporting and all threatened the advance of the ground forces. An early plan to take Porquerolles by amphibious assault was, for this reason held in abeyance. As Mandrier was the hub of the defense system and the reduction or destruction of the turrets by naval gunfire or aerial bombing seemed improbable the development of a plan for disabling these guns was undertaken at the request of Commanding General, SEVENTH Army. The plan consisted of a softening up by aerial bombardment and reduction of A/A and medium batteries by naval gunfire by both day and night. The final blow was to be delivered by two parties of French Groupe d'Assault, three men each under the leadership of Capitain de Fregate SERRIOT, who having been stationed on Mandrier was acquainted with the terrain. These parties were to land from rubber boats from P.T. boats during the course of a night bombardment by ships with aerial observation similar to that used so successfully by Balck Cats in the Pacific. The area was to be obscured by smoke from aerial smoke bombs dropped at last light and from burning forests. The funffire was designed to cause the A/A gunners and watchers to seek shelter and was only to be shifted at the minute of landing to a remote section of the area. The guns were to be disabled by placing thermit grenades in the barrels. The raiding party planned to escape in rubber boats to seaward to be picked up after daylight. The plan did not reach fruition, however, as the U.S. CVEs were not prepared for night operations. The C.G. XIIth Air Force did not concur in its feasibility and resorted to ridicule in official correspondence dubbing it "Operation Fantastic".


(r) Liaison and planning with the French Armee B was greatly facilitated by Capitaine de Fregate Bataille who had recently commanded the cruiser EMILE BERTIN in gunfire support of

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troops in Italy. His outstanding professional ability, know-
ledge of military maneuver and his familiarity with the
defenses of Toulon were inestimable assistance to the Support
Force Commander.



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Part II

Operations Sitka and Romeo

1. The establishment of the Special Service Force on the Isles d'Hyeres to insure the reduction of the batteries on the eastern end of the Isle du Levant and remove that threat to the transports prior to their arrival in Cavaliere Bay was named Operation Sitka. It was later decided to land the First Groupe Commandos d'Afrique on the mainland, thus having French troops the first to land on the soil of Southern France, to secure the left flank of the landing in Cavalaire against attack from troops hurried forward from Hyeres. This operation was named Romeo and was incorporated under the Sitka command. Both operations comprised two landings at separated points. Sitka, on the Isle de Port Cros about 650 men and the Isle du Levant about 1300; Romeo, consisted of a raiding party of 75 men to take out the defenses of Cap Negre and the landing of the main body of troops about 750 men and two 57mm A/T guns at le Rayol, two and one half miles to the eastward. The zero hour for the main assault in each operation was 0130 zone minus two time. In each, an advance party landed at Zero minus 60 to mark the landings and prepare scaling equipment, in the case of the islands, and to take out the defenders on Cap Negre with the knife. Secrecy and stealth in approach and landing were important factors.

2. The Zero hour for the landings was the subject of long discussions. There was slightly over six hours of total darkness on the night of 14-15 August in Latitude 42. The naval demands that the force be outside the circle of visibility of coast watchers as it advanced in the failing light and the Army demand for sufficient time to insure their accomplishing their task before dawn revealed their movements were difficult to reconcile, especially since dawn also marked the arrival of the transports.

3. On 9 August 1944, the Naval Commander Western Task Force placed into effect plans for the execution of operation DRAGOON. H-hour was set for 0800, 15 August.

4. Upon receipt of this signal, vessels of Task Force 86 were undergoing training in ports as noted below:

CASTELLABATE - PRINCE HENRY, PRINCE BAUDOUIN, ROPER, GREENE, TATTNALL, OSMOND INGRAM, BARRY.

AGROPOLI - PRINCE DAVID, PRINCESS BEATRIX, PRINCE ALBERT.

These groups with CARMICK and THEMISTOCLES as escorts, to sail at 1200, 11 August for PROPRIANO.

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NAPLES - AUGUSTA, DIDO, SOMERS, GLEAVES, LOOKOUT - to sail at
2100, 12 August for PROPRIANO.

MADDALENA - Minesweeping Group - to depart on the 12th, arriving
at PROPRIANO on 13 August. Leave PROPRIANO 1330, 14
August to arrive Assault Area first light, 15 August.

BASTIA - ARB Diversion Group - Arrive 9 August and install RCM
equipment. Depart for PROPRIANO on 13 August.

AJACCIO - HACKBERRY and PEPPERWOOD. HACKBERRY to depart 12 Aug-
ust for PROPRIANO and depart from that port with Mine-
sweeping Group for assault area. PEPPERWOOD to depart
16 August with light indicator net and equipment for
assault area.

5. On 13 August, all vessels and troops assigned to Task
Force 86, less LORRAINE, PEPPERWOOD and PT Screening Group, were
present at Propriano. THEMISTOCLES became a part of this Task
Force. Commander Task Force 86 held a series of conferences and
final briefings aboard the AUGUSTA on 13 August for all units part-
icipating in the SITKA assault phase.

6. Departing Propriano at 1130 of the following day, this
Task Force had an uneventful passage. Although its movements had
been reported by enemy reconnaissance planes, no interference was
encountered. Radar stations in the vicinity of Toulon "beamed" on
this group were effectively jammed by countermeasure units aboard
ships and shore stations on Corsica, in accordance with plan.

7. Weather conditions prevailing during approach were ideal.
A calm sea and winds of four to five knots from 200°T augured well
for debarkation operations. Temperature remained steady at 79°F.
Cumulus clouds at an altitude of about 8,000 feet interspersed a
starry sky but permitted sufficient illumination to enable landing
craft to identify prominent land marks and landing areas.

8. Approach was made without incident. No sign of enemy
activity was noted as the Task Force, at 2156, reached point "CB"
approximately ten miles to the southeastward of LEVANT. Despite a
low ground mist, the sharp outlines of LEVANT and PORT CROS were
clearly visible with the aid of glasses to personnel aboard vessels.
From point "CB" ships of this force proceeded to assigned transport,
patrol and gunfire support areas. To the westward, PT boats main-
tained their patrols to protect the main group while to the north-
ward, the ARBs accompanied the ROMEO Group prepared to carry out
diversion plans should the enemy be alerted.

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9. Even as transports slowed and stopped in assigned unloading areas, boats were lowered over ship's sides. From LSIs were lowered the LCAs which had proved so practical for quiet approaches, while APDs quietly dropped LCP(R)s to tow in the assault waves.

10. To each beach or "scramble" point to be approached was assigned a Beach Marker and Security Party. Consisting of twenty-seven Army personnel and three Navy scouts, each trained group was now ready to carry out its assigned task of preparing and marking landing sites for main assault troops.

11. LCAs and the LCP(R)s assembled on PTs lying to with idled engines in vicinity of unloading areas. At 2317, first waves were headed toward shore. Leading the advance units were PTs which had been ordered to approach within 3,000 yards of preselected landing sites, get definite fixes by radar and direct towing craft to proper areas. Behind these "lead-in" craft, LCAs and LCP(R)s, towing small rubber boats containing ten men each and having on board scout units equipped with kayaks and electric surfboards, maintained regular formation.

12. During the approach, a westerly set of about one knot was encountered. With the aid of radar and PPI equipment, PT boats obtained excellent fixes during the run in toward the beach. Approach was made at a speed of slightly over four knots.

13. Approaching within 3,000 yards, PTs stopped to permit towing craft to come alongside, receive final bearings and courses before proceeding inshore. With engines idled, PT boats remained on designated stations to act as guides for incoming waves and to furnish light weapon gunfire support to landing forces if required.

14. Leading units of the Sitka ABLE and BAKER advance waves encountered minor difficulties in effecting landings on preselected sites. Approaches were made to within 1,000 yards of the beach by LCP(R)s at which point rubber boats were released and paddled ashore. LCAs released their tows at approximately 750 yards from the landing areas. Scouts aboard kayaks and electric surfboats preceded rubber craft toward land and after orientating themselves by means of landmarks, "led-in" security parties by means of small portable lights. Upon landing, advance assault troops secured defense positions overlooking beaches and selected and prepared suitable areas for debarkation of incoming troops of the main assault waves.

15. In the ROMEO theater, difficulty was encountered in

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effecting landings on designated sites as a result of westerly set and a ground haze.

16. Upon approaching a point believed to be 750 yards from the right extremity of RAYOL Beach, 258-C, an LCA of the ROMEO group debarked a scout team, Lieut. JOHNSON and Major RENAUD on an electric surfboard. Approaching in the vicinity of Beach 258-B (1/4 mile to the westward of RAYOL), the scouts landed to identify and to check landmarks then proceeded to the eastward to 258-C to "lead-in" following craft by blue signal light. The light was not picked up by incoming boats with the result that the main party landed on Beach 258-B. Beach 258-C was under fire of small arms and mortar. This was avoided at the landing to the westward which did not come under fire until later.

17. Two LCAs towing rubber boats loaded with 75 commandos, to whom had been assigned the task of capturing enemy defenses on CAPE NEGRE prior to zero-hour, found themselves to the westward of the Cape. Lieutenant J. F. BRIDGEN, RNVR, in the leading LCA, turning sharply to starboard managed to maneuver around the point and effect landings on the rocks on the eastern side of CAPE NEGRE. At the moment of making the sharp turn, LCAs were illuminated and fired upon. The second craft, unable to maneuver was forced on the rocks under a hail of bullets. With exemplary discipline fire was withheld. Landing was successfully made on POINT LAYET by half the party where the commandos scaled the cliffs and carried out the plan, joining their group on CAPE NEGRE. As a result of striking submerged rocks on LAYET the LCA was damaged. Two members of its crew jumped into the water and after great effort managed to refloat it. While still under enemy fire, the boat cleared the area but Acting Leading Seaman Edward SMITH, Official Number C/JX 17687500 did not return aboard. Last seen in the water he was heard to shout, "Carry on, I can swim." This was the only casualty suffered by boats' crew in landings in operation SITKA.

18. Landings of main assault troops of the SITKA Force encountered slight delays. Occasioned by the over loading of the OSMOND INGRAM, one of whose LCP(R)s towed 13 rubber boats, and some delay in display of signal lights ashore, troops were five to twenty-five minutes late.

19. Some random small arms firing ashore was noted during the approach but no gunfire was directed against troops while waterborne.

20. Taken completely by surprise, enemy troops on LEVANT

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later revealed that they had no indication of landings being effected. On PORT CROS, prisoners of war stated that the rubber boats were noted approaching the island but before guns located in the vicinity of PORT MAN could be brought to bear, craft had disappeared from view under cover of overhanging ledges; a few minutes later, these defending troops were surrounded and captured.

21. Except in the case of ROMEO Units, all troops managed to land on designated beaches. French Commandos, as did scouts previously, effected landings on Beach 258-B and upon realizing their mistake took advantage of the lack of enemy opposition and promptly worked their way inland.

22. LCMS loaded with equipment and supplies for the islands arrived off unloading areas an hour and a half after zero-hour. On PORT CROS and LEVANT land mines and small enemy pockets of resistance which endangered landings of these craft were effectively neutralized and vessels were later unloaded without casualty. Red beach over which supplies were being landed was a rocky ledge where LCV(R)s had difficulty in maneuvering. Supplies were shifted in some instances to LCA to facilitate handling.

23. The four LCMS designated to ROMEO Forces made the same mistake as all former units of that group and landed on Beach 258-B. By the time these craft reached shore, all main assault units had departed from the beach. Unloading proceeded smoothly until three boats had been emptied. French Army officers, after surveying the terrain, apparently considered it impracticable to make an effective exit from this beach. As a result, almost all equipment, including bicycles, jeeps and guns, was reloaded aboard LCMS. Lieutenant W. SNELLE, RNVR, in charge of this boat wave, had no interpreter to obtain details other than that Army leaders wanted the equipment landed on RAYOL Beach. At about this time, LCMS were taken under heavy mortar fire by enemy batteries in the vicinity of RAYOL. Lieutenant SNELLE returned his loaded LCMS to parent vessels in the transport area.

24. Transports of the Sitka BAKER Group maneuvered from unloading areas enroute to designated retirement rendezvous at about 0435. Five minutes later a salvo fired by the SOMERS in patrol area three broke the stillness of the night. Breaking radio silence immediately, the SOMERS reported that she had two unidentified vessels on her radar approaching the SITKA Force and had taken them under fire.

25. Approaching from the vicinity of MARSEILLES, the two hostile craft, subsequently identified as the German Corvettes SG

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21 (SCHNELL GELEIT) and COMOCIO, were at 0329 noted to be on an easterly course which would carry them to the southward of the THEMISTOCLES in patrol area four. Closing the strangers, the SOMERS challenged with searchlight. Failing to receive a reply, she opened fire by radar without illumination.

26. The SOMERS' first salvo was directed at the COMOCIO which turned to northerly course. That some of the shots found their target is not doubted as the vessel immediately slowed speed. Having reached a disadvantageous position, the SOMERS reversed course and closed the second vessel which proved to be the larger of the two. This ship, the SG 21 (SCHNELL GELEIT) was on a northerly course and approximately 5,000 yards distant and making heavy black smoke. Manoeuvring radically, this second target attempted to escape but SOMERS at 25 knots closed and at 2,890 yards fired a full broadside. A few seconds later the SCHNELL GELEIT burst into flames which spread rapidly with detonations from stem to stern.

27. Departing from unloading areas to seaward, the TATTNALL and PRINCE BAUDOUIN were unable to rendezvous in designated rendezvous due to illumination throughout the vicinity resulting from the burning craft. These vessels steamed to the southwest and remained there until after daylight.

28. At 0520, the SOMERS, returned to and opened fire on the first ship. The first salvo, at a range of less than 3,000 yards, struck the COMOCIO and stopped her dead in the water and killed the crews of the 4.5 bow guns and 50mm. A few bursts of 20mm guns on the damaged vessel was the only return fire. The crew abandoned the ship. A boarding party from SOMERS removed books and papers including charts of minefields and communication documents. A few minutes after the departure of the boarding party, the COMOCIO sank at 0703.

29. Boats from transports and PTs searched the area. A total of 99 prisoners were picked up from the two enemy vessels, twelve (12) of which were casualties. Most of the injured were suffering from burns. They were subsequently put aboard LSIs for further transfer to CORSICA.

30. First waves of bombers appeared over prearranged targets at 0610. The aerial bombardment, by heavy, medium and dive bombers, continued until 0730, in accordance with plan. No enemy air opposition was noted. In the SITKA area, bombing was carried out only against Cape BENAT due to presence of troops ashore. The Commandos reported, however, being bombed to eastward of Cape NEGRE.

31. At 0450, a report was received from Colonel WALKER, U.S.

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Army, Commanding the First Special Service Force, that the enemy battery on the northeastern tip of LEVANT had been captured.

32. LCMS of the ROMEO Group returned to their respective parent ships fully loaded just prior to 0700. After conferences with Commander Task Force 86, Lieutenant Commander AKERMAN, R.N., was ordered to unload these craft on ALPHA beaches.

33. After considerable efforts to make contact with troops of the ROMEO Force, communications were established between shore fire control parties and the DIDO, using British sets 22 and 58. At 0655, that force encountered stiffening enemy opposition in the vicinity of CAVALIERE (coordinates 330030). At the same time, it was reported that little fighting was taking place and operations were well ahead of schedule.

34. To clear enemy resistance and break up a concentrated attack on the Commandos the DIDO fired the first salvos against enemy troops to the westward of that area, resulting in the capture of 50 of the enemy. AUGUSTA and DIDO supported the French Commandos attack at about 1130.

35. At 0830, the PRINCESS BEATRIX, PRINCE DAVID, PRINCE BAUDOUIN, PRINCE ALBERT, ROPER BARRY, GREENE and OSMOND INGRAM sailed for Ajaccio to deliver prisoners, casualties and pick up garrison troops. The APDs returned to the assault area on 17th with garrison troops for the islands of PORT CROS, LEVANT and PORQUEROLLES. The last named were landed at Red Beach ALPHA pending capture of the island.

36. Minesweepers which had arrived in the SITKA Area at first light were ordered to sweep area ABLE for the security of transports in Cavalaire Bay.

37. An early report was received from the Commander Special Service Forces on Isle de LEVANT of the reduction of the battery on the eastern end of the island which was passed to Army and Navy commands and to CTF 84. Later Colonel WALKER reported the reduction of the island with the recommendation that it be evacuated and not garrisoned. This was undoubtedly the result of chagrin at having found the eastern battery to be dummy and the lack of organized resistance as the troops moved to the western end of the island. They had, however, passed unnoticed in the early morning light a strong point mined in and occupied by about fifty of the enemy with two 88mm mortars and five machine guns. When the enemy opened fire casualties were sustained and reported with request for medical aid in the transports. PRINCE HENRY had departed with a full sick bay

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and TATTNALL, the one APD remaining, had transferred her medical team to the island. After the transmission of these messages no further contact could be made with the commanding officer to clarify the situation. This resulted in the despatch by the Commanding General 7th Army of an officer to land for more complete details. He reported on the Flagship at sundown accompanied by Secretary of the Navy, FORRESTALL and party. They were landed on Yellow beach at last light and returned about 2200. Report of the fall of the strong point at 2230 was received later in the night.

38. The Secretary's party remained for the night on the Flagship which cruised in the vicinity of LEVANT screened by PLUNKETT and GLEAVES. SOMERS remained in support of the troops on PORT CROS. DIDO screened by LOOKOUT cruised at sea.

39. The troops on LEVANT were evacuated on the 16th with about four hundred prisoners to the mainland. Garrison troops came forward and were landed on the 17th. Those destined for PORT CROS on which a pocket of resistance still existed, were landed at PORT MAN.

40. Resistance was encountered on PORT CROS shortly after landing had been effected. In the course of the day this centered in a pocket at 302869, an old Chateau Fort of heavy masonry which resisted 5" and 8" fire and two bombing runs. The RAMILLIES was borrowed from CTF 84 on the 17th. Twelve well placed rounds of 15" HE and the white flag went up. Approximately 100 prisoners were taken on the island.

41. The reduction of PORT CROS permitted the landing of the GCI on the LST 32 in Anse de PORT CROS and its erection on the western end of the island. This completed the task assigned in the SITKA Operation.

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Part III

Post Assault Period. Naval Attack on the Defenses of Toulon and Marseille and support of the Allied Armies in South France advancing on Toulon and Marseille and the Italian Border.

1. The directive for the Post Assault phase was very brief, "After the initial assault phase support the western advance of the army as directed by NCWTF. Valuable ships and limited gunfire available are to be employed only against targets of due importance. (2) Sweep areas as necessary for the support of the western advance and the clearance of Hyeres Roads."

2. The Oplan 5-44, Flare One, set up prior to the operation provided, "This force with ships and craft made available by NCWTF will engage in bombardment to repel enemy counter attacks, will bombard important targets in support of advancing troops and will, in conjunction with air forces and army forces in amphibious assault reduce island and coast defenses and will destroy enemy shipping in attack or attempted flight in advance of the Allied Armies. (2) Minesweeping operations will be conducted in the Rade Hyeres as necessary for the free movement of fire support ships. Ships and craft not immediately required in the assault area will be held in reserve."

3. Task Force Commanders 84, 85 and 87 having encountered less opposition to the landings of the main force than anticipated began releasing their gunfire support ships on D plus one, the 16th. By evening of the 17th all had been released and had reported to the Commander Support Force. Allocations of ships to the several Task Groups set up in the Support Force Oplan 5-44, Flare One, had been made by despatch and the Oplan placed in effect as of 172000B.

4. Composition of Forces.

86.2 (Left Flank Support Group) Rear Admiral Davidson, USN.
AUGUSTA (F)
PHILADELPHIA (4 VOS)
LORRAINE
GEORGES LEYGUES (F) (Deputy - Contra Amiral Jaujard, FN).
MONTCAIM
GLOIRE
LE MALIN
MC COOK
SOMERS
PLUNKETT
Plus 2 more DDs.

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- 86.3 (Assault Group) Rear Admiral Chandler, USN.
OMAHA (F)
TATTNALL
- 86.4 (Center Support Group) Rear Admiral Chandler, USN.
OMAHA (F)
*MARBLEHEAD
*CINCINNATI
QUINCY
EBERLE
MADISON
- 86.5 (Right Flank Support Group) Rear Admiral Deyo, USN.
TUSCALOOSA (F)
BROOKLYN (4 VOS)
EMILE BERTIN (F) (Deputy - Contra Amiral Auboyneau, FN).
DUGUAY TROUIN
LE TERRIBLE
LE FANTASQUE
BOYLE
CHAMPLIN
WOOLSEY
EDISON
- 86.6 (Security Group) Captain Maynard, USN. (HACKBERRY)
M/S Flotilla 5 (LARNE) SO
HACKBERRY
#PEPPERWOOD
#Net Unit
- 86.7 (Battleship Group) Rear Admiral Bryant, USN
*TEXAS
*ARKANSAS
#NEVADA
#RAMILLES

NOTE: * Reserve
Forward Reserve

5. A brief estimate which dictated the distribution of forces showed little probability of counterattacks on the beach-head, a probable rapid advance to the westward with requirement for gunfire support, the possibility of an amphibious landing on PORQUEROLLES and/or Giens, and the probability of need for some supporting fire by cruisers and destroyers on the right flank with emphasis on security from small boat raids on both flanks. It was.

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decided to advance the sweeping of Rade Hyeres and provide support for the sweepers, and commence immediately a naval effort to reduce PORQUEROLLES in view of the doubtful feasibility of taking it by amphibious assault and to push the evacuation of the troops from PORT CROS in event they should soon be required on PORQUEROLLES.

6. The plan for the reduction of PORQUEROLLES provided for a preliminary bombardment by AUGUSTA and EMILE BERTIN followed by a demand for surrender delivered by PT 215 bearing a white flag. This was carried out by a party under the command of Lieutenant Commander GRAHAM, AUGUSTA, Lt. Colonel BAXTER and Commander BATAILLE at 1330 on the 18th. Batteries on Giens took the PT under heavy fire and forced its retirement when within 2 miles of the port without receiving fire from PORQUEROLLES. Giens appeared to be as important a thorn as PORQUEROLLES and more difficult to remove.

7. Minesweeping was commenced according to plan during the assault phase. With the capture of the chart showing enemy mine free waters the Commander M/S Flotilla 5 in conference on board on the 17th was impressed with the importance of undertaking an entry channel into Rade Hyeres as soon as possible, and of extending the German channel to provide a secure area for the fire support ships. Unfortunately these orders were amended by COMESWES when sweepers encountered mines and damaged gear in an effort to enlarge the entrance through the sunken French net, resulting in the firesupport cruisers having to refuse targets on the 19th due to the rapid advance of the troops. The FANTASQUE was the first ship to enter being swept in Rade Hyeres on the 20th. While delivering supporting fire she received a hit on the center torpedo tube by a 138mm shell resulting in casualties with one man seriously hurt. Sweeping continued with the sweepers under fire from the batteries surrounding the Rade. Batteries were difficult to locate notwithstanding cruiser planes from first QUINCY and then PHILADELPHIA were detailed to assist those ships in support of the sweepers. While so engaged one plane from PHILADELPHIA with pilot and observer were shot down over Giens.

8. The French Army B had on the 19th commenced its advance on Toulon by passing through the Sixth Corps and was moving to the northward against light opposition but impeded by demolitions. The beachhead extended beyond Cap BENAT so the sweepers were able to work in the Rade without having to look behind them. The defenses of MANDRIER were an unknown quantity. Reports stated that the turrets K-20 and K-21 were both in active commission, other stated the guns to be dummies. Intelligence reported the battleship STRASBURG alongside the fuel docks at MANDRIER to be prepared to assist in

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the defense of Toulon with one triple gun turret in commission and a 6" cruiser moored alongside with six guns active. If this were true it was high time to do some new planning. To investigate the strength of the defenses it was decided to make a reconnaissance in force on the 19th of August. This involved the firing of the NEVADA, AUGUSTA and LORRAINE, screened by GLEAVES, EBERLE, KEARNY and McCOOK with OMAHA and QUINCY keeping PORQUEROLLES and Giens under surveillance. The plan was carried out AUGUSTA firing at 1609 on K-20 and observation post, NEVADA at 1617 on the STRASBOURG and LORRAINE on K-20 and K-21 at 1630. The LORRAINE lacking modern firecontrol equipment must needs pass through the smoke screen to fire as she required visible point of aim in train. Each ship fired about fifteen minutes. No retaliatory fire was observed by ships or spotting planes. This was puzzling but not for long. On the 20th the 340mm turrets came to life as did the medium batteries. K-20 and/or K-21 shortly to become known as "Big Willie" dropped shells around the BERTIN and PHILADELPHIA off PORQUEROLLES where the bombardment of that island stronghold was continuing while waiting for the Army to cut off Giens.

9. D plus five, August 20th proved to be a busy day. The Army had completed plans for the advance on Toulon to commence at 0800. Fire support ships were asked to be in position at 0530. The support plan provided for three cruisers to support the advance on Hyeres from the Rade Hyeres or Rade Bormes if the sweeping had not progressed sufficiently; PHILADELPHIA supporting sweepers from the south of PORQUEROLLES and with LE MALIN keeping that island and Giens under surveillance; MONTCALM, GEORGES LEYGUES and LORRAINE stationed south of Grande Passe with air spotting and AUGUSTA with EMILE BERTIN in the same area on call; QUINCY and LOOKOUT South of Cap Sicie and OMAHA, NEVADA, KEARNY and McCOOK South of Cape Alon, each of last named having a spotting mission continuously to engage targets of opportunity. Up to this time the movement of troops and shifting of liaison officers to the French Army had left a rather confusing situation with everyone asking questions for which there appeared few satisfactory answers.

10. All of the British cruisers had been retired to reserve through a misunderstanding. Upon receiving word that CinCMed desired a token force of one cruiser to be employed the DIDO was requested to return and the DUGUAY TROUIN to come forward. The latter had been retired with the EMILE BERTIN by 86.5 as unnecessary on the right flank. The EMILE BERTIN had been called on the 19th to provide for long range fire to overcome the failure of the sweeping in Rade Hyeres. DIDO and the TROUIN were not yet fueled at Propriano so Admiral MANSFIELD ordered BLACK PRINCE and AURORA forward. As the DUGUAY TROUIN sailed as soon as ready the BLACK PRINCE was released on the 21st. The late arrival of BLACK PRINCE and AURORA

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leftonly LE FANTASQUE to enter Rade Hyeres where she received a hit. GEORGES LEYGUES received two hits by medium calibre shells. One hit was made on the 40mm mount causing 11 casualties, one of whom later died, and fire and detonations of ammunition. The second hit carried away an antenna brace. M/L 562 sweeping the Rade Hyeres was holed by a 5 inch shell without casualty.

11. The fire on the 20th against the French cruisers and LORRAINE under Amiral JAUJARD was heavy and accurate. GLEAVES and EBERLE distinguished themselves by interposing with smoke as did LE MALIN for the PHILADELPHIA and ERICSSON for the AURORA. In fact, all the destroyers carried on gallantly throughout the operation. Denied by the long range of the shore batteries, an opportunity to retaliate with counter fire they had the uneviable task of having to become the target in order to screen their larger companion. The enemy headquarters in the Golf Hotel near Hyeres was demolished by AUGUSTA, PHILADELPHIA and later BLACK PRINCE who arrived about noon also fired on this target. Aerial bombing of Mandrier was observed. The flak was heavy and each mission lost one or two planes. K-20 and K-21 were reported to have received direct bomb hits but better evidence was had when they opened up on AURORA and MADISON at 1600, range 28,000 yds.

12. On the 21st disposition of supporting ships was little changed. Porquerolles still held out despite a brisk fire burning in the wooded section of the island. Giens was still in enemy hands and firing on the ships when opportunity afforded. Hyeres was holding out with the troops passing to the north of it. Troops were reported in sections of Toulon so fire on targets of opportunity was limited to batteries seen to be actively engaging our troops or ships. "Big Willie" became active at 1040 firing into the area south of Porquerolles.

13. At 1450 EBERLE noted a small group of men on the southwest point of Porquerolles displaying a white flag. An officer sent in to investigate reported that a number of Armenians in the German service desired to surrender having deserted their German comrades of whom there were about 150 in a fortification near the village. Other intelligence gleaned through interpreters on the Support Commander's staff led to the taking of fifty seven prisoners by the EBERLE and the destruction of two or three small boats in the harbor on the north side of the island by her gun fire observed by a PHILADELPHIA plane. These boats were to be used by the Germans to escape to the mainland that night according to the POW. At the same time a submarine was expected to take off the German Commander. However, a PT boat patrol off the Petite Passe failed to observe submarine or movement across the Passe.

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14. As there appeared to be dissention in the camp it seemed to be a good time to try another Flag of Truce. Rear Admiral CHANDLER, CTG 86.3 Assault Group was assigned the task. It appeared impracticable to load the Senegalese troops on the mainland and transport them in time so it was decided to have HACKBERRY and TATTNELL transfer a portion of the garrison on LEVANT to PORQUEROLLES and remove the prisoners. Lieut-Commander FRIEBURG of the OMAHA commanded the flag of truce party which landed from PT 556 at 1220 on the 22nd without opposition, demanded and received the surrender of 158 Germans, the commander of whom reported that about one hundred Armenians still roamed the island out of hand, probably not knowing that EBERLE had already taken off over half and was at the moment taking fourteen more from the south side of the island. HACKBERRY, TATTNELL and the landing craft were fired on by Giens during the transfer of 190 garrison troops from ship to shore. The battery was silenced by OMAHA.

15. Mandrier had been particularly active during the 22nd registering near misses on any ship of the Support that exposed herself. AUGUSTA was followed by splashes in the evening to a range of 39,000 yards. LORRAINE, AURORA and the French cruisers had taken the several batteries on the peninsula under fire day after day without apparent damage to the turrets. On the 23rd the pilot that spotted for NEVADA bombardment of K-20 and K-21 stated that first one and then the other of the turrets fired and that at the end of the shoot only K-21 was active. It is probable that NEVADA damaged K-20. In most instances single shots were fired but on occasion two splashes occurred simultaneously. On the evening of the 22nd it was decided to make the attempt to destroy the guns by a raiding party headed by Capitaine de Frigate SERRIOT of the Groupe d'Assaut stationed at Calvi. NCWTF was requested to have the party for five brought forward by PT boat. Despatch was sent to SERRIOT, the 7th Army was apprised of intentions; XII Tactical Air Force was requested to bomb at last light with fire and smoke and MACAF asked to produce a night fighter to observe and control. The date set for the raid was the night of the 23rd. The plan was approved by NCWTF, SERRIOT made ready but received despatch at such late hour that delay of one day was requested. XIIth Tactical Air Force replied, however, that the 7th Army did not agree to Mandrier being bombed and requested that no further bombing take place and that raid be called off and if it were scheduled for the twenty-third bombing could not be scheduled. The despatch was timed at 1025B.

16. On the 23rd NEVADA was stationed to fire on Mandrier, QUINCY on targets to the westward of Sicie which the troops were now attacking from the north as the Sixth Corps closed in on MARSEILLE. PHILADELPHIA still kept Giens under surveillance to protect

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the sweepers who were urged to clear an area further to the west in order to shorten the range to targets being called for in the Toulon area. Fire was being called for in the Toulon area and on Mandrier by SFCs so it was difficult to understand the Army's prohibition against bombing of Mandrier. Flak was still heavy though the naval gunfire had made an appreciable impression on that thrown at the spotting planes. A white flag had been observed for a few minutes over a battery on Giens on the 22nd by a PHILADELPHIA plane. The Assault Group was ordered to bombard at 0730 for a half hour and then present an ultimatum as had been done at Porquerolles and if accepted to land garrison troops from LEVANT, if refused to resume bombardment with assistance of PHILADELPHIA. At 0800 a white flag was again observed on Giens. Troops were brought forward. Lieutenant Commander FRIEBURG landed under a flag of truce but found the battery positions vacated and all troops withdrawn. This left only Mandrier of the island defenses of Toulon still in enemy hands with both turrets still reported active and "No Bomb" order out. It appeared that the Navy would have to do the job, as to reduce the peninsula by direct assault would be unduly costly.

17. The westward advance of the Army was so rapid that Toulon and Marseille were placed under siege practically simultaneously on the 23rd. This called for a division of support forces with ships spread over a front of over eighty miles on the left flank. At this time it was learned that French Patriots controlled area Chateaufort-LaMede-Martiques - Port de Bouc-Fos. Higher authority decided to open Port de Bouc and assigned to CTF 86. "Beginning at first light 24 August undertake sweeping operations to open Golfe de Fos and Port de Bouc approach from sector 190 degrees - 220 degrees from Port de Bouc light. Support sweepers as required by smoke and gunfire. Take measures to cope with shallow water mine fields off entrance to Port de Bouc and silence coastal batteries threatening our forces which became an additional task."

18. In order to carry out the directive it was apparent that the defenses of Marseille on the island of Pomègue and Ratonneau would have to be neutralized as would those on Cap Croisette. To reach the island batteries the mine fields southward had to be cleared with the sweepers working under the guns of Croisette. This plan for sweeping an area Mars south of Marseille had been set up and started on the 23rd in anticipation of calls for support from troops approaching Marseille. Additional sweepers were assigned and the sweeping of the channel to Gulf de Fos started on time supported by Madison. NEVADA on the 24th bombarded the fortifications on Ratonneau and Pomègues, bombardment of Mandrier having been prohibited by 7th Army command. Ban was lifted on the evening of the 24th after NEVADA had expended all but fifty rounds with ever in-

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creasing dispersion. Sailed NEVADA to Algiers to replenish from
TEXAS and MOUNT BAKER. Called up RAMILLIES.

19. Capitaine de Fregat BATAILLE was sent in to Gulf de Fos in PT 555 to approach Port de Bouc and determine the situation to land if practicable and a safe channel could be indicated by a fisherman or pilot. The boat entered the channel being swept and under fire of shore batteries in the vicinity of Carry dashed for port. The PT entered safely. Capitaine BATAILLE and Lieut. WALKER completed their inspection and sailed. Directed by fishermen in what was thought to be a safe channel the boat picked up a snag line mine blasting the stern off and killing four men on the after 40mm mount. An account of the trip is appended marked, "Appendix 1".

20. Vice Admiral HEWITT called with his Planning Officer during a bombardment of the batteries of Cap Croisette and the Frioule Islands. The sweepers in area Mars encountered many mines and came under fire of shore batteries on the 25th.

21. At the other end of the fire support area off Porquerolles which was now being used as a shelter from observation from Mandrier, LORRAINE and AURORA were carrying out a bombardment of Mandrier when about 1500, LORRAINE got a direct hit on the east turret, K-21. LORRAINE ceased fire and withdrew. AURORA who, acting as spot receiver for the LORRAINE, realized the significance of the situation immediately informed the Support Force Commander and requested authority to continue the pressure by advancing the intense bombardment planned to be carried out between 1800 and 1900. This was granted and Commanding Officer, AURORA made deputy Task Force Commander for the operation as it was considered that with the overloaded condition existing a despatch would fail to get through to Amiral Jaujard in Rade Hyeres in time to be of value. RAMILLIES and SIRIUS reported for duty about the same time as AURORA's message was received. RAMILLIES was directed by plain language to steam westward at high speed contact AURORA for briefing then take station SE of Cape Sicie to enter into the bombardment with plane spot. SIRIUS was to join AURORA who was to assemble as many ships as possible. Acting with promptness and decision AURORA assembled the MONTCALM, FANTASQUE, LORRAINE and KENDRICK and led them in close range attack against the batteries of Saint Mandrier deluging the area with fire. Due to lack of visibility RAMILLIES was unable to fire from her assigned position. GLOIRE fired from inside the minefields of Rade Hyeres. It is considered that this day marked the decline of Saint Mandrier as a serious threat to the Support Force. On the following day, the 26th, MONTCALM, LORRAINE and GLOIRE, FANTASQUE with three US destroyers again bombarded from ranges as low

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as 10,000 meters. This bombardment was followed by a demand by Army for surrender. After some considerable negotiations and without further activity on the 27th Mandrier surrendered on the 28th. X-20s last shot had been a close miss on the LORRAINE on the 26th.

22. Prisoners, fugitives from Saint Mandrier batteries taken from a small boat by KENDRICK on the 27 stated that life on the Portress was possible by remaining in the tunnels but that naval gunfire had so reduced the gun positions and killed so many of the defenders that morale was very low.

23. On the Marseille front it was possible to open Port de Bouc on the 26th. Additional minesweeping paralleling the coast to the eastward was carried out for fire support purposes but was not used except by the SOMERS in support of the sweepers.

24. It being urgently necessary to open Marseille as soon as possible it was decided to sweep a channel from area Mars into Marseille Bay forcing as far as possible with the heavy guns of the AUGUSTA supporting the sweepers. MADISON also was in support. The German General at Marseille had agreed to surrender at 1300 the 28th but could not guarantee the action of the island defenses. As the sweepers approached Rattoneau a small boat with white flag approached and offered to surrender the defenses and garrison of Isle d'If. Terms were unconditional, he was told, and the capitulation of Pomègues and Rattoneau must be included. He retired stating that a signal would be made the following morning, the 29th.

25. Captain ANSEL of the PHILADELPHIA supported by the Marine detachments from PHILADELPHIA and AUGUSTA landed on the 29th and took 890 prisoners making a total of about 1200 taken by the Support Force without assistance from ground troops.

26. This closes the narrative of the more outstanding events of the naval attack on the sea defenses of Toulon and Marseille heretofore considered impregnable to assault from seaward. The events of the support of the Allied Armies on the right flank in the vicinity of Nice and Cannes conducted by Commander Right Flank Support Group, CTG 86.5, Rear Admiral DEYO are not discussed here as they are fully covered in his excellent report, references (h), (i) and (j). The narrative of the support of the right flank from 18 August to 25 September near the Franco-Italian frontier is covered in Appendix 4.


L. A. DAVIDSON

13-8/116-3
Serial: 0216

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Appendices:

1. Report of Lieut. B. Walker, USNR relative to mining of PT #555 and opening of Port de Bouo.
2. Report of Lieut. D. E. Liane, USN on Aviation Activities of cruiser based planes and personnel,
3. Report of Lieut. H. D. Reek, USNR covering details of surrender of Islands of Ratonneau, Pomegues and D'If.
4. Support of Right Flank during period 18 August through 25 September 1944.

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Rear Adm. Chandler (CTG 86.4)
Contre Adm. Jaujard
Contre Adm. Auboyneau
USS PHILADELPHIA
USS BROOKLYN
USS AUGUSTA

1 September 1944

MEMORANDUM TO REAR ADMIRAL DAVIDSON, U.S.N.

Subject: Mission to Port de Bouc aboard PT-555.

Pursuant to your verbal orders of 24 August 1944, I accompanied Capitaine de Fregate Bataille, French Navy, on a mission to Port de Bouc on the PT-555 to determine whether the port was actually in the hands of the FFI as reported, and if so, to what extent it could be used. We departed from alongside the USS AUGUSTA at approximately 1300.

We proceeded westward past Marseilles and then northwards towards the Gulf de Fos through a north-south channel in the process of being cleared of enemy mines by a large sweeping force. Near the end of this channel we came close aboard a U.S. destroyer who notified us that coastal batteries to the eastward had straddled ships coming near the entrance of the Gulf de Fos. It is believed that the batteries were those in the Niolan or Cape Mejean area.

The other officers aboard the PT-555 were Lieutenant Stanley Livingston, Division Commander, Ensign Howard Boyce, Commanding Officer and Ensign Sterns, Executive Officer.

It was decided that we could enter the Gulf de Fos despite fire from enemy coastal batteries since we presented such a small target at long range. We entered the bay cautiously and proceeded close to the port without drawing enemy fire. Despite a two-man mine watch, we passed over a shallow mine which just cleared the bottom of the boat.

The french flag could be seen flying in more than a dozen places as we neared the port, demolished by the enemy when they left. A pilot and fisherman opened the boom and allowed us to enter the harbor. We were welcomed by cheering crowds waving french flags.

At Port de Bouc Capitaine Bataille and myself got the necessary information regarding the condition and usefulness of the port from the local authorities which included Lieutenant Granry, French Navy, in civilian clothes, who had parachuted in this area some weeks before. Through his efforts, much of the enemy attempts to make the port useless were countered. We learned that the last of the Germans had left the town on 21 August.

After about a half hour ashore, gathering the above information, we got underway to return to the AUGUSTA. Shortly after clearing the harbor entrance the Commanding Officer called all hands to general-quarters, set a two-man mine watch at the bow and began steaming at 1500 RPM, about 29 knots. A few minutes later (about 1715) a terrific blast exploded beneath our stern, carrying away the 40 mm gun and gun crew and almost everything up to the forward bulkhead of the engine-room. Enough frame-work remained to hold the engines, now submerged. The four torpedoes were immediately jettisoned and we anchored with two anchors from separate lines.

A rubber life-boat was then lowered as was a life-raft to search for the missing men. Four men were missing. One man with a broken leg, an uninjured man and a body were brought back aboard after a thorough search by those in the life-raft. Due to the strong current the life-rafts were not only unable to make headway towards the ship but were drifting away. Lieutenant Livingston, an expert swimmer, swam over to the rubber raft, a distance of over 300 yards, with the bitter end of a line to which we added all the spare line, electric cable, halyards, etc. available to make it reach. The line was kept buoyed by floatable material such as "Mae Wests" and regular life jackets at varying intervals. This made possible the return of the above mentioned men.

A french pilot boat and an open fishing boat stood out from Port de Bouc, rescuing the other searcher in the regular life-raft, thence coming alongside.

During this time we were constantly covered by a large number of fighter planes who had been attracted to us by the explosion. A navy spotting plane flew very close to us but was unable to read our light. A navy plane from the USS PHILADELPHIA landed and came close aboard to get our message concerning Port de Bouc for relay to CTF 86.

It was decided that I should attempt to make Port de Bouc, aiding an interpreter for the injured man who needed medical attention. We left with the Pharmacist's Mate and the body in the open boat. When we had gone scarcely 100 yards from the PT, a violent explosion lifted the boat in the air and threw us all headlong under water. The time was about 1805. An instant before the explosion I saw a greenish line with green floats spaced about every foot get tangled in our screw astern. I came up under the boat which seemed to be coming down on me and quickly freed my foot which got caught somewhere for an instant. The water was black in spots from the residue of the charge as I shot up nearer the surface.

As I gathered my senses I realized that everyone seemed to be all right and accounted for. The body disappeared never to be seen again and the injured man was placed on the bottom of the overturned boat where he appeared to be comfortable. The Pharmacist's Mate who was about sixty feet away from me called for help as he couldn't swim. I swam to him and reassured him he was doing fine, but got ducked under a few times in attempting to help him. Fortunately, an inflated "Mae West" floated by and then an empty ten gallon can, all of which helped calm him and keep him afloat. As a matter of fact, the situation seemed so good at this point that I decided not to take off my pistol and belt. We began drifting rapidly from the others, clinging to the boat, but the pilot boat came to our rescue, picking us up first and then those in the overturned fisherman. The injured man was put aboard without further harm and the boat up-ended and sank as the last man left go.

Right after the explosion the PHILADELPHIA plane took off before receiving our message, I learned later with regret, as we were most anxious to complete the mission by getting the word through.

We had two narrow escapes getting back to the PT - coming very close to similar lines and floats as I had seen before. I requested the pilot, Ensign Moneglia, french navy, also in civilian clothes, to go between two sets of lines rather than back down and turn around as the majority seemed to wish. It proved to be the safe way between two mines whose floats we could actually see.

Another fishing boat with Lieutenant Granry aboard came out and tied alongside. Lieutenant Livingston and Ensign Boyce attempted for a long time to get word to a US cruiser which was with the sweeping group out in the swept channel, but our portable light was not strong enough and attempts with a mirror received only spasmodic dashes, but no Roger.

We continued to jettison topside weights as the stern of the remainder of the boat sank lower. Eventually, two twin 50 cal. machine guns and the 20 mm gun and ammunition together with other top-side weights were jettisoned. One twin 50 cal. machine gun and some ammunition was not jettisoned at the request of the Commanding Officer in order to have something to open up with in case of attack. K-rations and fruit juices were brought topside to feed the crew and frenchmen.

Commander Bataille and Lieutenant Livingston set off for Carro in the rubber boat in an attempt to get the message through if they could find transportation or communication facilities of the army. I remained aboard with a duplicate message in case of visual contact with allied craft and also to serve as an interpreter with the french patriots alongside.

We had two teams of bucket brigades that night. One was comprised of the commanding officer and the crew and the other of the frenchmen and myself. About midnight the trim looked as though we might have to abandon ship prior to dawn despite the calm sea, so all preparations were made for such an event. The radar set and aerial were dismantled, destroyed and jet-tisoned and secret and classified publications and charts were made ready to be deep-sixed.

We were able to keep ahead of the water coming in, however, and the weather continued fair until daylight. The bilge pump aft had been shot away and the one forward couldn't make suction due to our being so far down by the stern.

The night was quiet except for the flashes and vibrations of the aerial bombardment which appeared to be going on in Marseilles. It was chilly and damp, but we made out fairly well by sharing blankets.

About an hour after sunrise, Commander Bataille and Lieutenant Livingston returned in a fishing boat followed by another boat. They reported that they hadn't been able to get the message through, but told of their experience of paddling by a mined gate and finding an almost deserted fishing village.

It was decided to tow the PT to Port de Bouc with two of the boats, using the other two boats ahead to search for mine lines. Commander Bataille and Lieutenant Livingston stood in the bows of the two searching craft. After going only a short distance so many of these lines were encountered that we abandoned the plan of going to Port de Bouc and headed instead for Carro, near Cap Couronne.

On arrival at Carro the PT boat was moored alongside the dock with the stern settled on the bottom. An abandoned house next to the dock was turned over to us to quarter the officers and men. Personal and living gear was taken to the house which we cleared out with the help of five Italian prisoners put at our disposal by the FFI. There were sufficient provisions aboard to take ashore to feed the men for several days.

The Commanding Officer of the PHILADELPHIA sent Ensign Pitcher and a radioman with a SECP radio ashore at the time of our arrival at Carro, to attempt to get information regarding troop dispositions and targets along the coast. It was by means of this radio that we were able to communicate with CTF 86 via the PHILADELPHIA. My 252050B reported the pocket of 3000 enemy troops in the area bounded by Ensues, La Redenne, and Rouet, only a few kilometers away whose escape was anticipated on the northern road via Martiques. The FFI strongly desired air support to prevent this maneuver as there were no Allied troops in the vicinity.

Saturday morning 26 August I proceed to Port de Bouc to gather further information. Colonel Chambers of the Army engineers had not come down again from Brignoles. Captain English, however, arrived with his party and we went over the situation together with the same local authorities. I returned that night to Carro for the night and to pick up my gear and returned to Port de Bouc the following day as USNLO.

I had asked the pastor of the Catholic church at La Couronne to say a mass on Sunday morning for the five men we had lost. A high mass was celebrated in the church, crowded to the doors at ten-thirty. The pastor and local people had gone considerable effort to decorate the church with French and American flags and flowers. The choir sang despite the broken organ and the cure gave a moving sermon in french. Four FFI men, gotten up in a uniform of french helmets, blue shirts and white trousers stood as a guard of honor before the draped coffin on which was an American flag.

After mass, our men fell in ranks behind a platoon of FFI followed by what seemed to be the whole town and marched to the World War monument. There, a little ceremony was held and a wreath was placed in honor of the five American sailors. We were told that a collection was in the process of being taken up amongst the local people in order to have a plaque made for the monument with the names of the five Americans who had given their lives for the liberation of France.

After the ceremony I proceeded to Port de Bouc and remained to help Captain English and his party until 30 August when I was relieved by Commodore Doughty's advanced base personnel. Lieutenant Livingston remained in charge of the officers and men at Carro who were subsequently to be picked up by the LST 134.

This memorandum, written at your request, is not intended to serve in any way as an official report concerning the PT 555, but rather as a brief resume of the experiences during my mission. I should like, however, to point out the highly commendable conduct of all those aboard the PT-555 who showed their skill, courage, calmness, ingenuity and obedience during many difficult hours.

/s/ BAYARD WALKER
Lt., U. S. N.R.

UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET
CRUISER DIVISION EIGHT

c/o Fleet Post Office,
New York, N. Y.,
6 September 1944.

From: Acting Squadron Commander, VCS-8.
To : Commander Cruiser Division EIGHT.
Subject: Activities of Naval Aviators in Training and
Operations with United States Army Air Force.
Enclosure: (A) Total hours in army fighter planes and
temporary duty dates for thirteen naval
aviators.

1. On 16 January 1944 four naval aviators from Cruiser Scouting Squadron EIGHT reported to the Commanding Officer, Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria for an instruction course in P-40 type aircraft. This action was initiated by Commander Cruiser Division EIGHT through Commander Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters in order that cruiser pilots might be checked out in a faster type plane in the event it was felt they might be needed for spotting naval gunfire in future operations. This first group of naval aviators, consisting of Lieut. D. A. Liane, U.S.N., Lt.(jg) M. G. Pickard, U.S.N.R., Lt.(jg) H. J. Eckardt, U.S.N.R. and Lt.(jg) R. N. Jolliffe, U.S.N.R., completed the regular training course and had a total of 109.2 hours in the P-40. They were detached to regular duties at Naval Air Facilities, Tunis, Tunisia on 4 February, 1944.

2. On 21 February 1944 Lt. D. A. Liane and Lt.(jg) M. G. Pickard reported to the Commanding Officer F.T.C., Berteaux, Algeria and picked up two P-40's and flew them to Oran, Algeria to participate in a practice shore bombardment at Arzew, Algeria. Due to extremely bad weather and visibility in that area, only a total of about five hours was flown. They were detached to regular duties on 3 March 1944.

3. The second group of naval aviators, consisting of Lieut. E. H. Lawry, U.S.N.R., Lieut. W. R. Austin, U.S.N.R., Ensign R. A. Sikes, U.S.N.R. and Ensign F. H. Markey, U.S.N.R. reported to the Commanding Officer, Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria for duty on 22 February 1944. All of these aviators, with the exception of Lieut. E. H. Lawry, completed the regular course with a total of 97.1 hours and were detached on 21 March 1944. Lt. Lawry received only 11.5 hours in the P-40 because of illness. He was detached on 28 April 1944. Lieut. E. L. Moss, U.S.N.R. reported to the Commanding Officer, Fighter Training Command on 25 March

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1944 and completed the course with 32.8 hours and was detached on 10 April 1944.

4. On 20 April 1944 the following naval aviators reported to Commander Naval Forces, Northwest African Waters, Algiers, Algeria to receive check-out instructions and flights in the P-51-C type aircraft at the Army Field, Maison Blanche: Lt. D. A. Liane, U.S.N., Lieut. E. L. Moss, U.S.N.R., Lieut. W. R. Austin, U.S.N.R., Lieut.(jg) M. G. Pickard, U.S.N.R., Lt.(jg) H. J. Eckardt, U.S.N.R., Lt.(jg) R. N. Jolliffe, U.S.N.R., Ensign R. A. Sikes, U.S.N.R., and Ensign F. H. Markey, U.S.N.R. Lieut. E. H. Lawry, U.S.N.R. reported on 28 April 1944. All pilots received instructions and were given flights totaling 68.3 hours before being detached on 6 May 1944.

5. On 8 May 1944 these nine aviators plus Lt.(jg) J. A. Cooke, U.S.N.R. from the U.S.S. CATOCTIN, reported to the Commanding General XII Tactical Air Command for duty in the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. Lieut. E. H. Lawry and Lt.(jg) J. A. Cooke were detached on 30 May 1944, the former to take over as Commanding Officer of the seaplane base Palermo and the latter to return to his ship. The remainder of the aviators stayed with the squadron and, after several local flights, started flying regular army combat missions. During this period the squadron moved several times from its field then located at Santa Maria, Italy. The successive moves were as follows: first to Nettuno, Italy, then to Rome, then to Tarquinia and last to Follonica, Italy. On 8 July 1944 all naval aviators returned to the U.S.S. BROOKLYN in Naples to take part in a practice shore bombardment. During this practice both P-51 and SOC aircraft were used for spotting and it was firmly established that the P-51 could be used as a spotting plane for ships' gunfire.

6. On 14 July 1944 all of these aviators, less Lieut. D. A. Liane who was retained on Commander Cruiser Division EIGHT's staff, returned to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron in Follonica. On 21 July 1944 this squadron moved to Borgo, Corsica where they were joined on 22 July by the following naval aviators who had received their fighter training by the navy in F-6-F (Hellcats) and F-4-U (Corsairs): Lieut. S. C. Fierstein, U.S.N.R., Ensign R. Smeigocki, U.S.N.R. and Ensign M. R. Beckett, U.S.N.R. These aviators operated with the squadron during the invasion of Southern France, during which time they flew a total of ninety-six (96) spotting missions for the gunfire support ships. Just prior to D-day the following enlisted personnel from various U.S. ships reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron for duty to assist in the maintenance of P-51s assigned to the navy aviators:

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U.S.S. ARKANSAS, Davenport, John C. 224-33-12, ARM1/c, U.S.N., Antonavage, Anthony A. 243-88-25 AMM1/c, U.S.N., Hoehl, Elmer G., 224-04-04, AOM2/c, U.S.N. and Kovach, John (n) Jr., 612-66-03, AMM2/c, U.S.N.R. U.S.S. AUGUSTA, Rinella, A. J., 393-24-70, ACRM, U.S.N., Swanson, H. J., 646-13-61, AOM2/c, U.S.N., Dollevact, A. J., 300-30-15, AMM2/c, U.S.N., and Stoddant, R. R., 224-54-73, AMM3/c, U.S.N. U.S.S. TUSCALOOSA, Jones, H. C., 262-54-52, ACMM, U.S.N., Dunaway, W. M., 350-99-58, ARM1/c, U.S.N., Sersen, R. B., 258-27-86, AOM1/c, U.S.N., Trojanowski, W. J., 807-21-37, AMM3/c, U.S.N. and O'Conner, J. J., 300-97-94, Seal/c, U.S.N., and Shank, Edward J., 874-84-93, AOM3/c, U.S.N.R. The cooperation and work of these men on planes and equipment of which they had little knowledge was highly commendable.

7. On 2 September all naval aviators and personnel were detached from the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and ordered to report back to their respective ships. During the period from 8 May 1944 and 2 September 1944 the thirteen naval aviators who had been attached to the army squadron flew a total of 776.5 hours and 248 combat sorties without damage to any plane except for minor damage due to enemy flak encountered.

8. It is the opinion of all naval aviators concerned that the P-51 is an ideal plane for use in the spotting of naval gunfire.

/s/ D. A. LIANE

APPENDIX 2

ENCLOSURE (A)

LIANE, D.A., Lieut., U.S.N.

Reported to Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 16 January, 1944 and was detached on 4 February, 1944. Total hours flown - 25.1. Type of plane - P-40.

Reported to Army field Maison Blanche, Algiers, Algeria on 20 April, 1944 and was detached on 6 May, 1944. Total hours flown 7.8. Type of plane - P-51-C.

Reported to 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 10 July, 1944. Total hours flown - 19.7. Number of missions - 6. Type of plane P-51.

LAWRY, E.H., Lieut., U.S.N.R.

Reported to Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 22 February, 1944 and was detached on 28 April, 1944. Total hours flown - 11.5. Type of plane - P-40.

Reported to Army field Masion Blache, Algiers, Algeria on 28 April, 1944 and was detached on 6 May, 1944. Total hours flown 6.0. Type of plane - P-51-C.

Reported to 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 30 May, 1944. Total hours flown - 6.0. Type of plane - P-51.

MOSS, E. L., Lieut., U.S.N.R.

Reported to Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 25 March, 1944 and was detached on 10 April, 1944. Total hours flown - 32.8. Type of plane - P-40.

Reported to Army field Maison Blanche, Algiers, Algeria on 20 April, 1944 and was detached on 6 May, 1944. Total hours flown 6.6. Type of plane - P-51-C.

Reported to 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 133.8. Number of missions - 50. Type of plane - P-51.

AUSTIN, W. R., Lieut., U.S.N.R.

Reported to Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 22 February, 1944 and was detached on 21 March, 1944. Total hours flown - 30.5. Type of plane - P-40.

Reported to Army field Maison Blanche, Algiers, Algeria on 20 April, 1944 and was detached on 2 May, 1944.

ENCLOSURE (A) (cont'd)

Total hours flown - 7.5. Type of plane - P-51-C.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 121.5. Number of missions - 32. Type of plane P-51.

FIERSTEIN, S. C., Lieut., U.S.N.R.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Borgo, Corsica on 22 July, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 45.0. Number of missions - 15. Type of plane - P-51.

COOKE, J. A., Lieut. (jg), U.S.N.R.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 30 May, 1944. Total hours flown - 10.0. Type of plane - P-51.

PICKARD, M. G., Lieut. (jg), U.S.N.R.

Reported to Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 16 January, 1944 and was detached on 4 February, 1944. Total hours flown - 22.6. Type plane - P-40.

Reported to Army field Maison Blanche, Algiers, Algeria on 20 April, 1944 and was detached on 6 May, 1944. Total hours flown 7.2. Type of plane - P-51-C.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 60.6. Number of missions - 18. Type plane P-51.

ECKARDT, H. J., Lieut. (jg), U.S.N.R.

Reported to Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 16 January, 1944 and was detached on 4 February, 1944. Total hours flown - 27.0. Type plane - P-40.

Reported to Army field Maison Blanche, Algiers, Algeria on 20 April, 1944 and was detached on 6 May, 1944. Total hours flown 7.0. Type of plane - P-51-C.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 83.0. Number of missions - 27. Type plane - P-51.

ENCLOSURE (A) (cont'd)

JOLLIFFE, R. N., Lieut.(jg), U.S.N.R.

Reported to Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 16 January, 1944 and was detached on 4 February, 1944. Total hours flown - 34.5. Type plane - P-40.

Reported to Army field Maison Blanche, Algiers, Algeria on 22 April, 1944 and was detached on 6 May, 1944. Total hours flown - 7.5. Type plane - P-51-C.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 60.1. Number of missions - 22. Type plane - P-51.

SIKES, R. A., Ensign, U.S.N.R.

Reported to the Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 22 February, 1944 and was detached on 21 March, 1944. Total hours flown - 34.8. Type plane - P-40.

Reported to Army field Maison Blanche, Algiers, Algeria on 22 April, 1944 and was detached on 6 May, 1944. Total hours flown - 10.4. Type plane - P-51-C.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 96.5. Number of missions - 33. Type plane - P-51.

SMEIGOCKI, R. (n), Ensign, U.S.N.R.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Borgo, Corsica on 22 July, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 27.5. Number of missions - 11. Type plane - P-51.

BECKETT, M. R., Ensign, U.S.N.R.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron at Borgo, Corsica on 22 July, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 41.0. Number of missions - 13. Type plane - P-51.

MARKEY, F. H., Ensign, U.S.N.R.

Reported to Fighter Training Command, Berteaux, Algeria on 22 February, 1944 and was detached on 21 March, 1944. Total hours flown - 31.8. Type plane - P-40.

Reported to the Army field Maison Blanche, Algiers, Algeria on 20 April, 1944 and was detached on 6 May, 1944. Total hours

ENCLOSURE (A) (cont'd)

flown - 8.3. Type plane - P-51-C.

Reported to the 111th. Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Santa Maria, Italy on 8 May, 1944 and was detached on 2 September, 1944. Total hours flown - 71.8. Number of missions - 21. Type plane - P-51.

COMMANDER CRUISER DIVISION EIGHT

MEMORANDUM

2 September 1944.

To: Rear Admiral L. A. Davidson, U.S.N.

Subject: Summarization of Events in Connection with the Surrender of Islands Pomegues and Rattonneau, and Fortress d'If.

1. The persistent resistance of German garrison forces on the islands Pomegues, Rattonneau and Fortress d'If after three days' punishing naval and air bombardment assumed new importance in naval tactics when the city of Marseilles was invested by Allied forces on 28 August. Since these islands command the entire water-front of Marseilles, the harbor channels and the seaward approach, Commander Task Force 86 was denied safe sweeping of channels through the harbor and making the port available to Allied shipping. Therefore, the immediate reduction of the islands was imperative.

2. That could have been attained by reassumption of naval and air bombardment had not the enemy himself on 28 August indicated desire to surrender. This information, conveyed in person by German officers of the islands to the U.S.S. MADISON, was communicated directly to Commander Task Force 86, whose reply to the MADISON was to accept surrender only on unconditional terms. The enemy, in no position to choose a captor, firmly stated its preference to surrender to U.S. forces, not French, whom it would fight if the latter attempted to take the islands. The MADISON, relaying this to Commander Task Force 86, was reminded that "We are on the French Forces' side."

3. Matters stood thus the night of 28 August, while Commander Task Force 86 drafted formal terms for the surrender, which he chose to be negotiated the following day by Captain Walter Ansel, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA.

4. The detachment of U.S. Marines set out by order of Commander Task Force 86 at high noon, 29 August, to assist Captain Ansel in his negotiations with the enemy. The detachment consisted of Capt. F. R. Schlesinger, U.S.M.C., 1st Lt. W. H. McDaniel, U.S.M.C., and fifty nine (59) men from the U.S.S. AUGUSTA, and 1st Lt. R. A. Thompson, U.S.M.C., 2nd Lt. H. A. Cable, U.S.M.C.R., and 40 men from the U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA. The AUGUSTA Marine Force was augmented by 2 PhMs, 2PhoMs, 1 SM; 1 RM, and 1 S2c (interpreter); the PHILADELPHIA, by 1 CY, 1 PhoM, and two other enlisted men. The AUGUSTA group embarked in YMS 28; the PHILADELPHIA group, in YMS 248. A third YMS, the 83, took the lead and the three proceeded to the Island of Rattonneau escorted by the MADISON with Captain Ansel aboard.

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5. At 1420 an advantageous position to the Island of Ratonneau was reached. The YMS 83 closed the MADISON, embarked Captain Ansel, and lay to off Port du Frioul. One hour passed before a 75' boat, flying a white flag, appeared from the Port to approach and come alongside the YMS 83. Captain Ansel shortly thereafter departed for the island in a motor whaleboat provided by the MADISON, and the Marines were soon ordered to land.

6. The conference for surrender, conducted on the veranda of a bombed barracks building, was composed of Captain Ansel, Kapitän Leutnant H. Fullgrabe (senior officer of the islands), and the latter's junior officers. Lt. J. L. Nuelsen, U.S.N.R., temporarily on duty with Admiral Davidson's staff, interpreted. Upon acceptance of the terms of surrender, at 1816, Captain Ansel instructed the Marine officers to expedite assembling of prisoners to board LCI's which he had requested to be sent to Port du Frioul, but to leave skeleton crews of prisoners on the islands for removal of demolition charges. 1st Lt. Thompson took nineteen (19) Marines to Fortress d'If to carry out this order; Capt. Schlesinger assumed command of Marines remaining on Ratonneau. At about 1830 Captain Ansel returned to the PHILADELPHIA.

7. Prisoners continued to arrive until 2245, singly or in groups under command of their own officers. Rifles and machine guns were stacked in piles. Search of prisoners revealed no concealed weapons, and they were placed in a large, barbed wire enclosure under guard for the night.

8. At 2000 the ships standing by were disposed as follows: LCI's 234, 674, 562 nested along mole in Port du Frioul; LCI 42, standing off Fortress d'If; LCI 953 standing off Port du Frioul with Comdr. J. W. Murphy, USN, CTG 84.2 aboard.

9. There were no untoward incidents during the night. Although heavy Marine guard was posted, this was hardly necessary, as the prisoners were perfectly self-disciplined. Curfew at 2030 was strictly observed.

10. At 0630, 30 August, evacuation of thirty (30) German wounded commenced from the hospital. The eight (8) stretcher cases were conveyed by ambulance (the only automobile on the islands, an Oldsmobile in good condition) to LCI 562. Included in this group were the Medical Officer, sixteen (16) hospital corpsmen (sanitätssoldaten), five (5) French women hospital "assistants," and six (6) French women who had been serving in various capacities at Battery Brigantine on Pomegues.

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11. During the remainder of the morning and early afternoon the other prisoners were conducted in groups to the LCI's. Although provision had been made for certain skeleton crews to remain on the islands, it was necessary, upon receipt of orders from Commander Task Force 86, to recall them from their batteries in order to evacuate everyone. This entailed a slight delay, but by 1800 all prisoners, Marines and Naval personnel were distributed in LCI's 953, 234, 42, 674, and 562, and en route to Yellow Beach in the Delta area. Prisoners were discharged to Army authorities on this beach at 0530, 31 August. AUGUSTA personnel returned to ship at 0630.

12. Information gained from observation and prisoner interrogation:

CONDITION OF BUILDINGS AND INSTALLATIONS ON RATTONNEAU

Scarcely a building on Rattonneau has not sustained bomb or shellfire damage in some measure. The interiors of the barracks building, the former quarry workshops, the French hospital, the telephone exchange and French magazines are in ruins. The hangar which the French apparently had used for lighter-than-air craft is utterly delapidated. Flimsy wooden barracks on Point du Banc are matchwood. Battery Le Banc is completely reduced. On the other hand, roads are in fine condition. Two caves cut out of solid rock were inspected; one, an extensive U-shaped tunnel which served adequately as a hospital; another, a refuge barracks forty (40) feet below surface under an anti-aircraft mount.

BOATS AND NAVIGATIONAL LIGHTS

Only two (2) boats were discovered in the Port du Frioul. The Officer in Charge of the Harbor Patrol stated there were no others on the islands.

(a) One 75' boat used for transporting sick and wounded. Red cross symbols painted on sides. Only one engine operating.

(b) One 75' French passenger boat, accommodating 30 people. Used for liberty parties between the islands and Marseilles. Name: La Canabiere. Compressed air generator broken; otherwise stated to be in good condition.

It was stated that there were no navigational lights on rocks or promontories. No lighted buoys.

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BATTERIES, AMMUNITION, MINE FIELDS, BOOBY TRAPS.

Kapitän Leutnant Füllgrabe described the six batteries on the islands as follows:

Battery Caveaux	4 - 138 mm.	3 serviceable; 1 repairable.
	3 - 20 mm.	
	2 - 37 mm.	antiaircraft.
	1 - 37 mm.	for land fighting.

Battery Brigantine	6 - 155 mm.)	Destroyed by Air Force.
	1 - 150 mm.)	
	4 - 20 mm.	Serviceable.
	1 - 37 mm.	Serviceable.

Battery Le Banc	4 - 75 mm.	anti-aircraft.
	3 - 20 mm.	
	1 - 75 mm.	for land fighting.
	2 - 37 mm.	for land fighting.

Note: Officer in Charge of this battery stated that everything was partially or totally destroyed by Air Force.

Anti Aircraft Battery	6 - 88 mm.	3 destroyed by Air Force, 3 serviceable.
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	3 - 20 mm.	1 destroyed by Air Force, 2 serviceable.
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Fortress d'If	3 - 75 mm.	all serviceable.
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Harbor Battery	1 - 47 mm.	unusable. Lack of parts.
	2 - 15 mm.	unusable. Lack of parts.
	2 - 20 mm.	unusable. Lack of parts.

The 20 mm, 88 mm, 150 mm and part of the 37 mm batteries were German guns; the rest, French.

Reserve ammunition was stated to exist in large quantities, but no accurate, or even approximate, estimate could be submitted. The Officer in Charge of Battery Le Banc asserted that his positions had been so completely destroyed that it was impossible for him even to find his guns, let alone gain access to his records and magazines in the ruins. (Later examination

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of Le Banc proved this correct. This battery resembles a gigantic pile of coarse gravel.) Inspection of the French hospital, however, disclosed about six hundred (600) cases of 75 mm shells, each case containing six (6), and two hundred (200) boxes of detonating fuzes, twelve (12) to a box. There were ample quantities of 30 cal. ammunition in the vicinity of the barracks.

Eight (8) mine fields were described, each 30' x 30', and conspicuously marked. Five (5) fields on Pomegues; three on Ratonneau.

Two (2) booby traps, dismantled, were discovered in the electric generating plant and barracks building. German officers stated that booby traps on the islands were very few and none were set to explode.

EFFECTS OF NAVAL GUNFIRE

Against the statement of the German officers that air bombardment was more destructive than Naval gunfire must be weighed the fact that the Air Force concentrated more on this target than the Naval forces.

The AUGUSTA engaged the island targets only on 25 and 26 August, expending 151 rounds. On the same days she was threatened by batteries on Cap Croisette which she took under fire so that mine sweepers could clear that area. 203 rounds were expended on Cap Croisette. Had the AUGUSTA not been low on ammunition and had she been able to move closer to island targets, gunfire from this ship would have had more telling effect.

The amount of bombs dropped by the Air Force on the islands is not yet known.

CASUALTIES

Eight (8) dead; thirty (30) wounded.

MILITARY ORGANIZATION

The islands were designated Frioul Island Group (Insulgruppe Frioul) in the coastal defense command. Kapitän Leutnant Fullgrabe stated that, whereas he was the Commanding Officer of Battery Brigantine, his function as senior officer of the island garrisons pertained only to maintenance of order and discipline. Central military control in Marseilles directed

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the firing of batteries.

APPEARANCE AND MORALE

Ages of prisoners ran from 16 to 53 years; all seemed to be in good health. Drinking water, which had to be brought over from the mainland, was amply supplemented by wines and cognac. Examination of barracks disclosed plentiful supplies of personal equipment and comforts.

Remarks were heard on every hand of relief at not having been taken prisoner by the French. Therein lies the reason for the ease with which our forces took over the islands after surrender. We had no difficulty with the enlisted prisoners, and the officers frequently took the initiative in supplying information.

On the night of 29 August the prisoners in the stockade sat up late singing songs and exchanging jokes. Several spoke English, and one of our guards was astonished to hear a voice from crowd, "Hey, Marine, how's everything in Jersey City?"

MISCELLANEOUS

Orders to abandon the islands completely on 30 August cancelled the plan of Capt. Schlesinger to make a thorough inspection of batteries and installations. However, it is to be noted that the statements of prisoners were truthful in all cases which could be checked, and the assumption is reasonable that the statistics submitted are accurate.

The final count of prisoners was 887 enlisted men and 10 officers.

Respectfully submitted,

H. D. RECK

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Subject: Support of Right Flank during period 18 August
through 25 September 1944.

1. Commander Task Force 86 operation plan No. 5-44 designated Rear Admiral M. L. DEYO, U.S. Navy, Commander Cruiser Division Seven, as Commander Task Group 86.5. To this group the following vessels were assigned:

(a) TUSCALOOSA (F)	1 CA
(b) BROOKLYN, EMILE BERTIN (F), DUGUAY TROUIN	3 CLs
(c) LE TERRIBLE, LE FANTASQUE, WOOLSEY, BOYLE, CHAMPLIN, EDISON	6 DDs

2. Enemy naval surface forces were not considered a serious threat to the fire support activities of TF 86 on the right flank. According to intelligence estimates not more than two or three corvettes, five to six E-Boats, eight to ten MAS boats and an undetermined number of explosive boats were believed operationally capable of attacking Allied Naval Forces in this area. Sub-surface or submergible enemy forces consisted of not more than one and possibly two U-boats and an undetermined number of limpeteers, human torpedoes and midget submarines.

3. Enemy naval traffic consisted primarily of F-lighters; small fast coastal freighters; Siebel ferries; and small freight barges which were plying principally between the ports of San Remo, Imperia, Savona, Genoa and La Spezia. It was believed that this traffic was transporting materials, supplies and ammunition from Turino via railroad to the Mediterranean coast and thence to Kesselrings Army in Italy (since the supply routes throughout the Po valley were under constant allied air attack).

4. With the 36th Division U.S. Army encountering little enemy opposition and little occasion to use naval gunfire support, Rear Admiral DEYO ordered the TUSCALOOSA with two destroyers to depart on the 18th to Propriano for fuel and ammunition. As French units had not reported to the right flank, only the BROOKLYN with two screening vessels remained to furnish gunfire support to that division.

5. During the night of 18-19 August, while in night retirement area, the BROOKLYN was taken under attack by two JU-88s. These planes were believed to have been homed by enemy coastal radar which that vessel had been jamming. No casualties were reported. However, to insure greater safety for vessels of this force, permission was granted to use night retirement areas further to the westward which had previously been assigned to DELTA Forces.

6. First indications that vessels on the right flank could expect more activity were received in a dispatch from Naval Commander Western Task Force. At 1330, on the 19th, he notified Rear Admiral DEYO that the First Airborne Division would relieve the 36th

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Infantry Division at noon of the following day. As the incoming division had little artillery, naval support was considered essential.

7. The TUSCALOOSA and escorts sailed from Propriano and arrived in the Golfe de la Napoule at three o'clock during the afternoon of 20 August. No major activity was noted and the turning over of the army divisions was carried out without incident.

8. General FREDERICK, in command of the First Airborne Unit, notified Commander Task Group 86.5 that he intended to advance towards Grasse and Cannes commencing on the 22nd. Some harassing artillery fire had been encountered by Army units during the night; guns appeared to be located in the Cannes-St. Marguerite areas. After briefing of the five Shore Fire Control Parties to accompany advancing troops, plans for the support of General FREDERICK's forces were drawn up.

9. During the past fourteen months, Commander Task Force 86 had seen considerable action against German troops. In Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, Gaeta, Formia and now at Giens and Toulons, Nazi Forces had fought gallantly and stubbornly, retreating only after destroying by demolition or preparing with mines and booby traps all important military equipment. With excellent defenses and well prepared positions, it was expected that activity on the right flank would grow to major proportions.

10. Even as units of the First Airborne Division moved forward, reports were being received that enemy forces were retreating to the eastward and headed for the Franco-Italian border. Deserting the Cannes-Nice area, no effort was made by Axis troops to carry out the plans which could have made Allied advances costly and slow.

11. It is hard at this time to determine what caused German troops to hurry their retreat. It is believed that the below-listed factors were in a large measure responsible for his actions:

- (a) Lack of troops in this area.
- (b) Overwhelming Allied air superiority.
- (c) Fear of being cut off from retreat by activities of FFI Units.
- (d) Danger of encirclement as a result of amphibious landings such as those resorted to by Allied troops along North Sicily.

12. The slight harassing fire put up by last remaining German troops proved to be ineffectual and was no deterrent to the slow steady advancing airborne division. Town after town was liberated. From points of vantage well ahead of Allied front lines, vessels of

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the gunfire support group, working in conjunction with Shore Fire Control Parties or planes on spotting missions, methodically "worked over" gun positions and retreating Axis columns.

13. Against vessels at sea, there was little activity. Coastal defense guns were on the whole ineffectual in their firings or were found to be unmanned. Majority of guns which opened up on ships were of 75mm or 88mm size. No ships were damaged and guns were effectively silenced.

14. On the 26th of August, the Army "no fire" line had been extended to the Var River (just to the westward of Nice). Planes reported that no enemy activity other than steady streams of passenger cars and trucks could be noted headed from that city toward the border.

15. Since the right flank activity was somewhat static and no counterattack seemed imminent CTF 86.5 suggested on 26th August, in concurrence with the First ABTF, that CTF 86 keep two destroyers in the fire support area daily, one cruiser on one hours notice and another cruiser on four hours notice. The cruisers were to base at Golfe de Tropez. CTF 86 agreed since indications pointed to a gradual withdrawal of German forces towards the Franco-Italian border.

16. During the night of 26-27 August enemy explosive boats attempted to break through the PT screen but they were successfully repulsed. At 1142A the U.S.S. TUSCHLOOSA and U.S.S. EDISON departed for Propriano. CDD 32 in the U.S.S. BOYLE became CTU 86.5.2 leaving the U.S.S. BOYLE and CHAMPLIN the only ships remaining in the eastern area.

17. There were only sporadic calls for gunfire support during the next few days and on August 30th U.S. troops entered Nice. CDD 25 in the WOOLSEY, with the EDISON, relieved CDD 32 in BOYLE with CHAMPLIN. In accordance with Flare Two, modified, the right flank group on 31 August consisted of:

- (a) Central Group: PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN and three U.S. destroyers.
- (b) Left Flank: LORRAINE, three French CLs and 2 French destroyers.
- (c) Right Flank: Two French cruisers, 1 French destroyer and three U.S. destroyers.

At 2055 a dispatch from the Commanding General 7th Army stated he felt that no further gunfire support was needed except in support of the left flank.

18. Pending issuance of Flare Three the following organ-

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ization of CTF 86 was effective on 2 October:

- (a) TG 86.1 PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN, H.P. JONES, MADISON,
WOOLSEY, EDISON, LUDLOW and LORRAINE.
- (b) TG 86.2 MONTCALM, GEORGES LEYGUES, GLOIRE.
- (c) TG 86.3 EMILE BERTIN and DUGUAY TROUIN.
- (d) TG 86.4 TERRIBLE, FANTASQUE and LE MALIN.

19. On 3 October the First ABTF requested cruiser support in the Sospel area and the U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA was assigned targets in this vicinity. All targets were out of effective gunfire range. Numerous French flags were seen flying in Monaco and Monte Carlo indicating a complete withdrawal of German troops from this vicinity. Confirmation was received from the First ABTF the next day that American troops had reached Cape D'Ail.

20. The first human torpedoe attack on the right flank took place on 5th September. The LE MALIN and the LUDLOW destroyed at least three and possibly four human torpedoes. Three prisoners were captured, and from preliminary interrogation it was learned that the torpedoes were launched in the Menton area. As a result of this attack additional PT screens were established and daily dawn reconnaissance flights by cruiser planes were started which later proved very effective in warding off other attacks.

21. The Army called for cruiser fire on September 5 in the Monte Carlo-Sospel area and the MONTCALM fired very effectively at troops concentrating for a counterattack. As a result of naval gunfire support this counterattack was broken up. Enemy coastal defense batteries fired accurately at gunfire support ships but no damage was suffered.

22. Again on 6 September a cruiser was called up to the fire support area and the EMILE BERTIN gave a good account of herself. Destroyer fire support was equally effective on targets closer to the coast.

23. The night of 7 September the enemy again attempted an explosive boat attack which was detected by the PT screen and successfully repelled. During the day the Army requested that a gunfire support area inside the 100 fathom curve in the Menton area be swept clear of mines to enable naval gunfire to reach targets in Sospel area. Orders were issued to sweep the area and destroyers were assigned to cover the minesweepers by counter battery fire.

24. In an attempt to discourage naval gunfire support, explosive boats again unsuccessfully attacked naval vessels in fire support area. The H.P. JONES, MADISON and the PT screen drove off the attacking craft with a possible destruction of at least four and possibly five explosive boats.

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25. Gunfire support missions on the 8 and 9 September were responsible for breaking up several counterattacks and SNGLO reported that the fire of the DUGUAY TROUIN, H.P. JONES and MADISON was very effective.

26. On 10 September three Italian patriots came out from the Ventimiglia area at 0645A and were picked up by a PT. They were interrogated aboard the flagship and valuable information regarding troops dispositions, locations of enemy batteries and a command headquarters, stowage places of human torpedoes, and a report on the low morale of German troops in the area was secured from them. They were later turned over to the Army at Nice for further interrogation. Gunfire support ships later fired at targets designated by these Italian patriots using cruiser planes for spotting.

27. At 1045A 10 September the H.P. JONES, MADISON, PT 212 and 206, M/S IMPROVE and MAINSTAY; planes from the BROOKLYN and PHILADELPHIA and an unidentified Coastal Air Force plane cooperated in destroying 10 positive and one possible human torpedoes in the Ventimiglia area. Three prisoners were captured in the water and three more by the Army ashore. Valuable information regarding the methods of operation of these submersibles were secured from interrogating of the POWs aboard the flagship.

28. Gunfire support missions on the 10th of September were reported not very effective because of heavy concrete emplacements and on 11 September the Army requested the LORRAINE to bring fire on the Sospel area. Even her mighty guns failed to do very much damage to the concrete emplacements although the area was reported well covered and it was believed that several counterattacks by enemy troops were successfully dispersed.

29. The off-shore screen was augmented by CTG 80.5 at CTF 86's request to include two PT patrols in view of the increased threat of human torpedoes, midget submarines and explosive boats.

30. Gunfire support missions the next few days consisted largely of targets of opportunity with SFCP, cub plane and cruiser plane alternating in spotting. These targets were mainly troops concentrations, enemy batteries, observation posts, and machine gun nests.

31. On 16 September the enemy attempted an explosive boat attack on destroyers in the fire support area which was successfully repulsed by the alert PT able patrol. Four explosive boats escorted by a radar equipped MAS boat were driven off.

32. On September 17th cruiser planes reported a concentration of small craft in San Remo, Port Maurizio and Oreglia harbors.

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The H.P. JONES and the MADISON conducted a bombardment of San Remo harbor with good results. Several small craft believed to be MAS boats were damaged. The bombardment was followed by another on September 18th in which all enemy craft in the harbor of San Remo and Port Mourizio were either damaged or destroyed.

33. From September 19th to September 25th the front lines on the Franco-Italian border remained virtually unchanged with intermittent calls by SNGLO for gunfire support. It was reported that the enemy had brought up artillery reinforcements by railroad via Turino and that the resistance continued to be stubborn and very active which precluded any possibility for the 1st ABTF to advance. Counter battery fire by coastal guns continued to be accurate and heavy in the Cape Mortola, Ventimiglia, Porto Maurizio and Oreglia areas. It is believed that harbor of San Remo was virtually abandoned by enemy shipping following the disastrous bombardment of September 18th since daily cruiser plane reconnaissance failed to indicate any large concentration in the harbor.

UNITED STATES EIGHTH FLEET
Commander Support Force
(Commander Cruiser Division Eight)

PART IV - COMMUNICATIONS

I. General.

II. Sitka Assault

- A. Assault Force Communications.
- B. Fire Support Communications.
- C. Recommendations.

III. Support Force.

- A. General.
- B. Shore Fire Control.
- C. Aircraft Spotting.
- D. Naval Circuits.
- E. Cryptographic Aids.
- F. Recommendations.

IV. Inter Force Communications.

V. Traffic Statistics.

I. General:

1. Operation Dragoon was notable for tremendous number of circuits employed and the scope and variety of equipment required to implement the frequency plans called for by the communication annex. Visual methods were used for only a small percentage of the total volume of traffic. This was due to the fact that the forces and groups were widely separated, and visibility was often poor due to the amount of smoke used as a defensive measure. At night it was usually preferable to use radio, as all bands were in continuous use after 1-hour of D-day, and no condition of radio silence was in effect after that time.

2. The volume of traffic handled was extreme, and this in itself imposed a certain limit on the speed at which messages could be handled. A great percentage of the so called communication breakdowns and delays were caused simply because circuits were called upon to handle more traffic than was physically possible. In future operations, careful consideration should be given to the probable traffic load of the various circuits, and steps taken both to provide more adequate outlets and to limit the number and length of messages required. The answer is not merely to provide additional circuits,

or personnel usually became the bottleneck before materiel. A great speed-up in communications could be achieved if originators could be persuaded to limit their messages to reasonable length. Thousand group messages not only defeat their own purpose of timely information but seriously interfere with the efficiency of the entire system.

3. Use was made of almost the entire radio spectrum from 180 kcs to 150 mcs. This operation saw a great increase in the use of VHF FM equipment. This was used for boat control, SFOP spotting, minesweeper and PT intership channels, and for radar reporting, and its superiority over lower frequencies and AM sets was clearly demonstrated. There also was an increased use of VHF AM sets, nine frequencies being assigned for aircraft spotting alone. An innovation was the high speed (60 wpm) teleprinter circuit used as a task force commander's channel operating on 142.58 mcs (AM) - a type of equipment showing promise, but which could not be fully exploited in this operation because of its limited range. (See Part IV, Para. 2).

4. Radio reception conditions in the assault area were generally poor on all bands, a factor contributing to the limiting speed at which messages could be closed. This was due to:

- (a) Heavy atmosphere disturbances.
- (b) The crowded condition of many of bands due to the number of circuits required not only for this operation, but for other military operations close enough to cause interference.
- (c) Local interference caused by own transmitters, or by adjacent ships.
- (d) A peculiarity in the reception conditions that produced very short ground waves on circuits even as low as 575 kcs. This is even more surprising when it is considered that abnormally long ranges are obtained on radar frequencies in this area during the summer.
- (e) The condition mentioned in (d) above was exaggerated on the AUGUSTA by long antenna leads.

5. Recommendations: - In consideration of above, the following recommendations are submitted for future operations:

- (a) A reduction in the number of circuits individual ships and commands are required to guard. This can be done by a system of guard ships through the echelons of command without actually reducing the number of circuits. A reduction in the number of broadcasts could easily have been effected. A Senior Officer's broadcast paralleling the regular area broadcast seems to serve little or no useful purpose. The area broadcast could have been guarded by the force flagship for the entire force without seriously overloading the OTC Fox. (See Part V, Para. 2).

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Part IV - COMMUNICATIONS (Cont'd).

- (b) Expand the use of high speed teleprinter circuits.
- (c) Provide group voice circuits, preferably on the TBS or SCR608 band for all major groups, and use these circuits for passing both plain language and short enciphered messages.
- (d) Use standard communication procedure on all voice circuits.
- (e) Reduce the number of messages required to be passed by radio.
- (f) Drastically reduce the length of all messages.

II. Sitka Assault.

A. Assault Force Communications:

1. The problem of efficient communications within the Sitka assault force was complicated by the heterogenous character of this force both with respect to type and nationality.
2. Equipment imposed severe limitations. A majority of the PT boats assigned this force could transmit on but a single frequency. The HACKBERRY (AN) had only one transmitter. The PRINCE BAUDIN and PRINCESS BEATRIX could not transmit on the 3000-4000 kcs band due to the limitations of their transmitting equipment (British Model TW-12). This was particularly unfortunate because both the task force W/T and the task force R/T circuits were within this band. These later deficiencies were overcome by placing TCS units aboard both ships. The LORRAINE was also supplied with a TCS to supplement their equipment. During the approach to the assault area 2980 kcs (the MTB Wave) was used as a convoy maneuvering circuit, being the only frequency that could be guarded by all units. Complete radio silence was observed during this phase, and it was never necessary to use this circuit for maneuvering. The diversion group (TG 80.4) which also used this frequency was heard testing frequently during the afternoon of D-1 day. It was presumed that this was part of the diversion plan.
3. Radar counter measures were commenced by this force at 2100 B, D-1, when approximately 38 miles from the enemy coast. It is interesting to note that this time was selected as being the point of probable maximum detection by enemy surface radars, and our listening watch indicated we were tracked only some two minutes before the jamming was started.
4. The boat wave frequency plan called for one SCR 509 for each transport, one for each wave of boats from each ship, and one for each PT boat acting as control vessel. Due to insufficient equipment, and to the fact that some equipment obtained was inoperative and could not be repaired within the

time available, this was not in fact provided. As complete surprise was achieved, and it was not necessary to use radio during the approach of the boats, these deficiencies were not felt but could have been serious if heavier opposition had been encountered.

5. On D-day radio silence was lifted by flagship to establish contact with FC 30 at 0335 B on SCR 608. At 0435 GLEAVES was in communication with FC 35 on assigned spotting frequency (HF). At 0440 both TBS and Force voice was used during the SOMERS action with 2 German corvettes. At 0530 radio silence was lifted on all bands except the 30-40 mcs band. At 0618 the AUGUSTA established communication with Bobcat Greens, the SOC spotting aircraft. AUGUSTA contacted FC 29 at 0745. The LOOKOUT reported to be in contact with FC 28 at 0827. The times of contact with Seafire spotters and FC 34 was not reported but appears to have been about 0630 for the Seafires and about 0830 for FC 34. By 0830 communication was established with the task force on N-26 and N-27, the task force key and voice frequencies. Due to previously mentioned deficiencies in equipment and to lack of personnel, not all ships could guard both at once, particularly while carrying on firing missions, and the PT's and minesweepers when they joined early in the morning could guard neither, but by mid-morning communication was established with all units on at least one frequency. Certain difficulties were experienced by some units (LSI's) who lacked frequency meters, in properly calibrating their equipment. It is felt this indicates a certain lack of foresight by the units concerned, for the LORRAINE, also without a frequency meter, with commendable persistence calibrated all required frequencies, including about a dozen SFCP spotting channels well before departure.

B. Fire Support Communications:

1. Spotting for Sitka gunfire support ships was provided by 3 SFCP's, 2 FOB's and Seafire and SOC aircraft. Communication with Seafires was on VHF (AM) and with SOC's on HF R/T frequencies. Communication with aircraft was excellent throughout the operation. Communications with SFCP's was by SCR 609's (VHF FM) and with FOB's by HF W/T. Communications with SFCP's was excellent. There was some difficulty with the FOB communications due to interference, and to the low power of their set which, however, did not prevent them spotting shoots as required.

C. Recommendations.

1. In view of experiences of this force, the following recommendations are offered:

- (a) All assault vessels should carry as part of their regular allowance sufficient radio equipment and spares to fit out their own boats, including control craft.
- (b) More training and drills provided to include use of tactical circuits both W/T and R/T, frequency shifting,

(c) Provide all SFCP's with SCR 609's in addition to the SCR 284 or similar sets, and all fire support ships with SCR 608's. SFCP's have a tendency to neglect to use their SCR 284's as long as communication can be maintained on SCR 609 channels. This results in very limited range.

(d) Provide the divisional and corps NLO's with a set having greater power and wider frequency range than the SCR 284.

II. Support Force:

A. General.

1. The Post Assault frequency plan called for two groups, the right and left flank forces, each operating with its own army command on separate but similar internal communication plans. Actually, the Support Force was organized as three groups during this stage, but this did not necessitate any change in the frequency plan as the right flank and center groups used the same plan. Two changes of frequencies were required. First, the Force W/T frequency of the Sitka Assault was retained for the left flank rather than using the Alpha frequency. This was done because use of the later caused extreme local interference aboard the flagship. Second, the Task Force Commander's frequency could not be used as a group commander's circuit because of the heavy traffic load, and 3240 kcs, the left flank group frequency was used in its stead. Aside from above, the situation had been accurately foreseen and setting up of communications with the II French Corps, the recrystallization of spotting aircraft and SFCP's, and the consolidation of the gunfire Support command was accomplished without a hitch.

B. Shore Fire Control.

1. Shore fire control on the left flank was furnished by eleven FOB parties. Each evening an assignment of available ships and FOB's was made by CTF 86 for operations the following day. Unassigned FOB's and ships guarded the common calling frequency until required for spotting and firing when assignments were made on this circuit. This basic principle proved sound, and in fact worked very well. Difficulties in execution were encountered as follows:

(a) Reception on both common calling circuit and spotting frequencies was poor particularly at night due to the crowded condition of this band.

(b) Low power of sets ashore resulted in loss of communications when the flagship moved out of immediate area.

(c) Certain delays due to time involved in shifting frequencies both by SFCP and by the ships. A great deal of these difficulties could have been eliminated if the FOB's and NLO's of the left flank had been equipped with SCR 609's and SCR

608's. Under conditions obtaining in this area the latter set had a considerably longer range than the HF radios carried by the FOB's. It might be noted that this was strongly recommended by this command before the operation.

2. Shore fire control on the right flank was provided by seven SFCP's with similar communication organization to the left flank. Cub aircraft spotters were also used to considerable extent on this flank. Unlike the FOB's on the left flank, the SFCP's were all equipped with SCR 609's, which they used to the exclusion of all HF equipment even on the common calling circuit. Comparison indicates the spotters on the right flank had generally more efficient communications than those on the left but only when full use is made of both HF and VHF sets can optimum performance be obtained.

C. Aircraft Spotting.

1. Aircraft spotting furnished by the carriers of TF 88 for left flank ships was uniformly excellent. On the very few occasions when communication was not immediately established, it was due to materiel failure of the shipboard equipment. Schedules for aircraft spotting missions were passed to the carriers each night to cover the succeeding day. A direct R/T link was maintained from 0600 until 2000. Changes in schedule were made on this circuit, and on call missions called up or secured as the action progressed. A properly briefed mission could be over the target ready to spot 45 minutes after the initial call up. At times as many as five missions were airborne at once. A normal day was three missions, two of which were continuous dawn until last light. When our (left flank) operations took us out of the general air cover area, a patrol of four fighters was maintained from first light until dusk, controlled by the AUGUSTA.

2. Aircraft spotting for the right flank forces was provided by naval aviators (From VCS-8) attached to the 111th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron on the 12th Tactical Army Air Force, flying P-51's. Again communications were excellent, using VHF frequencies. Due to the limited number of planes and to the distance from their bases to the fire support area, the number missions available was much less than on the left flank, and the time required to call up missions much greater.

D. Naval Circuits.

1. The communication plan called for all units to guard the OTC Fox, the Task Group (or Force) W/T and the Task Group (Force) voice circuit at all times. This was well within the capabilities of the smallest fire support vessel, and is considered to be a definitely sound doctrine.

2. Some units failed to maintain proper watches on these channels which at times caused unfortunate delays, particularly on the task group W/T circuit. It is believed that this was mainly due to the following:

(a) Lack of training by units concerned.

(b) Failures of materiel.

(c) Failure to have sufficient competent radiomen on watch. One communication officer stated he did not believe it was practical to maintain watch and watch in the radio department for longer than eighteen hours. As the AUGUSTA radio gang stood watch and watch for nearly eighteen days, this is considered a shallow argument indeed. After about a week of constant reminders of the importance of proper watch standing, acceptable--even excellent--standards were finally achieved.

3. As many units of this force did not have a TBS, an HF frequency was used in its stead. This proved generally satisfactory, and had the added advantage of greater range, a very desirable point considering the dispersal of our forces. It did not quite approach the TBS in overall reliability or convenience.

E. Cryptographic Aids.

1. The cryptographic aids used in this operation showed a great improvement over previous operations in this theater. The two greatest advances were the CCM and the combined assault code which, it is estimated, were used for over eighty percent of the enciphered traffic.

2. Plain language was used a great deal, and due to the general impotence of the enemy against our naval forces, a great deal of information was sent in clear that by every consideration of military security should have been enciphered. This is a dangerous habit that must be curbed.

3. The enemy was also given excellent opportunities to attack our cryptographic systems due to:

(a) Huge traffic load on a single system.

(b) Encipherment of reports received in plain language on VHF circuits before retransmission on HF channels.

Paraphrasing helped here some, but future operations should provide definite instructions to cover this dilemma. A reconnaissance plane reports to a ship important information via VHF. Should this immediately be rebroadcast in plain language on a circuit of much longer range -- or should it be enciphered? It was noted that situation reports were invariably enciphered and

classified as secret or even top secret, yet 90% of the information had been accumulated from VHF plain language reports only a few hours before.

- (a) Could be eliminated by a frequent change of key list.
- (b) Could be reduced in seriousness by specifying a low grade system for such encipherment of plain language reports.

4. Still to be solved are the problems of voice call signs and voice vocabularies. After two and a half years of constant use with every kind, type and variety of voice code and voice vocabulary known to man, including a great many of our own devising, it is the carefully considered opinion of this command that they are unwieldy, awkward, insecure, and a snare and delusion to their users. They are difficult to transmit, difficult to record, and the whole process is slow and inaccurate. Any message received in voice code by this command could have been handled easier and quicker in the combined assault code.

F. Recommendations.

1. The following is offered as a substitute for voice codes and vocabularies:

- (a) Use of general signals unenciphered when in contact with the enemy for urgent maneuvers, orders, and reports.
- (b) Use of the signal cipher with general signals when time allows.
- (c) Use of codes similar to combined assault code when message can not be transmitted in clear.
- (d) Use of plain language on all possible occasions using a comprehensive system of grid coordinates, geographical check points (which might be changed frequently) or both for indicating positions.

2. The problem of voice call signs is still open. The air corps has indicated an unwillingness to adopt anything but disyllabic words. The only objection is the difficulty in recording, but aircraft circuits are not often completely recorded anyway. A practical solution seems as follows:

- (a) Use disyllabic words for call signs on air - ship, air - ground, and intership circuits used for fighter direction or radar reporting.
- (b) Assign call signs using combinations of three letters or numbers to all commands and units for use by V/S, and all radio circuits both W/T and R/T. Number number letter and letter

number number are the best combinations followed by number letter number. Combinations of two letters and one number are liable to be confused with unenciphered naval calls and are not as easy to remember or look up.

(c) Use station (position) calls instead of unit (or command) calls when in formation or on screening or scouting lines.

3. The Mediterranean Bombardment Code demonstrated its superiority over all previous procedures of this type, and it is recommended that this code be adopted on a combined world-wide basis.

4. Considering the difficulties and congestion encountered on the TBS in this operation (as in all large scale assaults in the past) and the unqualified success of the newly installed SCR 608, the following recommendation is offered:

(a) A VHF FM radio be produced covering the 20 to 50 mcs band using the same power and output as the TBS and using the same type of remote control positions. It should be a 10 channel crystal controlled set similar to and using the same crystal principle as the AN/ARC-1 with an allowance per ship scaled from one per AM, PC, or similar types to four for a cruiser flagship. A very flexible system could be evolved, for these sets could be used with SCR 500 and 600 series, the MN set, and other special equipment for amphibious, Army-Navy and shore fire control circuits as well as for strictly naval channels. This band can be divided into 300 different channels without mutual interference.

5. Due to the use of several HF R/T frequencies, destroyers were required to use their TCS equipment a great deal. The present TCS installation in destroyers is designed for emergency use and is not conveniently located for regular operational use. It is recommended that the destroyer allowance be increased to permit a TCS, using ship's power supply, to be installed in CIC where it could be employed to much greater advantage than at present.

6. This operation saw the first use of the Beedex (radar beacon) and of the water borne spotter in LCG's to spot pre-landing fire. The Beedex was not really tested by this operation as conditions requiring its use did not exist. The water borne spotter proved quite valuable on occasions. It is recommended that these features, preferably combined as a single unit, be provided in future operations.

IV. Inter Force Communications:

1. CTF 86 maintained communication links with the PT's, the minesweepers, the destroyers of the screen, and the carriers of Task Force 88 on HF voice channels. All proved satisfactory.

2. This command maintained W/T links with the other task force commanders and NCWTF on N-13, the regular task force commander's circuit, and on N-13a, the high speed teleprinter circuit, and maintained as special link (which finally settled on 560 kcs as a frequency after experiments with many others) with NCWTF to handle the heavy traffic load between these commands.
3. Three broadcasts were copied -- Senior Officer's -- Area Broadcast -- and Force Fox.
4. The following recommendations are offered:
 - (a) The high speed teletype circuit operating on 142.58 mcs (AM) shows great promise. It could not be fully utilized by this command because much of the time the AUGUSTA was operating outside its range. At times, a high static level interfered with operation, and shock of own gunfire tended to jar the receiver out of alignment. It was difficult to determine when a vessel on the opposite flank was sending, thus other units transmissions were often inadvertently interfered with by this command (and vice versa). It is believed that much of above difficulties could be overcome by using an FM set with two or more frequencies assigned by sectors.
 - (b) It is felt the broadcasts could have been consolidated to two, preferably by rerunning the necessary area broadcast numbers on the force fox.

V. Traffic Statistics:

1. The following statistics cover the period from 0800, D-1 day until 0800, D plus 15 day:

Total messages from or to CTF 86	- 5122
Average per day	- 320
Approximately 60% of these were encrypted.	

This does not include voice transmissions that were not written up, transmissions on spotting circuits, services, relays, or intercept traffic. If above are included approximately 10,500 messages were recorded in communication office of CTF 86 during this period

2. From the time the OTC Fox was established on D day until the 30th, a total of 1934 messages were sent. Of these 265 were originated by CTF 86 and 670 were addressed to this command. Under heavy traffic conditions, the following average times were required to effect delivery of messages of various precedences on this circuit:

Urgent	- 1 hour 13 minutes.
Operation Priority	- 3 hours 34 minutes.
Priority	- 7 hours 31 minutes.
Routine	- 19 hours 25 minutes.

No deferred messages were sent. The average message was 100 groups long. The average number of messages per day was 129 which at the operating speed used resulted in nearly continuous operation. It might be noted that as the average number of messages per day on the area broadcast was 112, that these broadcasts could have been combined without eliminating any messages if it could have been possible to reduce the average length from 100 groups to 60 groups. This illustrates the most practical method for speeding up communications. Given a certain number of messages to clear, the problem can be met by

- (a) Increasing the number of circuits in use.
- (b) Increasing the speed of operators.
- (c) Reducing the average length of messages.

(a) may be limited by personnel, material, or frequencies available, (b) can not be effectively accomplished on most circuits. However, (c) offers great possibility, especially if very long messages can be eliminated. If out of six messages five are 50 groups each and the remaining one a thousand groups, the average is still over 200 groups. With excellent coders and operators, approximately seven hours is required to encypher and deliver a thousand group message, even with a single transmission.

ENCLOSURE B PART V

~~C-O-N-F~~

GUNFIRE SUPPORT NOTES

I. Left Flank (15-30 August)

The preliminary phases of this report deals with the gunfire support of the assault troops in the Sitka area. Details of the plan including sectors of responsibility, types of targets, gunfire lines, fire support areas and other pertinent information and duties of the support force may be found in ComCruDiv 8 Annex "B" to Operation Plan 3-44, appended hereto.

The Support Force under Rear Admiral DAVIDSON was divided in to four gunfire support units as follows:

86.2 Support Force - Rear Admiral DAVIDSON

(a) 86.2.1 Sitka Gunfire Support Unit "A"

U.S.S. SOMERS

(b) 86.2.2 Sitka Gunfire Support Unit "B"

U.S.S. AUGUSTA (F)

H.M.S. LOOKOUT

(c) 86.2.3 Romeo Gunfire Support Unit "C"

H.M.S. DIDO

U.S.S. GLEAVES

(d) 86.2.4 Reserve - Arriving at about H-180 minutes French Ship LORRAINE.

No preliminary naval bombardment was scheduled in an effort to maintain maximum secrecy and surprise not only so that the Sitka and Romeo forces could be landed successfully but that subsequent assault by the Alpha, Delta, and Camel Forces might be made under as favorable conditions of tactical surprise as possible. However, attack on targets of opportunity endangering the landing of the assault forces and calls for fire by Shore Fire Control and Beedex Parties were provided for. W.P. and smoke were to be used to screen forces from direct observation by enemy batteries if necessary.

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15 August "D" Day

0453 U.S.S. SOMERS fired one salvo, closed range and fired second salvo at German Corvette which resulted in fires and numerous explosions, vessel later identified as German fast escort ship Schnell Gelleit No. 21, broke in two and sank. It had been on patrol out of Marseille when encountered about 5 miles S.E. of Ile du Port Cros.

0508 U.S.S. SOMERS opened fire on a second German Corvette "COMOCIO" which had been operating with the S.G.#21 and had attempted to escape. Numerous hits were obtained and after ineffectual return fire with automatic weapons the crew of the "COMOCIO" abandoned ship. A boarding party sent aboard the German ship returned with various important documents including certain charts containing swept channels and mine fields of Toulon and Genoa areas. The "COMOCIO" sank immediately after the boarding party had debarked.

0742B H.M.S. DIDO commenced firing on command post at 317-034 in Cape Negre section in support of French Troops securing the left flank in the vicinity of Cavaliere who were meeting enemy opposition.

0910B U.S.S. AUGUSTA commenced firing on enemy troops located in fort at 301-869 Port Cros Island. Nine rounds 8"/55 cal. ammunition expended, results unobserved. Enemy opposition met on the Island of Port Cros was driven into the Fort. This strong point was fired on several times during the morning by the U.S.S. SOMERS and H.M.S. LOOKOUT. Firing was accurate and effective in keeping the enemy under cover but could not dislodge him from his position behind heavy stone walls and in tunnels.

Earlier in the morning H.M.S. LOOKOUT fired on enemy troops at coordinates 355891 on the Island of Levant in accordance with the request of SFCP #28. There remained but one enemy strong point on this island after daylight. It was being dealt with by the First Special Service Force. At 2234 August 15, 1944 report was received from the First Special Service Force that all of the Island of Levant was in friendly hands.

At 1026B on 15 August the U.S.S. AUGUSTA in response to a call for fire by SFCP #34 stating that a counter attack was in progress at 330-030 East of Cape Negre, fired six rounds but was requested to cease fire because of danger to own troops.

CTF 86 then ordered the H.M.S. DIDO to furnish fire support as requested by SFCP #34, this ship being in the best position to do so. At 1143 the DIDO commenced firing on enemy troops on Cavaliere Beach with excellent results. At the same time the U.S.S. GLEAVES was giving fire support to FOO 35 at coordinates 325-028 on Cavaliere Beach. Shooting was effective but observation was difficult due to poor visibility.

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It was apparent at this time that the most urgent requests for fire support would be at the area around the old fort on Port Cros Island and the Cavaliere Beech area where the French Commandos were meeting moderate resistance. The situation throughout the Sitka area was deemed to be well in hand.

During the afternoon of 15 August 1944 the U.S.S. SOMERS fired a total of 318 5"/38 common projectiles and 20 white phosphorus rounds at the old fort located on Port Cros and the area immediately surrounding it. The U.S.S. AUGUSTA fired 92 rounds 8"/55 cal. ammunition at the same target with results reported as 75% effective by spotters. In addition to the naval bombardment this area was pounded with 16 - 1,000 lb. bombs by aircraft.

At days end the fort showed no indication of surrendering and the bombarding ships retired for the night.

16 August 1944

On the 16th of August the situation was as follows: Island of Levant captured, Island of Port Cros in allied hands except for enemy pocket of resistance located in old fort, French Groupe de Commandos had worked inland as planned and control of Cape Negre had passed to the 6th Corps. Sitka ships were dispersed for fire support as follows: SOMERS and AUGUSTA supporting troops on Island of Port Cros with the AUGUSTA prepared to fire on mainland North of grid 000. The GLEAVES was located off Cape Negre to furnish fire support in areas between Cape Negre and Cape Benet. The H.M.S. DIDO was located due East of the Island of Levant to fire on targets of opportunity on the mainland in the Romeo area.

Urgent fire requests expected from FCP party on Port Cros were not forth coming. At 1800 on the 16th, sixteen dive bombers attacked fort on Port Cros with 32 thirty-two 1,000 lb bombs scoring 6 direct hits but the enemy refused to surrender. At 1849B the U.S.S. AUGUSTA fired 63 rds 8" HC with stell nose plugs at enemy strong point located in old fort at Port Cros. SFOP#29 reported fire 60% effective. At 1934, 16 August, the GLEAVES fired 30 rds. white phosphorus laying smoke screen to cover assault of own troops on same strong point. SFOP party reported mission successful, firing very good. During day and prior to the laying of the smoke screen the U.S.S. SOMERS had fired 658 rds. 5"/38 common and 24 rds. of white phosphorus at the old fort but the enemy hung on to their position with tenacity. It was becoming apparent that the caliber of the shells used to reduce the fortress were insufficient to damage the masonry.

On the mainland in the Romeo area the U.S.S. GLEAVES had been furnishing excellent fire support to French troops ashore. FOO #35 requested fire on enemy strong point at BU 304-024. By 1146B when cease fire was given, 131 rds. 5"/38 common had been expended and mission was reported successful, area well covered.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

In the afternoon the GLEAVES took under fire, at the request of FOO #35, an enemy strong point at BU 276-997 which was covering area of Pointe de Gouron. Majority of salvos landed in area, 64 rds. of A.A. Common was expended.

The H.M.S. DIDO fired for FOO party on right flank of the French Commandos in Cape Negre area with effective results during the day.

As the bombarding forces retired for the night on 16 August the situation ashore in the Romeo area was considerably improved but the old fort on Port Cros Island still seemed impervious to attack from land, sea, and air.

17 August 1944

Sitka assault plan still in effect, sole remaining obstacle to the successful completion of Op-Plan 3-44 being the enemy strong point at Old Chateau Fort in Port Cros Island. Attack on this target made by First Special Service Forces after laying on smoke screen by SOMERS on 16 August failed to dislodge the enemy. At 1105 on 16 August the Chateau Fort was again attacked by dive bombers, several direct hits being reported, but enemy was still not ready to surrender. At 1111 AUGUSTA opened fire on Chateau Fort using 8"/55 A.P. shells, numerous direct hits being observed. Forty-two rounds were expended upon the target, apparently with little effect, the enemy at this time gave indication that it would not surrender to naval gunfire. CTF 86, meanwhile, realizing that 8" shells were not heavy enough, had requested that H.M.S. RAMILLES be assigned to the Sitka area for duty. The RAMILLES reported at 1130 and at 1255 the RAMILLES opened fire on fort using 15" A.P. projectiles. 1311 white flag appeared over target, RAMILLES ceased fire having expended 12 rounds of main battery ammunition.

Upon the surrender of this target the Sitka assault phase was completed and CTF 86, Post assault gunfire support plan, operation plan #5-44 was placed into effect.

The Post Assault Plan had two objects in mind (1) to protect the left flank of the Alpha Forces and (2) to furnish support for the troops in their drive on the Toulon-Marseilles areas.

On the evening of August 17th, plans were formulated for the sweeping of channels to enable ships to furnish fire support to troops on the mainland approaching Toulon and for the assault on the island of Porquerolles. Channels were to be swept from a point one mile south of Cape Benat to a point one mile south of Cape de l'Esterel. Another channel was to be swept in a north-south direction between the Island of Porquerolles and Port Cros.

To protect minesweeping activities, ships were assigned to cover coastal batteries on the Island of Porquerolles and the area on the mainland from Cape de l'Esterel to Cape Benat. In addition the U.S.S. QUINCY, H.M.S. AJAX and F.S. GLOIRE were to arrive in Rade Bormes at 180630 prepared to support advance of the 3rd Division. CTF 86 made plans at the same time for the bombardment of the Island of Porquerolles prior to sending a "white flag" party to that island should it desire to surrender.

18 August 1944

M/S Flotilla 5 began sweeping operations in the Rade D'Hyerres early in the morning at 0915 battery in vicinity of Cite Des Bormettes opened fire on minesweepers, battery taken under fire by U.S.S. QUINCY and effectively silenced. Shortly after mid-day the F.S. LORRAINE (BB) began firing on Fort Repentance (Z 168-859) using air spot. Twenty-seven rounds H.E. ammunition expended. At 1345 LORRAINE fired on battery on Cape Medes (Porquerolles Is.) scoring a direct hit and destroying target. This preliminary bombardment preceded the approach of the "white flag" party in PT 215. Batteries on Giens Peninsula took PT 215 under fire during the approach and forced it to withdraw, there was no fire upon it by the batteries in Porquerolles however. The U.S.S. AUGUSTA took under fire the batteries on Giens Peninsula that fired on "white flag" party. No further attempt was made during the day to get PT 215 to the Island of Porquerolles but both it and the Giens Peninsula was subject to further "softening up" bombardment. During the day the F.S. GLOIRE fired effectively for SFCP at coordinates Z 137-996 and Z 129-006, expending a total of 164 rds of ammunition. The U.S.S. QUINCY fired on coordinates Z 094-014 for SFCP, mission successful.

The withdrawal of minesweepers for other operations delayed gunfire support ships and hindered operations in the Rade D'Hyerres area. Admiral DAVIDSON requested of COMINTF a similar force to continue sweeping operations so as not to deprive forces ashore of adequate naval supporting fire.

During the evening of the 18th August plans were laid for the gunfire attack on San Mandrier on 19 August. Admiral DAVIDSON requested that F.S. STRASBURG at Y 909-934 and cruiser at Y 913-937 be included in any scheduled aerial bombing of this area as it was believed that these ships could be used similar to shore batteries and would furnish counter battery fire.

Left flank forces ashore reported to be making excellent progress, ships unable to furnish adequate fire support due to unswept condition of Rade D'Hyerres. Commander minesweeps was urgently requested to continue sweeping operations in this area and make report as soon as possible on progress. The use of this area by fire support ships was urgently needed for the assault on Toulon even though it wasn't swept in time to allow ships to support forces proceeding inland.

19 August 1944

On 19 August Admiral DAVIDSON planned a reconnaissance of the San Mandrier area to test defenses around Toulon. For this purpose the heavier gunned assault ships were to bombard San Mandrier where it was known that the enemy had several large caliber guns with ranges of 38,000 yards and also the F.S. STRASBOURG inside Toulon harbor. This bombardment was to be carried out behind a smoke screen using air spot. Cruisers and destroyers were posted to seaward of Porquerolles to keep batteries on that island and the Giens Peninsula under surveillance using VOS spotting planes. A heavy cruiser and a light cruiser plus destroyers were assigned to support with counter battery fire the advance of the Allied armies on Toulon. These ships were stationed to the south of Port Cros and were to use VOS spot.

The San Mandrier area and Toulon harbor was scheduled to be heavily bombed during the day, so Admiral DAVIDSON postponed the naval bombardment until 1600. After the aerial attack planes reported gun area on San Mandrier well covered and the F.S. STRASBOURG listing slightly and a cruiser in the Toulon harbor as well as several other ships listing heavily. Later on an inspection trip, it was learned that these French ships were not manned and further that the STRASBOURG had been sunk by the French to prevent the Germans from using her as a block ship. Heavy flak was encountered by planes over San Mandrier.

From 1600 to 1700 on 19 August, the AUGUSTA, LORRAINE, NEVADA, KEARNY, ERICSSON, EBERLE and GLEAVES conducted bombardment of Mandrier under cover of smoke with air cover and air spot. NEVADA scored direct hit on stern of BB STRASBOURG and several near misses expending 125 rounds A.P. F.S. LORRAINE fired 60 rds. of A.P. on naval turrets emplaced on San Mandrier covering area well. U.S.S. AUGUSTA fired 27 rds. at K21 (2 - 340 mm. guns on San Mandrier). The F.S. LORRAINE moved out from under cover of smoke to fire and experienced no return fire. There appeared to be little sign of activity on San Mandrier although J-46 on the northern side was reported firing, probably inland on troops advancing on Toulon as no splashes were observed to seaward.

MONTCALM received mission to fire in support of troops in Hyeres area but targets were out of range due unswept condition of Hyeres Roads.

At 1609 GEORGES LEYGUES fired on guns at 104-998 near Gulf Hotel (Hyerres) in response to call from SFCP. Area well covered, no more enemy action seen, sixty-seven rounds expended on the target.

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U.S.S. QUINCY fired 20 rounds on guns at U 068-012 at the request of SFCP 36, mission successful, and 15 rds. on target at Z 172-027 area covered. In addition QUINCY fired 104 rounds on barrack at 153-855 (Porquerolles) setting barracks on fire and destroying one gun. Twenty-eight rounds were fired on target at 150-833, area well covered (Porquerolles).

Minesweepers in Rade l'Hayeres reported being fired upon by batteries at Cap de l'Esterel. An effort was made to take these batteries under fire to allow continuance of minesweeping unmolested but no activity could be located by air spots.

During the day it was decided that an amphibious operation against the island of Porquerolles would be unnecessary as there appeared to be very little activity on the island, and it must assuredly fall upon the capture of Toulon by the French. Commanding General 7th Army was so informed.

As a result of the days reconnaissance of San Mandrier and the surveillance of the Giens Peninsula and the Island of Porquerolles it appeared that the heavy aerial and naval bombardment of the area had been effective and little resistance could be expected. Such, as later proved, was not the case. Once again it had been proved that heavy aerial bombardment and attack with large caliber naval guns is ineffective against well established positions and they can only be put out of action by direct attack of troops on foot.

During the day troops ashore continued to make excellent progress and on the evening of the 19th plans were made for the assault on Toulon to be conducted on the 20th. Commander Minesweepers (5th M/S Flotilla) was notified that the Rade D'Hayeres area must be swept and available to fire support ships by 0700 on the 20th if at all possible. Conference of the commanding officers of all ships to take part in the assault was called on board the flagship by Admiral DAVIDSON. Location of ship was to be as follows: DUGUAY TROUIN, DIDO, FANTASQUE in Rade D'Hayeres on call supporting advance on Hayeres and westward. PHILADELPHIA and MALIN surveillance of Giens and Porquerolles, spot by PHILADELPHIA planes. Admiral JAUJARD in MONTCALM with GEORGES LEYGUES and LORRAINE south of Grande Rade on call with three air spotting missions continuously. QUINCY south of Cap Sicie, one spotting mission continuously. OMAHA and NEVADA south of Cap Alon, one spotting mission continuously. AUGUSTA and EMILE BERTIN south of Grande Passe on call. All ships to be on station by 200800. Destroyers with oil fog generators were to be available to lay smoke screens. No pre-arranged targets were given for the attack, ships were so placed as to have heaviest guns available for the largest counter batteries. Fire was to be on call from SFCP or from spotting planes on targets of opportunity.

20 August 1944

The assault on Toulon by naval forces scheduled to start at dawn was delayed until about 1000 because of spotting difficulties. Army Air Forces attacked San Mandrier with fighter bombers and medium bombers quite heavily during the morning. Flak over area was heavy and accurate. Several planes were shot down. Effect of aerial bombardment on batteries of this strong point did not warrant further risk of aircraft. During early morning, Admiral DAVIDSON sent out despatches assigning specific areas to be covered by various assault ships for neutralization purposes:

QUINCY was to cover areas 9400 FC 34.
AUGUSTA was to cover areas 9802 FC 34.
MONTCALM was to cover areas 9500 FC 34.
GEORGES LEYGUES was to cover areas 9700 FC34.

Batteries on San Mandrier and Cape de l'Esterel were very active during the day. In addition K-40 (025-935) was reported to be active. Firing was accurate and numerous straddles were obtained necessitating the laying of smoke screens and the retiring of ships beyond range of shore batteries whenever they were not actually engaged in shooting at targets that could be observed. LE FANTASQUE was hit on its port torpedo tube by the battery on Cap L' Esterel and the F.S. GEORGES LEYGUES suffered a shell hit on her starboard after 40MM quadruple mount. Responsible enemy battery not located. Casualties were incurred on both vessels. In addition one minesweeper in Rade d'Hyeres was holed by a shell fired from Cap de L'Esterel. All other batteries were inactive, or were so well camouflaged as to appear inactive, to spotting planes. During the day all active batteries were engaged, usual results being a temporary suspension of activity followed by another period of activity. This resulted in some ships being unable to carry out fire missions. Cruisers and VOF spotting planes constantly scoured all areas for active targets. Heavy flak over San Mandrier prevented too close observation in that case.

Fire Missions.

1. U.S.S. NEVADA

- 0834 - Fired 5"/38 battery on target of opportunity.
- 0901 - Commenced firing on active battery at Y-805-915 using air spot. Mission successful, no further activity in area. 28 rounds H.C. (12") expended.
- 1013 - Fired on J01 (Y-793-968) using air spot, target destroyed, direct hit. 70 rounds H.C. (14") expended.
- 1244 - Fired on 6 coastal defense guns at Y-866-898, air spot, guns destroyed, 71 rounds H.C. (14") expended.
- 1321 - Fired on K-39 (Y-938-920), 4-90mm guns, air spot, target destroyed. 15 rounds H.C. (14") expended.
- 1749 - Fired on J-37 Y-877-914 (3-75mm guns), air spot, 3 guns hit, fire started. 30 rounds H.C. (14") expended.

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H.M.S. LOOKOUT

- 0735 - Fired 90 rounds H.E. at J-42 (904-923) using direct fire, results unknown due to observation difficulties.
- 1240 - Fired 26 rounds H.E. at 2 gun battery located at 824-913, battery silenced.

H.M.S. AURORA (In area South of Grande Passe)

- 1515 - Given target by FC 37 at Y993-983, communication with SFCP poor, driven out by fire from K-20 (San Mandrier) after expending 12 rounds H.E.

F.S. LORRAINE

- 0825 - Fired 5 rounds H.C. at J-40 (Ft. St. Elme) using direct fire, fire accurate.
- 0844 - Fired 11 rounds H.C. at K-20 using air spot, hits in target area.
- 0911 - Fired 36 rounds at K-22 using air spot, target destroyed.
- 1104 - Fired 3 rounds A.P. at 88mm A.A. battery at ST. ELME (San Mandrier) observing plane shot down.
- 1140 - Fired on battery at ST. ELME using direct fire, fire accurate. 8 rounds A. P. expended.
- 1240 - Fired on battery near J-27, mobile battery, direct fire, battery silenced. Guns appeared to be firing at QUINCY.

F.S. FANTASQUE (supporting M/S and troops)

- 0804 - Fired 44 rounds direct fire at L-24, 5 hits. This battery hit FANTASQUE.
- 0925 - Fired 33 rounds H.C. at ST. ELME direct fire.
- 1054 - Fired 96 rounds H.C. at ST. ELME direct fire.
- 1154 - Fired 45 rounds H.C. at J-13 (847-981) direct fire.
- 1250 - Fired 21 rounds H.C. at K-27 direct fire.

EMILE BERTIN

- 1. - Fired 29 rounds at K-50 (results unknown).
- 2. - Fired 42 rounds at Z107-925, one gun destroyed.

H.M.S. BLACK PRINCE

- 1. - Fired 44 rounds at Z100-498, good results.
- 2. - Fired 37 rounds at Z086-958, results unknown.

U.S.S. AUGUSTA

- 1112 - AUGUSTA fired on Golf Hotel at Z104-996 using air spot, 114 (8") H.C. expended. This hotel was an enemy strong point in Hyeres area.

C. O. N. F. I D E N T I A L

U.S.S. QUINCY

- 0752 - Fired 68 rounds 5"/38 at coastal defense and AA battery Y907-920, plane spot, many hits in area.
- 0805 - Fired 275 rounds A.A. common at 938-919 (AA battery), plane spot, hits in area.
- 0852 - Fired 32 rounds AA common at 805-916 (coastal guns), plane spot, area neutralized.
- 1005 - Fired 12 rounds, 5"/38 at Y856-973, plane spot, target neutralized.
- 1100 - Fired 20 rounds 5" common at 887-921 (coastal battery), plane spot, fire not effective. Interference by other ships firing.
- 1121 - Fired 48 rounds at coastal defense battery at 905-923, plane spot, plane reported 12 direct hits and 6 additional hits in area. This target was also fired on earlier in day but flak was too heavy for observation.
- 1220 - Fired at coastal defense battery at Y936-932, plane spot, 23 rounds, 8" H.C. expended. Explosion in area, ammunition or gasoline burning.
- 1245 - Fired 124-5"/38 at active coastal battery at 818-914, plane spot, battery neutralized.
- 1359 - Fired 25 rounds at enemy troops (903-123), plane spot, hits with 4 salvos.
- 1450 - Fired on coastal battery Y859-898, ship spot, several hits in vicinity of target. 35 rounds 5"/38 expended.
- 1628 - Fired 9 H.C. and 90 A.P. at K-20 (Y935-924), air spot. Plane reports possible hit in casemate, area covered with A.P.

In the morning at 0805 QUINCY 20 rounds unobserved area fire in square T 9400 in support of ground forces.

Note - QUINCY quite possibly used 5"/38 against large guns where 8" would have been far more effective. This was undoubtedly done to conserve 8" guns and ammunition. However during an assault such as this using air spots it is believed that use of larger caliber guns for coastal defense batteries would have been more effective and warranted.

U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA

PHILADELPHIA was assigned surveillance over batteries on Giens Peninsula and Isle de Porquerolles. Air spotters could find but little activity on any of assigned targets, in consequence most of ship's firing was done to neutralize areas assigned. Visibility bad for air spot.

- 0801 - Fired 40 rounds HC unobserved on 100-885.
- 0810 - Fired 44 rounds HC unobserved on 109-886 (L-23)
(Battery firing on minesweeps and F.S. FANTASQUE).

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- 0827 - Fired 55 HC unobserved on 200-827 (L-24).
- 0847 - Fired 50 rounds HC unobserved on 200-827.
- 0854 - Fired 50 rounds HC unobserved on 109-886 (L-23).
- 0920 - Fired 15 rounds HC unobserved on 106-885 (L-30).
- 1012 - Fired 42 rounds HC unobserved on 106-885 (L-30).
- 1021 - Fired 8 rounds HC on 121-888 (L-24) "no activity" from plane.
- 1520 - Fired 30 rounds HC on K-34 (065-884), target neutralized, air spot.
- 1535 - Fired 42 rounds HC at 108-885, air spot, area effectively covered.
- 1545 - Fired 18 rounds HC at 125-852, plane spot, area effectively covered.

Commander Task Force EIGHTY-SIX requested by despatch at 1043, 20 August, that a group of stone houses situated Z170-853 (porquerolles) be bombed as they contained an observation post for large guns at K-20 (San Mandrier). This O.P. was felt to be responsible for the accuracy of the guns on San Mandrier even at long ranges. This request was carried out.

Commander Task Force EIGHTY-SIX requested that CTF-88 interrogate plane spotters about the effect of gunfire on and the activity around San Mandrier area, particularly the large turret guns located thereon. Pilots reported that it was impossible to tell whether guns were silenced or just discontinued shooting after the naval bombardment. It was proven in following days that they had just discontinued firing.

As a result of the days activities the French forces ashore were in the outskirts of Toulon. The Naval Base at Toulon, the Giens Peninsula, San Mandrier, Toulon harbor area and the Island of Porquerolles were still in enemy hands. Some of the smaller guns that could offer resistance to approaching troops and ships were knocked out, but the larger, better emplaced guns were still very much intact and very dangerous.

On the evening of the 20th, commanding officers were briefed in the activities to be conducted on the 21st and the location of ships in the various fire support areas. CTF-88 was informed of spotting missions for the 21st and requested to brief pilots on targets K-50, K-03, K-20, K-40, and area in vicinity thereof.

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Location of ships for assault on Toulon 21 August as issued by CTF- 86:

SHIP	POSITION	SPOTTER	TIME
FANTASQUE and GEORGES LEYGUES	Rade Bormes	On call	--
MONTCAIM	Rade Hyeres	FC 37	0700
AUGUSTA	3 miles S. of Grand Passe	On call	--
AURORA	South of Porquerolles	FC 40	0800
EMILE BERTIN	South of Porquerolles	FC 36	0700
LORRAINE and PHILADELPHIA	South of Porquerolles	Counter battery Giens and Porquerolles	0800
QUINCY	15 miles S. of Giens	On call	0800
NEVADA and OMAHA	Off Cape Sicie	Plane	0800

21 August 1944

Situation on 21 August, 1944, was not too clear. It was known that parts of Toulon were occupied by friendly forces, therefore no pre-arranged targets were assigned, fire was to be on call only. For the same reason no bombing by aircraft could be scheduled by the Army. Situation became clearer during the day. It was apparent that San Mandrier was still controlled by the enemy, K-20 was operating against land forces as well as sea forces, batteries around Golf de Giens were also active. Island of Porquerolles although showing no activity with large guns was still holding out. Batteries on Cape de l'Esterel covering approach to Giens from Hyeres road was still active. An effective fire support area in the Rade d'Hyeres had been swept. Comparatively little shore bombardment was carried out by fire support ships during the day and there appeared to be considerable counter battery fire from the shore batteries. A request from SFCP 66 in the afternoon to shell Toulon and to bomb Mandrier was responded to by ships but not by the air force.

Firing on 21 August 1944:

MONTCAIM

1157 - Fired 36 rounds H.E. at gun coordinates 040-999 in response to call from SFCP 37.

~~C-SECRET~~

- 1146 - Fired on gun position at 037-000 for SFCP 37, 96 rounds H.E. expended, area well covered.
- 1635 - Fired 15 rounds H.E. on enemy strong point at 046-018 for SFCP 37.

The MONTCAIM fired from swept area in Rade d'Hyeres.

LORRAINE

- 1323 - Fired on battery at K-26 using plane spot but was ordered to cease firing by CTF - 86 because of fire endangering own troops. 13 rounds A.P. expended.
- 1900 - Fired on K-40 using plane spot. Area well covered, 8 rounds H.E. expended.

EMILE BERTIN

- 1430 - Fired 100 rounds on Z-087-988. Area well covered.
- 1530 - Fired 50 rounds on Z-044-966. Ammunition dump exploded.

AUGUSTA

- 1026 - Fired 30 rounds HC on Z-078-952, area well covered. Target was light gun battery covering approaches to Toulon.
- 1059 - Fired 42 rounds HC on Z-087-958, pill box, no direct hits.

AURORA

The AURORA bombarded 033-990, 022-963 and 019-960 effect and rounds expended not known, targets were light gun batteries protecting approaches to Toulon.

In the afternoon at 1450, the U.S.S. EBERLE spotted a white flag on the Island of Porquerolles, a boat was sent in to take off prisoners of war, 150 Germans were unwilling to surrender and established themselves on island strong point. After removing those prisoners desiring to surrender the EBERLE bombarded Old Chateau Fort located at 152-852 and the harbor area adjacent. Small boats on the beach apparently to be used to escape to the mainland were sunk. PT 553 and 556 were ordered by CTF-86 to patrol Petite Passe during night to prevent escape to the mainland of Germans still holding out.

During evening of the 21st of August, plans were made for the bombarding of the Island of Porquerolles to be followed by another party sent in under "white flag" to attempt to negotiate a surrender. Army was requested not to include Porquerolles in any bombing missions unless naval bombardment should fail. Spotting missions for 22 August were relayed to CTF-88.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

Information was received from the Commanding General, 7th Army, that it was their intention to by-pass Toulon and by so cutting it off to cause its eventual surrender. CWNTF urgently advised against this as the port of Toulon was badly needed to land supplies from ships to support the army rapidly moving inland.

At the end of the day the Army was apparently making excellent progress inland and in a westerly direction but the situation was not clear in Toulon. It was later learned that the assaults on Toulon and Marseille were to be undertaken by the French.

22 August 1944

Assignment of gunfire support ships and shore fire control parties at 220700 as follows:

SHIP	POSITION	SPOTTER	F.S. AREA
MONTCAIM	Rade d'Hyeres	FC 44	SW of square 0502
GEORGES LEYGUES	Rade d'Hyeres	FC 37	SW of square 0502
AURORA	3 miles south of Porquerolles	FC 40	W. of Ville D'Hyeres
GLOIRE	6 miles south of Giens	FC 38	W. of Ville D'Hyeres
PHILADELPHIA & LE MALIN	8 miles south of Giens	Own Planes	Giens & Porquerolles counter battery.
AUGUSTA	3 miles south of Grande Passe	On call	On call
QUINCY	15 miles south of Cape Sicie	On call	On call
OMAHA & FANTASQUE	Rade Bormes	On call	On call
LORRAINE	8 miles south of Giens	On call	On call

Plans were made for a heavy bombardment of San Mandrier and vicinity by planes to begin at 1200. On request of the Commanding General, 7th Army, this bombing was cancelled, it being undesirable because of the nearness of own troops to the area to be placed under attack.

Plan for the forcing of the surrender of the Island of Porquerolles as issued by CTF 86 was as follows:

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"This force (TATTNALL, CTG 86.5, LORRAINE and PHILADELPHIA) will attack and demand the surrender of the island garrison. At 1000, the target (Z 153-853) will be bombed, at 1030-1100, LORRAINE fire 20 AP projectiles using PHILADELPHIA plane spot. At 1120 PT #556, with white flag, deliver ultimatum. OMAHA be prepared to neutralize guns using PHILADELPHIA plane spot. If accepted, TATTNALL take off prisoners, HACKBERRY install garrison (SENEGALISE). If refused, LORRAINE fire 10 more rounds deliberately."

The preliminary bombing at 1000 was cancelled and in view of a statement, made by a POW taken from the island on the 22 August, that most of the island garrison had escaped during the night in two submarines, (this was very doubtful) the LORRAINE was to fire 10 AP instead of 20. Should the garrison continue to resist after bombardment by the LORRAINE, aerial bombing on the point of resistance was to be undertaken.

U.S.S. EBERLE was ordered to approach beach Z 132-844 on S.W. Porquerolles and remove any enemy there assembled who desired to surrender. PHILADELPHIA furnished plane for preliminary observation and necessary support. Some prisoners were removed by the EBERLE, but others were still holding out. The EBERLE was fired at by guns on Giens Peninsula, batteries silenced by PHILADELPHIA.

Carriers, operating in support of ships in this area, departed during early morning (with the exception of the SEARCHER) to a point 50 miles Southeast of Arbonne to attack 11th Panzer Division.

At 0900, Army requested naval gunfire as practicable and as coordinated with SFCP prior to 221800. Batteries to be fired on were:

L30	Z 185-869	K39	Y 938-920
L23	Z 109-886	K22	Y 935-929
L24	Z 121-888	J43	Y 917-927
L25	Z 123-888	J44	Y 916-930
L26	Z 124-887	J40	Y 900-923
K26	Z 069-887	J35	Y 870-910
K21	Y 938-926	J39	Y 888-921
K20	Y 935-925	K40	Y 936-929

Commanding General 7th Army was requested to adjust bomb safety line to enable aircraft to assist ships in the bombardment of above targets, particularly those on San Mandrier which were again very active on the morning of the 22nd August.

PHILADELPHIA was assigned to neutralize or destroy targets L-23, L-24, L-25, L-26 and K-36 using own plane spot from 1330 to 1800.

QUINCY, using fighter spot was assigned to cover targets J-40, J-41, J-42, J-43 and J-44 from 1330 to 1800.

LORRAINE was assigned targets K-20, K-21, K-22 and K-39 using fighter spot from 1330 to 1800.

OMAHA was ordered to relieve MONTCAIM, support of SFCP. MONTCAIM was to establish communications with spotting plane at 1530; conduct fire on targets K-23, K-26 and if FC 41 approved, shoot on Y900-976.

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Commander Task Force EIGHTY-SIX requested that most recent photo coverage of San Mandrier, Toulon and coastal battery, area West Giens, be delivered to him by PT boat and other pictures be taken and delivered as soon as possible, giving particular attention to targets H-09, H-24, H-02, F-19, D-06, K-20 and K-21 and C-23.

At 1850, on 22 August, U.S.S. HACKBERRY supported by OMAHA, landed Senegalese troops on Porquerolles; no opposition except by battery on Cape de l'Esterel which was silenced by PHILADELPHIA. Remainder of troops, holding out on island, surrendered.

Report of gunfire support by ships on 22 August follows:

PHILADELPHIA

- 1010 - Fired on L-23 (110-887) 2 hits, 75 rds. H.C. expended. Guns had been firing on Porquerolles.
- 1050 - Fired 57 rds. H.C. at K-44 (075-945) scoring 3 hits, plane spot; target active against ships in area.
- 1346 - Fired 45 rds. H.C. at L-23 (110-887) plane spot, area neutralized.
- 1356 - Fired 42 rds. H.C. at L-26 (123-888) plane spot, area neutralized; target requested by ARMY.
- 1414 - Fired 57 rds. H.C. at K-36 (069-887) plane spot, 1 direct hit, fire requested by ARMY.
- 1918 - Fired 6 rds. H.C. at L-23 (109-886) plane spot, target reported inactive by planes; ceased firing.

AUGUSTA

- 1847 - Fired 54 rds. H.C. at road junction and railroad at T 544-148 as requested by SFCP #42, direct hits scored.

MONTCAIM

- 1021 - Fired 21 rds H.E. direct fire at K-44 battery on Giens which had been active; checked fire because of doubt about battery's location.
- 1541 - Fired 96 rds. H.E. at coastal defense guns (223-248) using direct fire. Results were good.

AURORA

- 1151 - Fired on K-23 (Y956-963) C.D. battery, using air spot. Scored 8 hits inside fort and 2 direct hits on guns.

LORRAINE

- 1040 - Fired 11 rds. A.P. at Old Chateau Fort on Porquerolles, using air spot. Very good results. This was the firing planned to induce the surrender of the remaining enemy forces on the island.
- 1355 - Fired on K-20 and immediate vicinity using direct fire; fire requested by Army. 13 rds. expended. CTF86 ordered LORRAINE to withdraw, due to counter battery fire landing all around her and such risk not justified.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

LEYGUES:

- 1616 - Fired on active guns at 978-986 as requested by FC 37, 12 rounds H.C. expended. Ceased fire, troops advancing too fast in area.

UINCY:

- 1340 - Fired 21 rounds H.C. at C.D. guns at J-40 and J-41 (Y901-923) using plane spot. Hits on battery, target neutralized.
- 1405 - Fired 101 rounds H.C. at C.D. guns (Y 917-927) using plane spot; 4 direct hits.
- 1512 - Fired 50 rounds H.C. at C.D. guns (Y 905-923) using plane spot. Three direct hits scored.

OMAHA:

- 1834 - Fired 73 rounds. on guns on Cape de l'Esteral firing at Porquerolles, direct fire used, guns appeared to be neutralized.

MALIN:

- 1354 - Fired two salvos direct fire at Fort de Giens; results not observed; counter battery fire forced ship to retire.

Summary of day's activities:

Island of Porquerolles surrendered. San Mandrier and area around Gulf of Giens still very active, although bombarded heavily by ships. Progress ashore excellent in a general west and northwest direction but stubborn resistance being met on the Hyeres approaches to Toulon. White flags reported waving on Giens Peninsula late in the day, indicating a possible desire to surrender. 'White flag' waving was spasmodic, interspersed with firing from that area. It was thought that a hand assault of San Mandrier might be required.

C.T.F. 86 requested that targets in the following areas be subjected to bombing attack on the 23 August as a preliminary to the drive on Marseilles upon completion of the assault on Toulon: La Cride, Cap D'Alon, La Ciotat, Croisette, Pomegues and Cote Martigues. Special attention to be given to H-09, a 3 gun 240mm C.D. battery; H-24, a 2 gun 280mm battery and to coastal defense batteries on Pomegues Island.

C.T.F. 86 requested that the Army occupy Giens Peninsula on night 22-23 August as the white flags seen there indicated a desire to surrender.

At 222130, C.T.F. 86 issued following proposal for destruction of Cepet by raiding party:

Turreted guns on Cepet outrange the guns of all allied ships and prevent all naval support of troops assaulting Toulon. Air and naval bombing ineffective. Plan hand destruction of guns by raiding party, led by Commander Serriot Groupe D'Assault, supported by naval gunfire under cover of darkness and by preliminary daylight bombing. Propose 12th TAC bomb heavily during day Dog plus eight as practicable; last attack at sunset to include fire and smoke and MACAF provide night fighter from 2230 to 2400, who should observe gunfire and adjust fall of shot to hit in eastern area of San Mandrier, until raiders have landed at 2330; then in western area. MACAF also requested to assist in recovery of raiders in rubber boats at sea as may be required.

Two PT boats required to pick up Commander Serriot and parties at Colvi, departing at noon to rendezvous with AUGUSTA off Isle du Port Cros by 1800 for final briefing. Commands addressed were requested to take necessary action to forward the plan and to advise C.T.F. 86 of concurrence and extent cooperation will be extended.

This plan was disapproved by Army leaders and was not carried out.

23 August 1944

Assignment of ships to gunfire support was as follows:

Ship	Position	Spotter	F.S. area.
NEVADA	15 miles South of Cape Sicie	Plane spot	Targets on San Mandrier.
QUINCY	15 miles S.W. of Cape Sicie	Plane spot	Active enemy guns to West of Sicie
PHILADELPHIA	7 miles S. of Giens	Own planes	Neutralize Giens.
% LE MALIN	5 miles S. of Porquerolles	On call	On call
LORRAINE	Same	On call	On call
GEORGES LEYGUES	Rade D'Hyeres	FC 35	Area S of 00
MONTCALM		FC 43	E of 93, W of 97
FLOIRE	same	On call	On call
TANTASQUE	Rade BORMES	On call	On call
OMAHA	South of Porquerolles	On call	On call
AUGUSTA and AURORA			

Plans for forcing surrender Giens Peninsula were issued by C.T.F. 86 as follows:

This force will attack and demand the surrender of the garrison. 0730 to 0800, OMAHA bombard deliberately, not to exceed 100 rounds. Use SOC plane spot, provided by PHILADELPHIA. PT-553 or 556, with white flag, deliver ultimatum at 0815. OMAHA support. If accepted, GREENE take off prisoners. HACKBERRY land garrison from Levant Island until occupancy by mainland troops. If refused, continue bombardment and offers of surrender. PHILADELPHIA assisting from southward. C.T.G. 86.3 in OMAHA assault commander. TATTNALL remain in support of garrison. M/S-19 will support as requested.

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Giens Peninsula was not fired upon because spotting planes reported white flag flying. Party was sent ashore and Giens was found to have been evacuated by the enemy. The approach to Giens was swept to allow safe conduct of the landing party.

During the morning of the 23rd August, C.T.F. 86 received despatches to the effect that French troops were occupying parts of Marseilles. Minesweepers supported by destroyers, were sent to sweep a fire support area in that vicinity so as to be ready for the attack on that city. It was also reported that French forces were in control of Port de Bouc and Gulf of Fos; ships up to the size of the American liberty ship could be accommodated there.

Operation of ships against shore batteries and in support of Army on 23 August was as follows:

NEVADA:

- 0945 - Fired 90 rds. A.P. at K-20 (Y 935-925) air spot. K-20 discontinued firing.
- 1118 - Fired 85 rds. A.P. at K-21 (Y 938-926) three hits, target damaged, air spot.
- 1237 - Fired 10 rds. A.P., 17 H.C. at K-49 (Y 937-933) air spot; results undetermined.
- 1259 - Fired 72 rds. H.C. and 13 A.P. at K-21 (Y 938-926) using air spot. Several straddles; no direct hits.
- 1455 - Fired 38 rounds. A.P., 29 rounds. H.C. at K-22 (Y 935-929) using air spots, area covered. NEVADA near end of gun life, large dispersion.

QUINCY:

- 1405 - Fired 36 rounds at K-49 (Y 936-933) using air spot; 15 hits in area.
- 1627 - Fired on J-41, 42, 43 (Y 902-923) using air spot; three salvos on target, 20 hits in area.
- 1722 - Fired 76 rounds at K-38 (Y 851-953) air spot; 12 direct hits on fort.

LORRAINE:

- 1507 - Fired 8 rounds H.E. at Fort of St. Marguarite (Y 975-960) air spot. Three hits, one right on target.
- 1528 - Fired 16 rounds H.E., 33 rounds A.P. on active target near St. Marguarite; two direct hits; excellent firing.

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MONTCALM:

- 1103 - Fired 12 rounds for FC 38 on K-23 (957-963). Ordered to cease fire by C.T.F. 86; too close to own troops.
- 1146 - Fired 48 rounds A.P. for FC 38 at 922-957 (guns). Results excellent.
- 1240 - Fired 63 rounds A.P. at active guns at 924-955; fire very effective.
- 1412 - Fired 5 H.C. and 78 A.P. at guns located at St. Marguarite; good shooting, guns silenced. FC 38.
- 1625 - Fired 79 rounds A.P. at gun firing at 976-959 (St. Marguarite). Effective, guns silenced. All missions for FC 38.

In view of the Army's rejection of the plan to attack San Mandrier with Commandos, and the success of the French forces, CWNTF assigned to C.T.F. 86 the task of clearing a channel in Golf de Fos and the opening of the harbor of Port du Bouc. Also, San Mandrier was to be attacked by artillery from on shore assisted as practicable by naval gunfire. No planes could be spared for this effort unless A.A. guns in San Mandrier were subdued, as the air force losses had been too heavy in this area.

Requests for gunfire support in Marseilles area had already been received but could not be responded to because of minefields. Minesweepers were given orders to begin sweeping in the Gulf de Fos at first light on the 24th; support vessels and smokers were assigned to M/S.

On the evening of the 23rd August, the Commanding General 7th Army, requested that ships not fire on San Mandrier until further orders. This was passed along to all fire support ships.

The bombing of strong points between Toulon and Marseilles, as requested by Admiral Davidson, could not be carried out by the Army because of previous commitments.

Summary of day's activities:

Giens surrendered. Progress made in area of Toulon, but San Mandrier still holding out against repeated assaults. French control Marseilles except for a few pockets of resistance. Port du Bouc and Gulf de Fos in friendly hands and available for shipping when cleared of mines.

24 August 1944

Assignment of gunfire support ships for 24 August was as follows:

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Ships	Position	Spotter	Target
LORRAINE	Under lee of Giens	Plane	From San Mandrier to grid 92
EL FANTASQUE	"	"	"
MONTCALM	"	FC 37	"
G'ORGES	Rade D'Hyeres	FC 36	Toulon outskirts.
LEYGUES			
GLOIRE	Rade d'Hyeres	FC 39	"
PHILADELPHIA	SW Cape Sicie	FC 35	Toulon outskirts.
		Own plane	
OMAHA	SW Cape Sicie	FC 43	"
QUINCY	SW Cape Sicie	Plane	San Mandrier - Cape Sicie area
AURORA	South of Giens	FC 43	Toulon outskirts
NEVADA	10 miles S. of F-19	Plane	Counter battery in vicinity Marseilles and Golfe de Fos
AUGUSTA	S. of Grande Passe		On call.

There was little activity by support ships in the Toulon area on the morning of the 24th because of Commanding General 7th Army's request that San Mandrier not be fired upon. This order was cancelled later in the day.

Various activities made the following reports:

- 1045 - Marseilles harbor demolished.
- 1112 - Spotting plane reported La Crotet in friendly hands.
- 1300 - Photos of F-12 and F-13 show positions to be badly damaged.
- 1509 - Cape Sicie appears to be in friendly hands (plane report). Cape Couronne batteries active.
- 1514 - FC 39 reported Toulon arsenal surrendered.

C.T.F. 86 requested that the Army bomb D-06 and D-07 in the Marseilles area and at 1400 sent QUINCY and PHILADELPHIA to Golfe de Fos to support minesweepers which were under fire and requesting support. Activities of fire support ships on 24 August.

NEVADA:

- 0912 - Fired 55 rounds H.C. at F-14 (T 403-133) using air spot. Results good, hit and explosions in target area.
- 1003 - Fired 15 rounds H.C. at F-12 (T 392-116) using air spot; target destroyed.
- 1020 - Fired 30 rounds H.C. at F-13 (T 400-117) results effective; air spot.
- 1056 - Fired 40 rounds H.C. at F-39 (T 425-133); one hit on cliffs below guns knocked them into sea. Air spot.

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GEORGES LYGUES:

1536 - Fired 21 rounds A.P. at 935-964 in response to call from FC 36; good results.

QUINCY:

1404 - Fired 47 rounds H.C. at K-20 (935-925) using plane spot, target straddled with five salvos but still firing.

1806 - Fired 85 rounds at D-06 (Marseilles area) using plane spot. One direct hit on gun, 3 hits on casemates.

AURORA:

1339 - Fired 78 rounds for FC 38 at Y 919-933; result unreported.

1425 - Fired 52 rounds for FC 38 at battery firing at Y 939-925; area covered.

1455 - Fired on observation post at Y 936-932 for FC 38, large fire started; believed to be OP for K-20.

TOIRE:

1009 - Fired 208 rounds for FC 39 at J-44 (916-930); excellent firing, guns silenced.

1128 - Fired 208 rounds on A.A. guns at 936-925; exploded ammunition dump. FC 39.

1200 - Fired 183 rounds for FC 39 on troop concentrations and OP adjacent to 936-925; area covered.

1339 - Fired 78 rounds on J-44 (916-930); silenced guns which had opened up again.

Good progress was made by the forces ashore during the day. Some fighting was still going on in Toulon, but the main resistance continued to be centered around San Mandrier.

Army assaulted the area with artillery but could not subdue it and requested naval fire be resumed. K-20 remained active and seemed impervious to anything but a direct hit by large caliber shell.

With a few exceptions, the area west of Toulon was in friendly hands.

In Marseilles proper, there was scattered resistance by the enemy, particularly around the coastal defense batteries which put in an active day firing on minesweepers clearing Golfe de Fos. Approaches to Port du Bouc heavily mined.

25 August 1944

Assignment of gunfire support ships:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>SPOTTER</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
LORRAINE	Lee of Giens	Fighter plane	St. Mandrier
ONTCAIM	Lee of Giens	Calling wave	On call
J. LEYGUES	Lee of Giens	On call	On call
GLOIRE	Rade D'Hyeres	Calling wave	On call
FANTASQUE	Lee of Giens	On call	On call
AURORA	Lee of Giens	Calling wave assign targets	On call
OMAHA	5 mi. S.W. of Cape Sicie	Calling wave	On call
AUGUSTA	10 mi. S.W. of Cape Croisette	Fighter plane	Marseilles area
PHILADELPHIA	Entrance to swept channel Golf de Fos	Own plane	Support of M/S
QUINCY	Entrance to swept channel Golf de Fos	Own plane	Support of M/S

Toulon area.

San Mandrier and Cape Sicie were still active and the Army requested that naval gunfire continue on these strongpoints. While absent in the Marseilles area C.T.F. 86 appointed Commanding Officer, H.M.S. AURORA as his deputy for a combined naval assault in San Mandrier. At 1639, CTF-86 sent following message to forces in this area:

Force surrender of Mandrier to French Army at 1900 X By continuous deliberate bombardment by several ships from 1800 to 1900 Y All ships fire present position except AURORA and RAMILLES in YOLF 7786 spotting plane assigned one each RAMILLES channel C and LORRAINE channel A Link ship for LORRAINE as this morning X Other ships use own SFCP's K For ranging first 5 minutes LORRAINE second 5 minutes RAMILLES when range established and planes recognize own fall of shot both RAMILLES and LORRAINE take up simultaneous bombardment X If K-20 and K-21 inactive RAMILLES engage active targets West of grid line Y925 LORRAINE east of that line X.

Unfortunately the Army did not receive the message and so did not cooperate in the plan to force the surrender of this fortress. Heavy bombardment of the area was kept until 1900 by naval support forces.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

Marseilles area.

Minesweepers completed a swept channel in a North-South direction into the Golf de Fos. This channel was out of range for fire support by light cruisers against batteries near Marseillè so C.T.F. 86 ordered a East-West channel swept in the Baie de Marseille. In addition to this a channel in the Cap Croisette area was to be swept to allow for counter battery fire on the batteries on Ratonneau and Pomegue. D-06 which had been active the day previously now appeared to be in friendly hands. Army requested no fire on Marseille harbor as it was pending capture and installations were desired intact. Troops were reported near waterfront in Southern part of Marseilles against which a drive was expected to be made on the 26th August at which time naval gunfire would probably be needed. Minefields unless cleared would make long range firing necessary.

Firing missions 25 August 1944.

OMAHA

- 1538 - Fired 127 rounds HC at 895-946 (San Mandrier) for FC 41, target reported destroyed.

AUGUSTA

- 0837 - Fired 30 rounds HC on DP battery F-16 at T 415-140 using air spot, guns destroyed.
- 0857 - Fired 45 rounds HC on barracks at T 415-141, air spot, building hit several times.
- 0944 - Fired 42 rounds HC on active 3 gun CD battery F-14 (T403-~~44~~ 133), air spot. Target area well covered, battery ceased firing temporarily.
- 1016 - Fired 29 rounds HC at 4 gun CD battery F-19 (T447-060), air spot. Battery silenced.
- 1126 - Fired 37 rounds HC at barracks T 408-133, air spot, several direct hits.
- 1226 - Fired 24 rounds HC at barracks T 408-132, for FC 42, area covered.
- 1406 - Fired 78 rounds HC 12 rounds AP at active 4 gun CD battery F-19 (447-060) using air spot. 3 A.A. gun emplacements destroyed, 1 CD gun destroyed.
- 1648 - Fired 21 rounds HC at F-19, air spot, guns were neutralized, have not fired since.
- 1836 - Fired 18 rounds HC at active 4 gun CD battery F-12 (397-116), air spot, area well covered, battery silenced.

AURORA

- 1228 - Fired 88 rounds for FC 38 at Y 915-929, guns firing. Fire started, area covered.
- 1314 - Guns firing at Y 939-929, expended 77 rounds for FC 38, results unknown.
- 1350 - Fired 50 rounds at 905-923, air spot, results unknown.

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- 1429 - Fired 5 rounds at guns firing at Y915-938 for FC 38. Smoke made observation difficult.
- 1434 - Fired 50 rounds at gun firing (Y905-923) using air spot, guns silenced.
- 1458 - Fired 22 rounds on gun firing at Y905-922, air spot, results unknown.
- 1523 - Fired 12 rounds on guns firing at Y920-920, air spot, explosions and fire result of shoot.
- 1540 - Fired 79 rounds for FC 38 on guns firing at Y915-936, area covered.
- 1555 - Fired 110 rounds direct fire on Y935-925 (guns firing), area covered.
- 1638 - Fired 133 rounds for FC 38 on Y930-935, area well covered.
- 1729 - Fired 29 rounds for FC 38 on guns firing at Y918-927, hits near guns.
- 1749 - Began area bombardment of San Mandrier using direct fire, expended 253 rounds. Ceased fire at 1900.

RAMILLES.

- 1640 - Fired 16 rounds at CB battery (938-926) using direct fire. Smoke too thick to observe results.
- 1838 - Fired 44 rounds on CD battery at Y901-923 using air spot, direct hits on gun emplacements.

FANTASQUE

- 1855 - Fired 47 rounds on J-67 (Maregar) direct fire, several direct hits.

GLOIRE

- 0928 - Fired on battery at 925-930 for FC 39. Four direct hits.
- 0958 - Fired 12 rounds on battery at 916-927 for FC 39, smoke obscured observation.
- 1056 - Fired 10 rounds on 920-920 for FC 39, results unknown.
- 1508 - Fired 49 rounds on K-20, results ineffective.

LOOKOUT

- 1340 - Fired 113 rounds HE on battery at 904-923, direct fire. Battery silenced.
- 1425 - Fired 114 rounds HE on battery at 904-923, direct fire, many rounds on the target.
- 1503 - Fired 15 rounds on above target, unobserved results.
- 1533 - Fired 21 rounds HE on building at 936-926, direct fire, hits in target area.
- 1550 - Fired 63 rounds HE on K-20, direct fire, ineffectual results.
- 1728 - Fired 85 rounds HE on K-20, direct fire. Fire for effect in area.

KENDRICK

Fired 117 rounds on J-35 and J-40 direct fire, results good.

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MONTCAIM

- 1503 - Fired 78 rounds direct fire on J-70, well covered.
- 1552 - Fired 63 rounds direct fire on K-21, well covered.
- 1619 - Fired 72 rounds direct fire on K-21, well covered.
- 1841 - Fired 108 rounds direct fire on K-21, well covered.

LORRAINE

- 1204 - Fired 15 rounds at K-20, plane spot, two adjacent batteries destroyed.
- 1627 - Fired 18 rounds direct fire on gun on San Mandrier, near misses.
- 1832 - Fired 69 rounds on San Mandrier using direct fire, ammunition dump exploded.

Photo summary report of bombardment in the Toulon area submitted by CTG 88.2 follows:

Photos approximately 251545, except targets K-40 and K-43, which were approximately 250900. Two excellent sorties. Target J-40 (Y901-023) 2 gun CD Battery, no damage. J-41 (Y 904-923) 3 gun CD Battery, no damage. J-42 (Y904-923) 3 gun CD Battery. No damage observed, but near hits in wood. J-43 (Y 9127) 4 gun D.P., one unaccountable, others appear unharmed. Some rather distant craters. J-44 (Y916-930) 6 gun CD/AA Battery (heavy). One gun has suffered direct hit. Five others appear unharmed. K-20 (Y 935-925) 2 gun heavy coastal battery. Hits within few yards, but no visible damage, guns or turrets. K-21 (Y939-926) 2 gun heavy C.D. Battery. Same as K-20. K-22 (935-929) 4 gun CD Battery knocked out. K-37 (Y935-032) 3 gun battery, light CD, knocked out. K-39 (Y938-920) 4 gun AA/CD battery, 1 gun out with direct hit; another probably damaged, two appear undamaged. K-40 (Y937-930) 2 gun CD Battery; guns undamaged. K-43 (Y 939-929) 2 gun heavy DP. Near hits but guns appear undamaged. K-49 (Y937-933) 4 gun light CD Battery, not covered. J-70, hits in woods around position, causing fires; 1 gun knocked out, other 3 do not appear to have suffered direct hits. Command post hit, additional information on photos. STRASS-BCHRG (Y909-935) all but one turret demolished, remaining turret badly damaged. Many direct hits; ship, though upright, probably unserviceable.

26 August 1944

On the 26th of August, the enemy was located in the following places from which resistance could be expected. From Carry to Letasque (on peninsula between Marseilles and Golf de Fos), several batteries in area; Ile de Ratonneau; Ile de Pomegues; Cape Croisette and San Mandrier. Pocket of 3,000 German troops concentrated in area around Censuela and Nequet, who anticipated escape via Martiques. Forces insufficient to prevent this in area and Port de Bouc would be jeopardized by such an attempt. To cover areas, ships were stationed as follows:

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<u>SHIP</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>SPOTTER</u>	<u>TARGET</u>
GLOIRE	Rade d'Hyeres	Calling wave	On call
MONTCAIM	Lee of Giens	Calling wave	On call
LORRAINE	Lee of Giens	Calling wave	San Mandrier
LE FANTASQUE	Lee of Giens	Calling wave	On call
OMAHA	SW of Cape Sicie	Calling wave	On call
RAMILLES	SW of Cape Sicie	Plane	San Mandrier and Fort Six Fours
SIRIUS	SW of Cape Sicie	On call	Fort Six Fours
AUGUSTA	10 mi. S. of Cape Croisette	Plane	Marseilles area
PHILADELPHIA	10 mi. S. of Cape Croisette	Plane	Marseilles area
RODMAN	S. of Gulf de Fos	On call	Support M/S

SNGL0 and 7th Army notified of this disposition. In order to give gunfire support in the Marseilles area, CTF 86 ordered that sweeping as requested be started on the east west gun fire support area and also on the Mars area off Cape Croisette if this would not interfere with the opening of Port du Bouc. Commander M/S Flotilla 5 replied that this could be done and began sweeping area for fire support ships SW of Cape Croisette. In general, sea around Marseilles was heavily mined.

At 1150, CTF 86 received a report from LO 66 that Army intends to clear whole peninsula SW of Toulon on 26 August. Intensive fire required on San Mandrier battery to support operation. Fort Six Fours reported captured. In response to this, CTF 86 ordered an intensive bombardment of San Mandrier from 1230 to 1630, similar to that of 25 August; FS MONTCAIM with Contra Amiral JAUIARD was in charge of fire support vessels in that area. Difficulty in assigning ships to SFCPS and placing them in best support areas was experienced because of failure of SFCPS to give their locations. In addition, many SFCPS were carried beyond range of ships by the fast moving Army and had to be recalled to areas where they were needed for control of ships fire. The bombardment of San Mandrier was carried out very effectively with very little return fire. After retiring from the area, LORRAINE suffered near misses at about 30,000 yards from guns believed to be located at Cap Cepet.

Minesweepers clearing the East-west Fire Support area in Baie Marseille were taken under heavy fire by guns located at F01, F19 and D06. SOMERS supporting the minesweepers covered D06 effectively but could do nothing against F01 and F19 as they were out of range. Minesweepers retired under cover of SOMERS smoke after completing sweep without damage.

Minesweepers in Mars area were also hampered by fire from shore batteries at Cap Croisette. AUGUSTA responded with counter battery fire and silenced the batteries.

Firing on San Mandrier considerably reduced its effectiveness

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and after the bombardment ceased, an attack by French forces ashore could probably have forced its surrender. Due to narrow isthmus approach to area such an attack would have suffered heavy casualties and so was not made.

MONTCAIM:

- 1300 - Fired 116 rds direct fire at J-70, 920-920, area well covered.
- 1328 - Fired 353 rds direct fire at K-38, K-39 (938-919), area well covered; one explosion.
- 1400 - Fired 156 rds direct fire at St. Elme, area well covered.
- 1420 - Fired 16 rds direct fire at K-49 (936-932), one direct hit.
- 1435 - Fired 90 rds direct fire at machine guns (912-916), area well covered.

LORRAINE:

- 1329 - Emptied two guns on ST. ELME, direct fire.
- 1345 - Fired on gun sighted at tunnel entrance by plane; 16 rds expended, target neutralized.
- 1430 - Fired 14 rds at 3940mm gun (Y 933-922), direct fire; results unknown.
- 1445 - Fired 21 rds on suspected troop concentration at Cap Cepet; direct fire.
At 1321, 1421, 1450, LORRAINES 138mm guns fired on St Elme and exploded ammunition dump. 75mm guns fired at same time, expending 121 rds on port battery and same on starboard battery.

FANTASQUE:

- 1345 - Fired on K-39, direct fire; observed direct hits; believe target destroyed.
- 1444 - Fired on J-70, direct fire; observed large explosion and fire.
- 2050 - 2114 - Fired on Cap Cepet, direct fire; results unobserved. Total rds expended for day - 241.

RAMILLES:

- 1306 - Fired 17 rds H.E. and 18 rds A.P. at C.D. Battery (Y 939-926), air spot, area well covered.

KENDRICK:

- 1425 - Fired 59 rds 5"/38 at ammunition dump on San Mandrier using direct fire. Dump set afire.
- 1455 - Fired 5 rds at K-38 using direct fire; results fair.

LUDLOW:

- 1828 - Fired 28 rds at F-19 firing on minesweepers, using direct

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

LUDLOW: (cont'd)

fire; smoke obscured results.

GLOIRE:

- 1305 - Fired on 929-990, using direct fire; results excellent.
- 1319 - Fired on J-43 (917-927) results unknown.
- 1400 - Fired on (917-927) using direct fire; probably one direct hit.
- 1409 - Fired on la Croix de Signaux, observed numerous hits.
Total rounds fired -- 152mm -- 384
90mm -- 448

AUGUSTA:

- 1106 - Fired 12 rds H.C. on 4 gun battery at 447-060, using air spot; target area well covered.
- 1643 - Fired 27 rds H.C. on active 4 gun battery at 447-060, using air spot; one gun destroyed, one gun damaged, ammunition dump hit; battery silenced.
- 1823 - Fired 24 rds H.C. on active 4 gun battery at 442-060 using air spot; target area covered, target silenced.

Photo interpretation report as of 1450, 26 August shows following effects of bombardment:

- F-12 (T 397-116), 4 gun CD Battery; two unoccupied, damage. One casemate of 2 guns in CD Battery appear unhit.
- F-13 (T 400-117), 4 gun light CD Battery guns do not appear to have had direct hits.
- F-14 (T 403-133), 3 gun CD Battery camouflaged. One gun direct hit, entirely eradicated.
- F-14 (T 404-133), 3 gun CD Battery camouflaged. One gun direct hit, two guns not directly hit. Command post direct hit.
- F-16 (T 416-040), 5 gun AA/CD Battery, 2 unoccupied; 3 occupied, positions have not suffered direct hits.
- F-36 (T 409-134), 6 gun AA/CD Battery, no guns appear to have suffered direct hits. One slight and CP have had direct hits. Many nearby buildings have been hit.

CTF 86 issued instructions to TF 86 and NGLO for gunfire support on 27 August as follows:

Army requirements will not be known until early 27 August. Gunfire support ships, less LORRAINE and FANTASQUE, take same support areas 27 August as occupied today. GLOIRE rendezvous, with FMILE BERTIN in lee of Giens.

CTF 86 requested pilots of spotting planes be briefed on targets F-14, F-16, F-36, F-19, F-20 and vicinity and also San Mandrier for operations on 27 August.

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27 August 1944

There was little activity on this day, constant bombardment of shore batteries by ships finally taking effect. Commanding General 7th Army, at the request of the French, ordered air force to bomb Islands of Ratonneau and Pomegues and San Mandrier, expending maximum effort to the exclusion of all other missions for medium and heavy bombers. This was done in the belief that one final heavy bombardment would force surrender. Should the bombing fail to force surrender, the ARMY "B" was to put maximum artillery fire on positions and request heavy naval fire to assist. However, no heavy naval gunfire was called for during the day. In addition to the above enemy held territory, the following were still in enemy hands: Cape Sicie, Port area and South end of Marseilles, and a pocket on the isthmus South of Etang de Berre. The PHILADELPHIA was covering this pocket, but was requested not to fire because it might force the Germans to make a dash for freedom toward Port du Bouc which was only sparsely garrisoned.

Minesweepers, which had been subject to light fire during the day, had opened up the Port de Bouc and cleared two fire support areas; one off Cap Croisette and another due West of Marseilles, beginning at 5°11'E longitude.

Following report of gunfire received by CTF 86:

Spotting plane reported 271330B two large fires and explosions in area J-44 West of King 37; following naval bombardment, guns at K-20, K-22, K-37 and K-40 appear serviceable but unmanned. Bombardment San Mandrier, 261045B to 261115B, RAMILLES fired 34 rds on K-38. DOUGAY TROUIN, 4 rds on K-22 and 928-930. GLOIRE fired 67 rds on K-22; shooting effective, fires started. MADISON fired 280 rds at battery located 445-062 from 271613 to 271830B. Fire reported effective, guns silenced, area well covered by fire; this in support of minesweepers.

On the evening of the 27th, CTF 86 requested CTG 88.2 to brief pilots for targets in Marseilles area and railway guns T4122. The railway guns were reported by SNGLO as a possible target for the 28th August, SFCPS to spot. Targets in Cap Sicie-Mandrier were also to be briefed. Commanding General 7th Army reported that all resistance in the Toulon and Cap SICIE concluded, that San Mandrier had not surrendered but was no longer firing. Army planned to send "white flag" party to San Mandrier; requested no bombing or gunfire until further notice. It is believed that the defenders are too far underground to make future bombing or gunfire effective. General Patch also reported that the peninsula between Etang de Berre and sea is free of enemy. CTF 86 notified his deputy in Toulon area not to shoot at San Mandrier pending further orders.

At 2200, CTF 86 received a despatch from French SNGLO (6th Corp) that a cease fire order had been issued in Marseilles area pending discussion with German general about to take place.

Assignment of ships in Toulon area for 28 August, orders issued by CTF 86:

Ships on two hours notice X One plane on call EMILE BERTIN and LORRAINE with FC 34 X SIRIUS with FC 35 X Following ships will be in vicinity of Iles d'Hyeres X EMILE BERTIN carrying deputy CTG 86.2 who will reassign ships to SFCP's as called for LORRAINE, GLOIRE, DUGUAY TROUIN, LE FANTASQUE, SIRIUS and escorting destroyers X Ships hereby directed in accordance orders LO 66 no repeat no bombardment of San Mandrier until further requested by LO 66.

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Assignment of ships and SFCPs in Marseilles area on 28 August.

Ship	Spotter	Target
ROMERS	FC 14	On call
ROOKLYN	FC 41, FC 37, own plane	On call
MADISON	FC 42	Support M/S
WINCY	FC 36	N.W. Corner
	Fighter plane	Marseilles Harbor

Do not fire on mainland without clearance from SNGLO 6th Corps. It is reported that Maquis do not wish German pockets above Mejean fired upon since if they break Northward Maquis cannot hold them. They also request that road East from Marsignes on South shore of Citany de Berre be not fired on because of pipe line work by U.S. Engineers.

British CVE's in Toulon-Marseilles area that had been furnishing fighter cover and spotting planes for ships were released at last light on the 27th August.

28 August 1944

"No gunfire order" in effect throughout day as indications were that all enemy pockets holding out in Toulon - Marseilles area would surrender today. Situation was not clear as to whether Marseilles would surrender in its entirety or whether the islands would continue to hold out. All enemy batteries in the Toulon - Marseilles kept under surveillance by naval vessels until definite knowledge received of their surrender. Destroyers supported minesweepers against possible counter battery fire, while they continued to clear mined areas in vicinity of Marseilles. Orders were issued to commence sweeping Toulon harbor after report was received that entire Toulon area including San Mandrier had surrendered at 230932 and LO 66 reported no further gunfire support required in that area. Upon the surrender of Toulon French ships were retired to St. Tropez harbor to remain on one-half hours notice. Marseilles surrendered at 281332 but the surrender of the islands of Ratonneau, Pomegues, and D'If still uncertain. It was later learned that these islands would surrender but not to the French. MADISON was ordered to receive a party from the island of D'If which had come out in a small boat with a white flag to discuss terms which were to be unconditional surrender. This was done to forego any further menace from the islands to M/S in harbor. MADISON informed CTF 86 that final acceptance or rejection of surrender terms would be signalled at 290800 from Ile D'If.

It now looked that the need of gunfire support ships in the Marseilles area would soon be ended. However, CTF 86 ordered pilots be briefed on targets on Islands D'If, Ratonneau, and Pomegues for

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possible fire support on 29 August, should terms of surrender not be accepted. Plans were also laid for retirement by BB's CA's, and CVE's to rear area as soon as their services were no longer required. "No fire" orders were issued for 29 August.

29 August 1944

Assignment of ships in the Marseilles area substantially the same as on 28 August. Captain of the PHILADELPHIA sent to islands with terms of surrender. AUGUSTA and PHILADELPHIA marines were sent to garrison islands and carry out terms of surrender. At 1816 terms of surrender were signed and all resistance was ended in Marseilles area.

CWNTF released all remaining CVE's.

CTF 86 reported no further spotting missions required on the left flank, one continuous spotting mission daily required on the right flank, the arrangement for observation of fall of shot by WFCP, cub plane or air spotting the commitment of the Army commander. CTF 86 reported to CWNTF that gunfire support requirements on the right flank would be handled by light forces augmented as necessary by light American and French cruisers. All unnecessary ships plus heavy cruisers and battleships were released from TF 86.

30 August 1944

AUGUSTA and PHILADELPHIA marines and POW were evacuated from the islands off Marseilles. CTF 86 Operation Plan 5-44 (Post Assault Gunfire Support Phase) ended. Operation plan Flare Two effective. "Well done" from Admiral HEWITT and General PATCH.

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ENCLOSURE B PART V

GUNFIRE SUPPORT NOTES

II. Right Flank (18 August - 25 September)

A. General..

1. In accordance with instructions issued by CTF 86, Op-Plan 5-44 was placed into effect 0000, 18 August 1944. All landings had been successful, beachheads firmly established; hence certain areas no longer required naval gunfire support. Therefore a redistribution of ships was necessary and was provided for in above mentioned plan.

2. In the Right Flank Group was placed 1 CA (U.S.S. TUSCALOOSA) CTF 86.5 Rear Admiral DEYO, 3 CL's (USS BROOKLYN, FS EMILE BERTIN, FS DUGUAY TROUIN), 2 DL's (FS TERRIBLE, FS FANTASQUE) 4 DD's (USS BOYLE, USS CHAMPLIN, USS WOOLSEY, USS EDISON).

3. Plan 5-44 was naturally fluid enough to allow ships to be designated for operation outside of their own particular group. For example the FS FANTASQUE operated entirely with the Left Flank Force and the EMILE BERTIN assisted the Left Flank Force in the reduction of Toulon, later rendezvousing with the USS TUSCALOOSA in the Right Flank area on the 23rd of August.

4. The mission of the Left Flank Support Group was to conduct bombardment in support of right flank beachhead, support advancing troops with gunfire, and to prevent small craft raids from enemy held territory to the eastward. Support fire to be used against targets of opportunity determined by liaison with advancing troops, aircraft spotters and in rare cases the top spotters on the ships themselves.

5. The Right Flank was equipped with strong enemy defenses. Intelligence had compiled rather complete information as to number, range, caliber and arc of fire of the coastal guns. The largest how batteries were 150 mm. with range of about 26,000 yards. However, with railroads running along the beach as they were, there was also the possibility of having to deal with large mobile guns. Following the general plan the cruisers could provide fire support long and short range and the destroyers were to act as escorts of the capital ships and standby bombardment vessels on call for Army requests for fire. Two DD's were designated to remain in F/S area at night and answer calls for fire support. These requests for night fire did come in.

B. Support.

1. D-plus-3, 18 August - Returning from retiring area the Task Group took stations in F/S area's South and Southwest of Cannes and awaited assignments by SFCP's. At 0945 the USS EDISON

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opened up on an AA battery to the Westward of Cannes. The range was 11,000; results unknown. The ship fired 37 rounds AAC using ships spotter. This did not draw any fire from the beach. No missions were being fired and there was no activity on the beach. Complying with orders of CTG 86.5 to "close harbor and develop land batteries", the USS WOOLSEY, USS EDISON and USS BOYLE moved into Cannes harbor at 10 knots. This was about 1115. At 1140 the EDISON commenced firing on a pill box which had previously fired on observation planes. Fired 46 rounds of AAC. Made direct hits using ships spot. By this time the DD's were well within the harbor, and 1142 the shore batteries opened fire on them. The enemy fire was accurate and our ships were straddled. However, by maneuvering radically at high speed and with a little good fortune none received any hits. The WOOLSEY saw flashes to Eastward of the harbor in vicinity of the charted location of a 3 gun coastal defense dual purpose battery, 88-1-5mm., and at 1149 commenced firing and during the next four minutes put 66 rounds AAC into target area. The USS TUSCALOOSA and USS BROOKLYN meanwhile had seen the splashes near the destroyers. The USS TUSCALOOSA, at 1149 fired two rounds HC (8") at the same target at which the EDISON was firing. The range was 6850, so commenced firing 5" battery. Expended 29 rounds AAC. The battery was silenced and caused no further trouble during subsequent operations. The BROOKLYN fired on gun emplacements about 500 yards South at W-53, the WOOLSEY's target. Ship's spot was used, the range being 8,100 yards. Forty-four rounds H.C. were expended, covering the area very well. On orders of CTG 86.5, the destroyers cleared the harbor as batteries being firing upon were incapable of firing on allied troops.

Calls for fire from the beach had been nil up to now. But at 1157, the BROOKLYN shifted targets, at the request of LO 11, to an OP and battery fired 15 rounds H.C. and secured direct hit on tower. In the early afternoon, NLO 11 designated an active battery as target. Commenced firing at 1239, range 14,800 yards, using P-51 for spotting. Fired 27 rounds in ranging salvos and 9 rounds for effect. Area was well covered. Later a new target, called for by NLO 11. The target was heavy artillery and OP, at which a total of 53 rounds H.C. were fired. At 1555, firing completed, mission successful. Later LO 11 reported the Op had surrendered. At 1610, the BROOKLYN fired, using differed type ammunition to advantage. Upon call from NLO 11, this ship commenced firing on OP and strong point in a castle, using FC 11 and P-51 spotting. Secured direct hit on third salvo but H.C. projectiles doing little damage, so checked fire and shifted to A. P. A.P.'s penetrated and enemy evacuated castle, taking shelter in woods. So fire was again checked, and resumed, using H.C. once more, firing into woods. Enemy was dispersed, a total of 51 H.C. and 15 rounds A.P. having been fired.

The U.S.S. TUSCALOOSA had no requests for fire so lay to in Gulf of Frejus and departed in the evening for Ajaccio with EDISON and WOOLSEY as escorts.

The BOYLE was later directed by BROOKLYN to take Army Liaison Officer, to Green Beach for conference with NLO 11.

2. D-plus-4 - 19 August - Returned to right flank area and the BOYLE picked up and returned to BROOKLYN the ALO, who had attended conference on the beach. The LO had brought with him a captured German map showing in great detail the position of German batteries in the vicinity of Gulf of Napoule as of the 17th of August.

Only two targets were fired upon during the day. The USS BROOKLYN received a call from NLO 11 to fire on slit trenches and guns located by coordinates from captured German map. Using a P-51 for spotting the BROOKLYN fired 36 rounds HC completely neutralizing the area. Just prior to that the USS BOYLE successfully took under fire a dual purpose battery at the Western end of the Gulf of Napoule, fired 70 rounds, observed by LO 11.

The FS TERRIBLE reported for duty in late afternoon and was assigned patrol duty in Gulf of Napoule. No calls for support were forthcoming from forces on land and planes and ships had noted little activity during the day; so at 1910 right flank group departed for retirement area.

3. D-plus-5 - 20 August - The right flank group returned to F/S area about 0630. Informed by C. F. HUGHES that there had been no activity during the night. Heavy haze over land made plane observation very poor. Surveillance from ships disclosed no activity. Front lines believed to be in Le Napule area. Only one call for naval gunfire came in. NLO 11 requested Q-24 (guns) to be taken under fire. USS BROOKLYN complied firing 26 rounds H.C. with LO 11 spotting. Mission was successful.

The 1st Airborne relieved the 36th Division at noon and strong naval gunfire support was anticipated as the 1st Airborne had little artillery. However, support evidently not needed. The USS TUSCALOOSA and escorts returned to area in afternoon but they too received no call for fire support. The CHAMPLIN had seen slashes on the beach and a BROOKLYN plane was put in air to investigate. Later splashes seen about 600 yards from BROOKLYN but no active batteries located and the right flank group departed for retirement area leaving the USS BOYLE and USS CHAMPLIN in area to answer calls for gunfire support during the night.

4. D-plus-6 - 21 August - At 0530, ships this Task Group proceeded independently to F/S areas, the USS TUSCALOOSA to Gulf of Frejus and the BROOKLYN, EIDSON, WOOLSEY and TERRIBLE to the Gulf of Napoule. CDD-32 reported no signs of activity on the beach. During the night an E-Boat group had been intercepted by destroyers patrolling the area. Two were destroyed, one escaped. An SOC from the BROOKLYN assisted C.F. HUGHES in locating escaped E-Boat. Found beached and being abandoned in Golfe Juan, East of Cannes.

There was no activity until 1104. At that time CTG 86.5 assigned target to USS EDISON. The target was enemy occupied buildings a little to Westward of Cannes. 202 rounds AAC were fired being spotted by SFCP 12. Results "good shooting, direct hits."

The USS WOOLSEY furnished necessary gunfire support during the afternoon firing on three targets all within easy range of her batteries. All three shoots requested by NLO 13 and were spotted by NL 13. The first target, an active battery at Western end of Gulf of Napoule, was silenced with 48 rounds H.C. Area was well covered. Eighteen (18) rounds H.C. were fired at a warehouse and vehicle. Results: "Direct hits. Naval gunfire very good." Thirty-nine (39) rounds H.C. fired at third target, an active battery, in Western suburbs of Cannes. Party ashore believe target was destroyed.

About 1835 the USS WOOLSEY and FS TERRIBLE ordered to close Cannes and retire by 1900. Enemy batteries commenced firing on DD's. On orders of CTG 86.5 the TERRIBLE fired 27 HE and 9 AP at two targets, one at West end of Gulf Napoule and the other just West of Cannes. The TERRIBLE was bracketted by what was estimated to be an 88 mm. The DD's cleared the Gulf shortly after 1900. Meanwhile the USS BROOKLYN answered request for fire from NLO 13. Fired 24 H.C. at active battery, using both NL 13 and SOC for spotting. The mission was successful.

At 1637 the USS TUSCALOOSA arrived at Gulf of Napoule and CTG 86.5 issued orders to TG 86.5 that "General Frederick is advancing toward Grasse and Cannes tomorrow morning. All ships will not hesitate to fire into populated area, if enemy batteries located there are shelling troops or ships." CTG 86.5 had interviewed General Frederick and received information of planned advance. A hill overlooking Napoule was to be taken that night. Fire SFCP's would be available the next day.

About 1930 Task Group 86.5 departed for retirement area. The EDISON and WOOLSEY remained in assault area to answer requests for gunfire support.

At 2037 the USS EDISON received call from SFCP 12 for close supporting fire on enemy strong point. This point was about 2,000 yards west of hill which Gen. Frederick had mentioned at conference. The EDISON fired 60 rounds AAC but ceased fire due to radio casualty. Results were unknown.

D / 7 - 22nd August - Leaving two DD's in assault area during the night proved to be a profitable assignment. The night of the 21st and 22nd, as mentioned before, the CHAMPLIN, BOYLE and C.F. HUGHES had teamed up to destroy enemy E-Boats. Tonight the EDISON had shelled an enemy strong point prior to midnight and now after midnight the WOOLSEY was to have her turn. At about one hour intervals, the Army requested fire on enemy batteries shelling the troops. The WOOLSEY complied using indirect fire. Gun flashes observed were checked with know gun emplacements which assisted in

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obtaining an accurate solution. Forty-eight (48) rounds AAC were fired at the first target, 39 at the second and 38 at the third. The first target was about 4,000 yards northwest of Cannes and the second and third just north of La Bocca. The second and third were probably Q-34 and Q-24, five light guns and three 75 mm. Firing was evidently effective as Army reported that enemy shelling greatly reduced.

At 0630 the left flank group returned and took station in F/S areas. The USS TUSCALOOSA and USS BROOKLYN were in an area about 4 to 6 miles south of Cannes, well within range of coastal batteries. At 0915, the USS EDISON was ordered by CTG 86.5 to fire on concentration of enemy vehicles about 1500 yards east of La Bocca. The shoot was spotted by SFCP 11 and was successful. Forty-eight rounds AAC fired. "No vehicles left. Good shooting" from SFCP.

Little activity and CTG 86.5 took TUSCALOOSA, EDISON, CHAMPLIN and BOYLE into Bay of Napoule to locate batteries by drawing their fire. The coastal batteries complied but batteries not located and aircraft were direct to make an extensive search for active batteries.

While close inshore the EDISON ordered to fire on gun emplacements.

Fired 40 rounds unobserved fire. At 1150, the EDISON fired 40 more rounds unobserved fire on same target. This was a 4 gun battery of 88 mm. just west of Cannes. During this time the EDISON was from 2300 to 4000 yards from the beach.

In the afternoon, more missions were forthcoming. The TUSCALOOSA fired 6 missions using air spot (P-51). Thirty-two rds. H.C. (8") fired at the first five targets. Four of the targets hit but fifth was a flak battery on a reverse slope and it was not destroyed. The sixth target was a gun emplacement, pillbox, and strong point. Thirty-Two rounds of 8" H.C. expended. Plane reported target "positively neutralized". The BROOKLYN took under fire three coastal defense batteries. Expended 15 rds. H.C. on each target, neutralized all three and scored one direct hit. An SOC did the spotting. At 1414 the BROOKLYN commenced firing on troops and vehicles, range 10,900, using direct fire. One truck was hit and the troops dispersed. The spotting plane located a group of armored vehicles which were quickly dispersed by BROOKLYN's fire. All of these targets had been in the vicinity of La Bocca. The last target was a 170 mm. railroad gun in a tunnel which had been located by an SOC. Using SOC for spotting the BROOKLYN fired 60 rounds AC and secured hits near tunnel entrance, damaged some of the tracks, and started a fire in the tunnel.

C-0 [REDACTED] -L

The group retired from assault area about 1930. BOYLE and CHAMPLIN were designated to answer calls for fire support during the night.

It might be well to note here that the FFI were assisting the Army in locating batteries.

D / 8 - 23rd August - The group returned to the assault area off Cannes about 0630 and took stations in F/S areas assigned. The USS BOYLE reported to CTG 86.5 that she had carried out eight missions during the night. Two were with piper cub spot against harrassing batteries, and the other unobserved fire against active enemy batteries. One of the latter mission was interdiction fire of 10 rounds hourly from 0400 to 0600.

The high performance spotting plane available for 8½ hours arrived on station and was requested to make close search for activity in vicinity of targets G-07 and G-11.

The USS BROOKLYN had catapulted an SOC and at 0915 commenced firing on a 5 gun emplacement and personnel about two miles north of La Bocca. The SOC had located the target and did the spotting. The opening range was 14,800 which placed the BROOKLYN just southwest of the Ile St. Honorat. Thirty-six rounds H.C. fired with 2 direct hits and area well covered. The BROOKLYN's plane located targets and spotted firing on two other occasions. The first at 0957 was a gun emplacement about 9,000 yards from the beach near La Bocca. Four salvos knocked out a flak emplacement and five hits registered in vicinity of other gun emplacements. Thirty-six rounds of HC were fired. The last mission was slit trenches and camouflaged buildings a little northwest of Cannes. The ship fired 6 rounds H.C. but ceased fire when yellow pyrotechnic signal was seen indicating presence of friendly troops. The troops advancement was so rapid that it made reports of their location which were obsolete soon after release. The position of our troops was uncertain throughout the day and the signal of friendly troops might have been originated by the enemy.

The USS TUSCALOOSA also fired three missions during the morning, using the P-51 for observation and spotting. At 0945, a half hour after the BROOKLYN had commenced firing, the TUSCALOOSA took under fire target Q-11, a 4 gun emplacement and had fired 16 rounds H.C. when fire was checked following a report received that friendly troops were in the area. However, plane reported that guns were destroyed. At 1035 the spotting plane reported enemy trucks gathered about 2½ miles north of Cannes, and at 1037 the TUSCALOOSA opened fire, range 17,200 yards. Ceased firing having expended 16 rounds H.C. Plane reported "Trucks pretty badly shot up." The plane located another target just south of Q-11.

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This was a 5 gun emplacement. One round H.C. and 15 rounds A.P. fired before plane had to return to base. The relief plane was unable to find the target; however, one direct hit had been reported.

SFCP's commenced calling for fire now and the USS WOOLSEY complied by firing 48 rounds AAC at a building and tank gun and machine gun using SFCP as spot. The mission was successful. Ten minutes later the WOOLSEY fired on a pillbox and enemy concentration on the beach in La Bocca. Fired 97 rounds AAC using SFCP for spotting at first and later shifting to direct fire. This mission also quite successful. In the afternoon using the P-51 for spotting the WOOLSEY fired on a CD gun emplacement. Direct hits on emplacement, and area covered but battery not positively knocked out. Received orders from CTG 86.5 to cease fire after expending 220 rounds AAC. The next request called for firing inside the "no fire line". It was an enemy concentration on the beach a little west of La Bocca. A delay in authentication caused slowness in opening fire. The target was cleared by the ship and CTG 86.5. Communication was poor, spotting erratic. Ship fired because of requests for urgency. However, after firing 13 rounds FC 13 ordered "cease firing". The mission was not successful. This fact will be discussed later.

At 1335, the FS EMILE BERTIN (Contre Amiral Auboyneau) reported for duty. Although an original member of the right flank group she had been employed on the left flank during the assault on Toulon. Amiral Auboyneau who was deputy commander 86.5 was acquainted with the existing situation on the right flank at a conference with CTG 86.5 and General Frederick. Shortly after 1900 the group retired to night cruising area. The EDISON and WOOLSEY remained in F/S area. It wasn't to be a dull evening. At 1934 the WOOLSEY fired on anti-tank gun and enemy concentration using SFCP spotting. The mission was successful. The SFCP called for fire again at 2213 on enemy gun position. Twenty-three rounds AAC were fired. Set fire to a large area, hit ammunition dump and silenced gun - mission successful. The WOOLSEY's last target was an enemy battery well inland. Fired 87 rounds AAC and smoke shells. Battery was silenced, fires started. The SFCP "very satisfied".

The USS EDISON had not been idle and had fired on call for SFCP 11. The first target was area target using interdicting fire. The other two missions were close supporting fire. The first a railway gun and the second a gun emplacement. One hundred ninety-one rounds were expended but there was no observation due to darkness.

D-plus-9 - 24 August - At 0115, the U.S.S. BROOKLYN and U.S.S. BOYLE left formation and proceeded to Ajaccio. The remaining ships returned to firing area and were on station off Cannes at 0700. The 1st ABTF were, from reports, moving rapidly eastward, so the TUSCLOOSA, EDISON and CHAMPLIN closed Nice and steamed into the Bay of Anges, about three or four miles Southwest of Nice.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

Control defenses in immediate area of Bay were 88's, 105's and 120mm guns with ranges of 18 to 22,000 yards. The three ships were well within range, but drew no fire. The spotting plane, which had been requested daily from the 12th TAC, reported on station and was instructed to make reconnaissance flights over Nice. Plane drew light flak and a few minutes later returned to base for maps of area northeast of Cannes. CTG 86.5 ordered the U.S.S. CHAMPLIN to close beach and fire on bridge across the VAR River in compliance with request of the Div. Art. Hdqtrs. The TUSCALOOSA was to cover the CHAMPLIN. The CHAMPLIN commenced firing using air spot. Meanwhile the EDISON commenced firing, employing direct fire, on 4 to 6 heavy guns near the CHAMPLIN's target. After the CHAMPLIN had fired 94 rounds, word was received from Div. Art. Hdqtrs. to cease fire. Hits were observed and holes in bridge structure was reported by spotting plane. The results of EDISON's fire unknown.

The F.S. EMILE BERTIN joined company just after noon. No missions were fired by the Group until evening. At 1720, the BERTIN screened by the TERRIBLE, fired 73 rounds at merchant vessel in the harbor at Nice. The spotting plane reported six direct hits and ship burning.

Only the one mission was fired but the spotting plane performed excellent work at reconnaissance for both the ships and the SFCP. The planes examined all known batteries west of the Var River and saw no guns or activity.

Underway 1926 for retirement area, leaving the WOOLSEY and CHAMPLIN in Fire Support Area.

The reconnaissance reports of the spotting plane, plus the report that the 1st ABTF was north of Antibes, seemed to indicate that the enemy were withdrawing eastward. A report from CWNTF stated Grasse had been captured and Cannes would be attacked in the evening.

D-plus-10 - 25 August - With the Army advancing eastward so rapidly, the Group moved eastward with them and upon its return from night retirement, steamed directly to the Nice Area. Their position brought them within range of coastal batteries in vicinity of Nice, the largest of which was 155mm. However, very little enemy fire was incurred. Both the EDISON and EMILE BERTIN were fired on but shells fell wide of their target. The TUSCALOOSA's position was 10,000 yards southwest of Cape Ferrat and drew no enemy fire.

During the morning, the F.S. LE TERRIBLE secured a crystal from the TUSCALOOSA which made it possible to contact spotting plane. The TERRIBLE was ordered to fire on target soon after installation of crystal, but plane had to return to base and target not taken under fire. The spotting plane, during the morning, had made intensive search for batteries in Var River area. The relief spotting plane returned a little after noon and called for fire on radar installation located on Cape Ferrat. The TERRIBLE answered call. Secured three direct hits and target was reported destroyed.

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The WOOLSEY complied with calls from SFCP, to fire on enemy troops just west of the Bay of Anges and on enemy mortars just west of their first target. These targets were evidently playing a part in holding up our troops at the southern end of the front line as the situation report of 1330, showed the advance in the north was well eastward of that in the south. The WOOLSEY fired 56 rounds at the first target and 46 at the second. Both missions reported as being successful.

Soon after the Army extended their "no fire line" to a position east of the WOOLSEY's targets and about 3,000 yards west of the Var River.

At 1420, the TERRIBLE destroyed another radar installation located on Cape Nice. This fire was called for and spotted by high performance plane. The TERRIBLE fired a total of 72 rounds of H.E. and 42 A.P.'s on the two radar installation targets.

In the evening, the U.S.S. EDISON fired 60 rounds AAC on gun emplacements near target X-08 which was just Southeast of Nice. The target was assigned by MLO 11 and the results were reported as "good shooting, several direct hits".

The Group departed from area at 1937, leaving the TERRIBLE and the CHAMPLIN to provide night gunfire support.

D-plus-11 - 26 August - The Group returned to Bay of Anges about 0730, less the WOOLSEY, who had sailed for Propriano. The CHAMPLIN reported firing one mission at about 0115 on artillery. The SFCP reported results successful. The spotting plane arrived on station and was instructed to make reconnaissance of area east of the front lines. He reported no activity with exception of light traffic heading east. The TUSCALOOSA closed Nice to give support to the BOYLE and CHAMPLIN, who had fire missions. All three ships closed to 4,000 yards of Cape Ferrat but drew no fire. The BOYLE fired on targets on Cape Ferrat, making direct hits on six guns and destroying a radar installation. Air spot was used.

The TERRIBLE received orders to fire on three separate mortar emplacements located in the hills west of the Var River. Shore observation used. The first two target areas were well covered and the third was definitely put out of commission. Ammunition expenditure was 61 rounds HE and 19 rounds AP. During this period of firing, small caliber guns on beach had been firing on the ship but with no effect.

Later in the afternoon, the EDISON fired deep supporting fire on vehicles and personnel, located about 1010 yards from the beach just West of the Var. The second target was also vehicles and personnel a few hundred yards South. SFCP 11 spotted the firing but no results given on either target.

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The EMILE BERTIN and the TERRIBLE departed for Ajaccio at 2030, but C.T.F. 86 ordered BERTIN to Sitka area. The TUSCALOOSA and escort anchored for the night in Gulf of Frejus. This left the BOYLE and CHAMPLIN to act as gunfire support ships during the night in the Nice area.

The "no fire line" had advanced during the day to the Var River.

On this date, C.T.G. 86.5 reported to C.T.F. 86 that reconnaissance indicated that no counter attack need be expected. No activity - hence, suggested, with Gen. Fredericks concurrence, that (a) two DD's be designated to support right flank, being relieved every five or six days. Reliefs to come from C.T.G. 80.6 or keep two standing by at Ajaccio, (b) Have one spotting mission daily from Corsica for general reconnaissance and one plane on call, (c) One CL at Ajaccio on four hours notice, the cruiser Commanding Officer to be in charge of group, (d) C.T.G. 86.5 in TUSCALOOSA and Contre Amiral Auboyneau in EMILE BERTIN to be released for such duties as C.T.F. 86 may assign. Suggestion "ABLE" approved. CDD-32 in BOYLE with CHAMPLIN left to support the right flank. The TUSCALOOSA and EDISON to retire to Propriano to remain on four hours notice for call to either flank and the EMILE BERTIN ordered to take charge gunfire support ships in Lee of Giens on left flank.

D-plus-12 - 27 August - During the night, explosive boats were active off Nice between 0000 and 0200. PT Boats engaged them and were successful in sinking the explosive boats. However, the control boat escaped. In the morning, the spotting plane was ordered to make reconnaissance flights over Nice and Ville Franche. He reported seeing several small fishing vessels present in harbors. Harbors were not shelled as their liberation was imminent and the small craft seen were not suspected of being other than fishing craft.

At 1142, the U.S.S. TUSCALOOSA and U.S.S. EDISON departed from Bay of Anges for Propriano. CDD-32, in the BOYLE, became C.T.U. 86.5.2, Commander Destroyer Bombardment Group on the east flank.

During the day, CHAMPLIN fired two missions; one at tanks west of the Var River, the other at infantry west of Nice. Both missions reported successful. At 2215 the BOYLE fired 16 rounds at a battery 2000 yards east of the Var. Results unknown.

Calls for fire support missions on the east flank were few in number. Thus we find by evening of the 27th, the BOYLE and the CHAMPLIN, the only ships remaining in the eastern area to give naval gunfire support on the east flank.

The TUSCALOOSA and EDISON were in Propriano; LE TERRIBLE in Ajaccio; the BROOKLYN and the WOOLSEY were to rendezvous with C.T.F. 86 in the U.S.S. AUGUSTA; the EMILE BERTIN, the DUGUAY TROUIN

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

and the FANTASQUE were all in Sitka area as a part of the force operating against Toulon.

D-plus-13 - 28 August - The period commencing 28 August 1944, was more or less a modification of OpPlan 5-44, in regard to the right flank, in that all cruisers had been withdrawn leaving two DD's in the fire support areas on the right flank who were to furnish gunfire support to the troops advancing eastward. TG 86.5 still remained with CTG 86.5 in USS TUSCALOOSA, but CDD-32 in the BOYLE became CTU 86.5.2 and SOPA in Nice-Cannes area. Cruisers were available, however, if circumstances required. The situation with the Army on the right flank was approximately as follows: The enemy retreating in that general direction of the Italian border and the 1st ABTF had advanced across the Var River with pockets of resistance still to the West of the Var.

In the fire support area the BOYLE and the CHAMPLIN had spent a rather uneventful night until 0345. At that time the BOYLE picked up a surface radar contact. Illuminated with 36" searchlight but no target was visible. However, a patrolling PT did see the target, an enemy E-Boat, heading for Nice. The PT gave chase and requested starshell illumination. The BOYLE complied, and the PT opened fire. However, the E-Boat escaped into the harbor.

During the day the two destroyers fired five missions. The first was fired by the BOYLE using air spot. The target was guns and mission was very successful.

The BOYLE fired the other four missions which were called for and spotted by the SFCP. Three were successful but the fourth target could not be seen by either the spotting plane or SFCP so only three rounds were fired, one of which was a W.P. The object of the three successful missions had been to disperse troops, destroy a gun and help reduce an enemy strong point. These targets had been almost on a North and South line from the beach inland to about 12,000 yards and 1,500 yards east of the Var River.

D-plus-14 - 29 August - Very little activity on the right flank. No missions were fired by an gunfire support ships.

Four PT boats were ordered to patrol nightly inshore from the Var River to Cape Ferrat. At the beginning of each patrol, they were to contact the DD's in the fire support area.

D-plus-15 - 30 August - This was another quiet day with no call for fire made. Troops were now in Nice. At 2025, CDD-25 in WOOLSEY with the EDISON relieved CDD-32 in BOYLE with the CHAMPLIN. In accordance with CTF 86 plan Flare Two, modified, the right flank group now includes the French CL's EMILE BERTIN (Contre Amiral Auboyneau, CTG 86.5), DUGUAY TROUIN, the French DL TERRIBLE, and the American destroyers WOOLSEY, EDISON, and LUDLOW. Not all of the

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above ships were in the Right Flank area on the 30th but there were two DD's in fire support area with two French CL's standing by in Gulf of San Tropez.

D-plus-16 - 31 August - Troops advancing east of Nice but front lines very indefinite. A cub plane furnished the only air observation. During the day the WOOLSEY fired three missions. The first two were anti-tank guns, machine guns and personnel. The third target was troops and vehicles moving westward, evidently moving up to the front lines. All missions were reported as successful. The WOOLSEY drew some fire from the vicinity of Monaco but no hits were scored.

In the evening the EDISON complied with two calls from SFCP 12. Both targets, gun emplacements, were well East of Nice. The ship's position was off Cape Martin. Seventy-six rounds including two star shells fired at first target and SFCP's report was "Very good shooting". The area of the second target was well covered but the SFCP reported the enemy was well dug in.

At 2055 a dispatch from the Commanding General 7th Army stated he felt that no further naval gunfire support was needed except in support of the right flank.

C.T.F. 86 also stated that the immediate task of the support force left flank had been completed. Thus at 2400 on 31 August 1944, we find Task Force 86 reorganized as follows:

1. Control Group: PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN, 3 U.S. Destroyers.
2. Left Flank: LORRAINE, 3 French CL's and 2 French destroyers.
3. Right Flank: 2 French CL's, 1 French DD, and 3 U.S. destroyers.

1 September 1944

In the First Airborne sector the enemy continued withdrawing East of Nice. Reconnaissance executed to Cape Martin - without contact. U.S.S. LUDLOW was designated to relieve EDISON.

Fire missions of ships on right flank on 1 September:

WOOLSEY

- 1228 - Fired 107 rounds A1 common on strong point at 692-822, spotting by SFCP, mission successful.
- 1408 - Fired 47 rounds A1 common on vehicles at 719-955, using air spot, mission successful.
- 1433 - Fired 36 rounds A1 common on battery at 757-838 using air spot, mission successful.
- 1440 - Fired 46 rounds A1 common on strong point at 890-839, SFCP requested, effects not observed.

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EDISON

- 1020 - Fired 83 rounds AA common on Fort gun emplacement at 713-870, using SFCP spot, mission successful.
- 1700 - Fired 84 rounds AA common on guns located at 700-853 using SFCP spot, mission successful.
- 1847 - Fired 54 rounds AA common on gun emplacement at 607-853, SFCP spotting, good effect.
- 2038 - Fired 10 rounds AA common on mortars at 691-835, SFCP spotting, mission successful.

Commanding Officer of First Airborne Battalion advised C.T.F.86 that Nice Harbor unloading facilities can accomodate three liberty ships at a time.

C.T.F. 86 plans to keep two gunfire support destroyers on right flank with French to be worked in gradually. One cruiser to be on immediate call at San Tropez. Spotting to be by SFCP or by cubs, if flak gets too heavy 12th Tactical Force to be called on to provide P-51's.

Front line situation in Nice area is very fluid, Germans in general withdrawing towards France-Italian border.

WOOLSEY and LUDLOW plus two PT boats took up nightly anti-E-boat patrol East of Camel area upon completion of firing.

2 September 1944

EDISON and WOOLSEY on station in Monaco area for East flank gunfire support. NCIA 45 requested a cruiser to be assigned for special mission, cruiser to report immediately. F.S. GEORGES LEYGUES was assigned but due to communication failures did not received notification until too late to arrive on station off Monaco during daylight.

At 1035, C.T.F. 86 was advised by the Army that 111th Squadron was moving to Valence which would reduce availability of high performance aircraft for naval spotting. One mission of 225th Squadron Spitfires on call for observation not exceeding 45 minutes on East flank. This meant that practically all spotting would have to be done by cub or seagull or SFCP. 1147 - LUDLOW arrived in the Monaco area to relieve EDISON but orders were cancelled by C.T.F. 86. C.T.G. 86.5.2 kept LUDLOW in fire support area because number of daily missions appeared to be increasing.

Fire missions on 2 September.

WOOLSEY

- 1153 - Fired 141 rounds on enemy guns at 710-856 using SFCP spot, mission successful.
- 1751 - Fired 68 rounds on enemy tanks at 689-860 using SFCP spot, mission not successful.

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EDISON

- 1131 - Fired 54 rounds on enemy guns at 758-815 using air spot, mission successful.
- 1147 - Fired 81 rounds on enemy guns at 695-815 using air spot, mission successful.
- 1343 - Fired 36 rounds on troops and mortars at 693-817 using SFCP spot, mission successful.
- 1916 - Fired 120 rounds on enemy battery at 720-866 using air spot, mission successful.
- 2311 - Began interdiction fire on enemy troops located at 704-843 requested by SFCP, 54 rounds expended.

C.T.U. 86.5.2 informed C.T.F. 86 that NGLO with 45th Division requested one cruiser standby on one hour's notice to answer calls on 3 September.

Following message was issued by the Admiralty:

"In addition to the one 474 torpedo and the explosive motor boat the Germans have developed and may associate system time operated 2 men type of submersible craft mustard attacks on inshore concentrations and coastal convoys. There is no evidence that these submersible craft are at present intended for operations outside the North Sea and channel areas. Evidence is not accurate enough to distinguish the details of either craft clearly, but the following particulars probably cover both - Lengths 18-25 feet, crew of 1-2 men, armament 1 or 2 torpedoes, periscope probably fitted on one type".

Pending issue of Flare 3 following organization effective Task Force 86, orders issued by C.T.F. 86:

- A. TG 86.1 PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN, H.P. JONES, MADISON, WOOLSEY, EDISON, LUDLOW and LORRAINE.
- B. TG 86.2 MONTCAIM, GEORGES LEYGUES, GLOIRE.
- C. TG 86.3 EMILE BERTIN and DUGUAY TROUIN.
- D. TG 86.4 TERRIBLE, FANTASQUE and MALIN.

3 September 1944

Enemy positions ashore substantially the same as on previous days.

Army requested that one cruiser be on station off Monaco on the morning of the 3rd to fire on 5,000 enemy troops reported concentrated at 743-979. Most enemy resources withdrawn to that area. Target was outside of destroyer range and the Army had very little artillery support. U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA was assigned for this job with two destroyer escorts and fighter cover by the Army.

In order to furnish a sheltered anchorage for ships firing on the right flank, orders were issued at 1000 for the sweeping of Gulfe Juan and at 1400 minesweeps were ordered to begin sweeping in the Nice area for the entry of supply ships.

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Fire missions 3 September 1944.

LUDLOW

2335 - Fired 15 rounds on enemy troops at 725-846 for SFCP, no observation of results.

EDISON

On two occasions during the day, EDISON fired interdiction fire at enemy traffic on road at 704-843.

PHILADELPHIA

1342 - Using cub spot PHILADELPHIA fired 16 rounds H.C. in the afternoon on enemy light field guns located at 702-978. All salvos fell short, target out of range using 2800 fs velocity powder. Necessity of staying outside 100 fathom curve because of possible mine fields in Monaco area seriously restricts naval gunfire support to Army on right flank.

On the evening of 3 September Army reported seeing numerous Allied flags flying in Monaco indicating possible evacuation of Germans from area.

All ships in vicinity of Monaco and San Tropez area were alerted against possible human torpedo attacks from direction of the Italian coast on nights 3-4 September and 4-5 September. Ships took screening stations as assigned for night patrol.

4 September 1944

Shore batteries at Mt. Agel were active expending about 60 rounds at ships in Monaco area, no resulting damage. Definite knowledge was received that the FFI were in control in Monaco, the Germans having escaped to the hills. American troops reached D'Ail, Germans were reported to be at Point de la Veille. Following medium batteries were suspected: Five guns 762-837, one gun 748-848, possibly two guns at West entrance Cape Martin tunnel and 3 small guns on jetty of Menton harbor.

Fire missions 4 September.

LUDLOW:

- 0050 - Fired 40 rounds on guns at 751-894 at request of SFCP, results not observed.
- 0101 - Fired 39 rounds on guns at 748-894, on request of SFCP, results not observed.
- 0524 - Fired 36 rounds on guns at 745-875 at request of SFCP, results not observed.

- 1510 - Fired 112 rounds at enemy strong point (716-869) using direct fire, area well covered.
- 1555 - Fired 46 rounds on troops and battery at Cape Martin using direct fire, point well covered with shells.
- 1645 - Fired 209 rounds on enemy battery at 714-869 for SFCP, no further activity in area.

MALIN:

- 1335 - Fired 103 rounds on concrete emplacement at 735-013, SFCP reported mission successful.

Destroyers and PT boats took patrol stations for the night, human torpedo alert still in effect for night 4-5 September.

5 September 1944

Operations on the morning of 5 September were complicated by the initial appearance of human torpedoes in the area. F.S. MALIN was the first to sight and fire on a suspicious object in the water at 0812. Fire was opened by the 20mm and 40mm battery and the LUDLOW approached and dropped 13 300 pound depth charges set at 130 feet. The object disappeared, presumably sunk, as a pilot of a human torpedo was picked up in the vicinity by the LUDLOW at 0820. At 0836 F.S. MALIN observed another wake and another perspex dome in the direction of the sun and opened fire with 138mm, 40mm and 20mm guns bracketing the target. The target disappeared at 0839 after being covered by splashes set up by near misses. The LUDLOW picked up the pilot at 0900. At about 0853 a third human torpedo was sighted and attacked by the LUDLOW with depth charges and by the MALIN with automatic weapons and 138mm guns. The pilot abandoned ship and was picked up by the MALIN.

Preliminary interrogation revealed that three more human torpedoes were operating in the vicinity and further attacks could be expected. Continued search was made, the LUDLOW depth charged, on two occasions, suspicious sound contacts which immediately disappeared, the objects being either sunk or proving to be false contacts. Calls from SFCP for counter battery fire ended the search. The Commanding Officer of the MALIN requested PT boats for continuing the search and fighter planes for aerial reconnaissance. One cub plane showed up over the area.

These human torpedoes apparently were based in the area around Menton. P.O.W. stated that further attacks were planned in the near future and that the torpedoes operated at 8-10 knots, endurance about 8 hours. Shallow dives could be made. Favorite position for attack against shipping was out of the sun on the bow, releasing torpedo at short ranges. Maneuvering at high speeds seriously affected their aim.

As a result of the above attacks additional PT boats were assigned to patrol area; their speed, size, and heavy automatic weapon armament making them ideal for such purposes. For aerial reconnaissance cruiser scouting planes were assigned to cover area daily, weather permitting.

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At 1130, 5 September, NGLO of the 45th Division requested a cruiser to fire on heavy pill boxes extending generally between Monte Carlo and Sospel which the Army's artillery was unable to neutralize. MONTCALM was assigned to respond to the call.

Fire support missions by ships on this date.

LUDLOW:

- 1605 - Fired 123 rounds A.A. and 3 rounds W.P. at enemy battery (713-857) for SFCP. Mission successful, no counter battery activity remaining.
- 1635 - Fired 75 rounds AA and 5 rounds W.P. at enemy battery at 700-856 for SFCP. Area well covered, no further enemy activity.
- 2345 - Fired 56 rounds AA at enemy battery (740-856) for SFCP, area well covered.

MALIN:

- 1335 - Fired 103 rounds on concrete emplacement at 735-013 for SFCP, mission successful.
- 1727 - Fired 32 rounds on enemy observation post at 727-847 using direct fire. Area well covered. Target requested by SFCP.

MONTCALM:

- 1759 - Fired 69 rounds at troop concentration at 729-958, close supporting fire. SFCP reported good shooting.
- 1821 - Fired on troops concentrating for counter attack at 729-958. Expended 48 rounds. SFCP reported good shooting.
- 1831 - Fired 42 rounds on area 200 yards to the right of above target, another troop concentration. SFCP spot, good shooting reported.
- 1845 - Fired 18 rounds on pillbox at 735-915. SFCP ordered check fire, smoke over target prevent observation.
- 1921 - Fired 92 rounds on pillbox at 735-915. SFCP reported very good shooting.
- 1955 - Fired 174 rounds on Fort Mt. Igel at 711-866. SFCP reported very good shooting, mission successful.

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Some counter battery fire was experienced during the day from medium batteries located at 793-869 and probably at 801-872. Except for shell fragments from near misses which fell on the MALIN no ships were touched. There were no casualties of personnel or material.

Evening of 5 September ships took up patrol stations augmented as necessary to guard against possible human torpedo attacks.

6 September 1944

Position of front lines substantially unchanged, activity ashore mostly relegated to patrolling. EMILE BERTIN sent to bombardment area to supplement LUDLOW and MALIN. Two cruiser scouting planes from the PHILADELPHIA catapulted to arrive in fire support area at first light and ordered to remain on station until 1000. Results of plane search disclosed no enemy activity.

Firing missions executed during day.

LUDLOW:

- 0012 - Fired 52 rounds at battery (780-863) for SFCP, area well covered.
- 0025 - Fired 113 rounds on battery at 780-872 for SFCP, mission successful, no further fire from enemy in area.
- 1153 - Fired 92 rounds on battery at 747-848 for SFCP, area well covered.
- 1205 - Fired 96 rounds on battery at 727-855 for SFCP, mission successful, area well covered.
- 1242 - Fired 124 rounds on machine guns and mortars at 728-846 using direct fire, area well covered.

EMILE BERTIN:

Fired 62 rounds at 2 batteries; 70 rounds at troop concentrations and barracks scoring several direct hits and dispersing enemy; 40 rounds at enemy fort, results unknown.

PT boat patrols were cancelled for the Cape Ferrat-Cape Martin area this night due to heavy weather, SOC patrols called off for same reason. Army was requested to brief pilots of 63rd fighter wing on day coverage search of Menton area for human torpedoes.

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EMILE BERTIN requested by NGLO of 45th Division to standby night of 6-7 September in fire support area. This was rejected by CTF 86 because of danger from human torpedoes and explosive boats. EMILE BERTIN was ordered to take station behind submarine screen unless fire was urgently required by Army.

7 September 1944

Approximate front line on the right flank reported as of this date: 783/870-7590-7494-7698.

As a result of the interrogation of POW captured from human torpedoes, CTF 86 issued following instructions to TF 86:

Commanding Officers of ships operating in bombardment areas will employ zig-zag and diversion as protective measures when not actually firing and will avoid lying to or steady steaming at low speeds for protracted periods. Unexpected changes of course throw human torpedoes out of firing positions.

Fire missions 8 September:

EMILE BERTIN:

1640 - Fired 70 rounds on troops and pillbox at 746-936 at request of SFCP, direct hit on pillbox.

1752 - Fired 42 rounds on vehicles at 764-989 for SFCP, mission successful, target destroyed. USS MADISON relay between SFCP and BERTIN.

LUDLOW:

Fired 179 rounds on a troop concentration for SFCP, shooting effective.

At 2332, 7 September, while patrolling off Cap Martin, the H.P.JONES saw PT boats firing and changed course towards them maintaining an erratic zig-zag. At 2347, a small boat was picked up by radar and visually. Craft passed close aboard on the port side and exploded about 200 yards away just prior to reaching wake of ship. No survivors picked up and no damage resulted.

Evening of the 7th instructions were issued for BROOKLYN's planes to be on station in the bombardment area at first light to aid in search for human torpedoes; PT boats were requested to continue patrols until 0900 daily as explosive boats and human torpedoes were most active during morning hours.

Army requested that mine fields be swept in Menton area to enable gunfire supporting ships to reach targets further inland near Italian border. Orders were issued to sweep from the 200 fathom line in towards Menton on line 330° T, to about the ten fathom curve, thence 090° T to the 100 fathom curve.

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Attacks by explosive boats continued on the morning of 8 September 1944.

At about 0010, H.P. JONES picked up two radar contacts on the SG radar at about 2,500 yards, chemical smoke was observed on the same bearing as the radar contact. Ship was maneuvered so as to be down moon from the target. Six firing runs were made on the target, after the second heavy billowing black smoke was observed and one contact disappeared from the radar screen. Four more firing runs were made as the target approached dangerous waters, all to no avail, and the JONES reported to PT boats that the ship was ceasing fire but would illuminate target by searchlight for PT attack. Searchlight was turned on but target could not be picked up and probably escaped.

Around midnight of the 7th September and shortly thereafter PT boats off Cap Martin 2 miles off shore made contact with large group apparently searching area or retiring on northerly course. All enemy boats made smoke when detected and dropped some smoke floats indicating attendants still on board. Radar was effective from 1,000 to 1,200 yards. PTs detonated four and set fire to one, probably the control boat. Those destroyed detonated a few seconds after being hit without visible flame but with shock similar to depth charge and emitting tall column of black smoke. Boats were described as having small, low silhouette and fast, even in a choppy sea.

At 0115, while MADISON was returning to station, after going to support of the JONES during earlier attack, a small boat was sighted on the starboard bow on a collision course (Lat 43-39, Long. 07-36E) distant about 800 yards. Avoided by turning away at high speed. Boat was lost in smoke and subsequent search was unfruitful. It is believed that attacking boat sank and the control boat retired toward beach.

CTF 86 issued following instructions to TF 86 in regards to explosive boats:

The PT boat offers the best defense and offense against explosive boats. Destroyer commanders should normally permit PT boats full freedom of action. Employ evasive action and full radar control of gunfire or starshell illumination. As it seems improbable control boats are radar equipped, attacks should be expected at half-light or on moonlight nights. Searchlight illumination should be employed only at close quarters as a last resort.

Fire missions fired by ships on 8 September. Front lines (approx) 785-870 to 7890 to 775-930 to 75-97.

DOUGUAY TOUIN:

Expended a total of 457 rounds on following targets:

Troops at 745-935
Battery at 750-983
Battery at 775-989

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Battery at 761-989
Troops at 740-980
Battery at 747-947
Machine Guns at 749-945.

SFCP reported excellent results.

H.P. JONES

1640 - Fired 44 rounds at machine gun nests (790-889) using indirect fire for SFCP 15. Fire stopped when own troops began moving in area. SFCP 15 reported enemy gunners had cleared out.

Instructions were given by C.T.G. 80.5 that PT's will continue to operate nightly weather permitting from Cap Ferrat to Bordighera remaining within three miles from shore. Patrol will attempt contact with friendly Seagulls in area prior first light. Communications 2980 voice. NCWTF requested that Senior Officer Inshore Patrol move Western limit of operating area for PT's and MTB's operating from Bastia to line running 135° T. from Imperia.

C.T.F. 86 informed Army on East Flank that T.F. 86 could no longer risk remaining in fire support area throughout the night and would hereafter withdraw to safer area to await call from SFCP.

9 September 1944

There was no reported activity against enemy explosive boats or human torpedoes during this day; enemy troops in the front lines, however, were very active. Approximate front line runs from 795-870 to 785-900 to 76-93 to 74-76 to 735955.

Fire missions of ships during day:

H.P. JONES.

- 1035 - Fired 330 rounds for FC 15 on troops concentrating for an attack at 810-890. SFCP walked fire around in area and reported at end of shoot "Troops on the run, mission completed, excellent shooting, you got a lot of them".
- 1150 - Fired 14 rounds close supporting fire on a moving flak wagon at 748-939, FC 16 spotting. Target destroyed.
- 1205 - Fired 77 rounds close supporting fire on troops and machine guns at 745-939, FC 16 spotting. SFCP reported "Area well covered, troops retreating with casualties. Mission accomplished, that was the best shoot in days, the best I have ever seen!"
- 1335 - Fired 81 rounds at enemy troops and mortars at 800-872 for SFCP 15. Area covered and neutralized.
- 1430 - Fired 124 rounds at enemy troops and tank concentration (746-948) preparing for counter attack, close supporting fire. SFCP 15 spotting. Troops scattered, many casualties.

- 1548 - Fired 28 rounds on enemy troop concentration (806-889) close supporting fire. SFCP 15 spotting. Troops scattered, many casualties.
- 1720 - Fired 22 rounds on enemy troop concentration at 745-954, SFCP-16 spotting. Mission accomplished, area well covered.
- 1744 - Fired 114 rounds on dug in troops and ammunition dump at 747-940 for SFCP 16. Area covered.

MADISON.

- 0500 - Fired 33 rounds on battery at 810-890.
 - 0514 - Fired 30 rounds on battery at 828-884.
 - 0624 - Fired 17 rounds on battery at 810-885.
 - 0639 - Fired 14 rounds on battery at 813-888.
 - 0650 - Fired 27 rounds on battery at 823-888.
 - 0818 - Fired 14 rounds on battery at 835-887.
 - 0825 - Fired 2 rounds on battery at 827-887.
- SFCP spotted throughout, effectively silenced, areas well covered.

DUGUAY TROUIN:

Fired total of 280 rounds on following targets, plane spot.

- 775-932 Troops
 - 742-890 Battery
 - 748-892 Battery
 - 747-936 Pillbox
 - 747-863 Armored vehicles.
- Firing reported effective.

The DUGUAY TROUIN fired at twilight, 9 September, 65 rounds of 75mm and 20 rounds of 115mm against light batteries at Bordighera which had been firing on mine sweeps operating in area. Direct fire was used.

Batteries located on Cape Ampeglio fired a few scattered shots at M DISON from guns estimated to be of 88mm caliber, no casualties resulted.

During the day cruiser planes were fired on by batteries at San Remo (T0390) and at Bordighera (S9086). Cub planes were attacked by enemy fighters while spotting ship's gunfire. It can be reasonably deduced from this that ship's firing had been particularly obnoxious to the enemy on this day.

Mine sweeps reported that the harbor at Nice had been swept and was considered safe. The area off Menton that CTF 86 requested swept for fire support ships was nearly complete. Shore batteries had minesweepers under fire practically throughout operation but were well supported by Task Force 86. No casualties suffered.

Evening of 9 September ships took up patrol stations or dispersed in retirement areas as assigned.

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10 September 1944

There was a great amount of activity today by human torpedoes, explosive boats and enemy forces ashore. Account of activity against enemy at sea follows:

At 0645 the H.P. JONES received aboard 3 Italian patriots that had been taken from a rowboat by a PT. They claimed to have considerable knowledge of local activity including artillery, minefields German headquarters, etc. They also reported 8 human torpedoes in storage places at Ventimiglia. These men were later delivered to Army Headquarters at San Tropez for further questioning. At 1006 JONES sighted a human torpedo in position 43-42.3 N., 7-35 E bearing 345° Rel, range 400 yards. Speed was increased and ship turned away firing a 300 lb. depth charge set at 50 ft.; charge landed very close to the target. No survivors or identifiable wreckage was observed although PT's and planes searched area. At 1142 the JONES began firing on a small submarine that had been in the harbor of Menton the night before firing machine guns into the town. Sub was spotted by a SFCP just as it was clearing the breakwater; coordinates were given to the H.P. JONES to which ship the target was not visible due to sub being submerged. JONES commenced firing and after two salvos that were spotted to target by SFCP the target became visible as a double feather and small projection. Ship shifted to direct fire using top spot but receiving and weighting spots of SFCP. At 1126 after two salvos were spotted "on" by both top spot and SFCP the object disappeared and a single survivor was seen swimming toward the beach. A final salvo on the target also caused the disappearance of the swimmer. This may have been a human torpedo but it is believed that, since it had been firing machine guns on Menton the night before, and in view of its "double feather with a small projection", it was some type of midget submarine.

The U.S.S. MADISON report of action against human torpedoes on 10 September follows: (exclusive of H.P. JONES report above):

At 0718 MADISON and PT's sunk one 5 miles South Cape Mortola survivor recovered. At 0747 MADISON and PT 206 sank one with gunfire and depth charges 150° T., 5½ miles from Cape Martin, one survivor recovered. At 0900 MADISON straddled one with main battery about 2 miles South of Menton, possibly destroyed. At 0921 sank one with gunfire and depth charges 5 miles South of Cape Martin, one survivor recovered. At 1216 MADISON sank one by gunfire and depth charges 144° T. 3½ miles from Cape Martin, operator not recovered. At 1145 Cruiser plane, PT 214 and MINSTLY (MS) sank one with gunfire and depth charges 2 miles South of Monaco. In addition to above PT 206 sank two recovering 1 survivor. IMPROVE reports sinking one at 1217 Lat. 43-45 N Long 07-36 E with three inch gunfire, torpedo was seen to explode, operator not recovered. Total 10 sunk, one possible sunk, 3 survivors recovered. At 1730 cruiser planes reported one washed up on beach West of Menton Harbor. Human torpedoes were operating from Ventimiglia. Arrangements of planes and PTs on some frequency very satisfactory.

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Following action report by PT's against explosive boats was received:

PT patrol made following contact on 10th. 0030 Chased three explosive boats consisting of one control and two drones. All three made thirty knots. One drone exploded after twenty minutes chase. Other drone lost when control boat departed and was chased to the beach, laying smoke. Initial contacts 3 miles off shore between Cape Martin and Ampegia.

Survivors from human torpedoes gave up papers with sketches of operating areas, instructions and other technical information of interest.

Fire missions on 10 September. Front lines approximately 80-87 to 79-91 to 76-93 to 74-93 to 73-95.

H.P. JONES

- 1015 - Fired 38 rounds on infantry concentration for SFCP 15. Target at 801-872. Mission accomplished.
 - 1050 - Fired 68 rounds on troops and troop column at 801-878 for SFCP 15 using air bursts and contact fuzes, good effect, mission accomplished.
 - 1424 - Fired 44 rounds on enemy troops at 804-880 for SFCP 15. Mission accomplished, target decimated.
- In addition to above the JONES on two occasions fired a total of 50 rounds on gun flashes using direct fire in support of minesweeps which were being shelled off Menton. Results unknown.

MADISON:

- 0646 - Fired 81 rounds on troop concentration at 805-885 for SFCP. Area well covered.
 - 0841 - Fired 46 rounds on troops and vehicles for SFCP. Many casualties.
 - 1440 - Fired 9 rounds at enemy battery (888-901) using air spot. Interrupted by shifting to new target.
 - 1455 - Fired 141 rounds on vehicles, troops and guns at 880-871 using air spot. Many casualties, vehicles, guns destroyed, others damaged.
 - 1522 - Fired 42 rounds on battery at 882-901 using air spot, target neutralized.
 - 1548 - Fired 18 rounds on troops, vehicles, guns at 880-871, using air spot. Many guns destroyed.
- During the morning of 10 September MADISON fired 81 rounds at troop concentration (805-885) for SFCP. Area well covered.

WOOLSEY:

- 1727 - Fired 79 rounds on bridge and passing vehicles at 878-879 using cub spot. Hits scored on trucks, building and bridge.

- 1900 - Fired 55 rounds on German headquarters house at S-912/855 for SFCP. Target knocked out.
- 1937 - Fired 96 rounds on enemy battery at S-983/867 for SFCP. Target neutralized, fire effective. Ammunition set on fire.

Minesweepers operating off Menton were endangered by human torpedoes and shore battery fire but continued their sweeping supported by destroyers. Orders were issued to continue sweeping in this area from South limits of swept channel seaward to the 100 fathom curve.

Army requested LORRAINE to bombard enemy installation in vicinity Sospel on 11 September as cruiser and artillery fire had been ineffective. CTF 86 assigned PT boats and cruiser scout planes to cover LORRAINE and requested fighter cover from the Army. WOOLSEY was assigned to destroy human torpedoes reportedly stored at 863-872 and German headquarters at 853-863.

11 September 1944

Front lines on the East Flank this date extended from 81-87 to 80-90 to 75-95 to 71-96. Heavy fighting going on East of Menton. There was no human torpedo or explosive boat activity during the day except by the Army who fired on 5 human torpedoes in harbor of Menton.

Fire support missions completed by ships on 11 September as follows:

LORRAINE:

- 1010 - Fired 91 rds. on fortifications at 746-989 using plane spot. Twelve direct hits scored on target, area well covered.
- 1520 - Fired 58 rds. on fortifications at 747-935 using plane spot. Four direct hits, area well covered.

MADISON:

- 0546 - Fired 30 rds. on counter-attacking troops at 804-885 for SFCP. Attack broken up.

MALIN:

- 1623 - Fired 34 rds. at White House (799-872) which Army had failed to destroy by artillery fire. Direct fire was used, 8 hits scored.

LUDLOW:

- 1155 - Fired 26 rds. on troops, mortars, and machine guns at 791-896 using SFCP spot. Troops were scattered counter-attack broken up.

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1849 - Fired 130 rds. on battery at 853-910 using air spot. Area well covered, 8 guns definitely destroyed.

WOOLSEY:

0801 - Fired 224 rds. on headquarters building at 853-873 using cruiser plane spot and both direct and indirect fire. Many direct hits, area well covered. Shells did little discernible damage to building.

1253 - Fired 24 rds. on house (base for human torpedoes) at S-822/869 using cruiser plane spot. Mission accomplished.

1315 - Fired 65 rds on suspected human torpedo launching site at S-823/869 using cruiser plane spot. Target demolished.

Army requested cruiser be available in bombardment area for targets beyond range of destroyers. F.S. GLOIRE designated by CTF 86.

CTF 86 sent following despatch to CTG 80.5: There have been enemy attacks by explosive boats and human torpedoes on ships in bombardment area off Menton. Launching points alleged to have been Cape Mortola and Ventimiglia. Allies action will probably cause enemy withdrawal of launching points to Eastward. Request you augment present nightly MTB patrol. Establishing two patrols two to three miles off shore. Able patrol between Cape Martin and Ventimiglia. Baker patrol from Cape Ampeglio to San Remo. Able patrol remain as screen until 1000. Baker patrol withdraw to San Maxime at first light. Establish communications with planes and destroyers on 2980 kcs upon arrival departure.

12 September 1944

Situation on front lines of the East Flank substantially the same as for 11 September. There was no reported human torpedo or explosive boat action.

Ship's fire missions during day.

LUDLOW:

1340 - Fired 117 rds. on troops at 821-867 for SFCP. Mission very successful.

1715 - Fired 72 rds. on troops at 805-880 for SFCP. Mission successful.

GLOIRE:

- 0942 - Fired 89 rds. H.E. on bridge at 837-958 using air spot, several direct hits on target.
- 1102 - Fired 99 rds. A.P. on bridge at 859-875 using air spot. Target straddled.

WOOLSEY:

- 1259 - Fired 24 rds. on enemy battery at 833-905 using cub spot. Mission successful.
- 2000 - Fired 46 rds. on enemy troops at 754-936 using SFCP spot. Mission successful, area well covered.

CTF 86 issued following instructions to TF 86 by dispatch:

Rate of expenditure of ammunition has been excessive and may not be continued. Commanding Officers shall assume themselves that targets accepted are appropriate. Main Battery reduced charges shall be employed when practicable. Cruisers shall employ secondary batteries where appropriate or reassign target to a destroyer. Strict economy shall be exercised.

Cruiser planes reported torpedoes beached in shallow water at Cape Martin 761-836 and two at Menton 776-861 and 777-862. British Army picked up torpedoes and delivered to Toulon it was later reported.

The following information was passed along on the performance of human torpedoes as learned from POW.

Speed about 8 kts, endurance 8-10 hours. No definite plan of attack, to be used in groups against ships in amphibious landings. Operated usually with about six to the group. After launching, torpedo carrier makes way as best he can back to launching base. Organization is new and fairly large. Doubt exists as to whether or not they can submerge. Attack position desired by pilot is on ships bow 600-700 meters away. Moving target very difficult to hit.

NCLO of the 45th Div. requested that a cruiser be assigned to the bombardment area on September 13th.

Minesweeps reported 100% complete sweep of the harbor of Nice; area considered safe.

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13 September 1944

No explosive boat or human torpedo activity reported during the day. Approximate front lines on the East Flank 811-870 to 80-91 to 78-91 to 76-94 to 76-93 to 75-93 to 72-00. Ships in bombardment area could observe considerable artillery fire indicating stiff fighting in progress along front. Enemy directed accurate fire on Menton during the day.

Ships fire missions:

WOOLSEY:

- 0720 - Fired 19 rds. on enemy troops and mortars at 807-855 using SFCP spot. Mission successful.
- 0729 - Fired 7 rds. on enemy artillery at 810-897 using SFCP spot. Mission successful.
- 0826 - Fired 32 rds. on enemy troops (close supporting) at 796-895 using SFCP spot. Mission successful, area well covered.
- 0948 - Fired 25 rds on enemy vehicles at 749-938 using SFCP spot. Mission accomplished.
- 1225 - Fired 3 rds. on enemy battery (796-841) firing into town of Menton in an effort to point out target to Army. Ceased fire for fear of hitting own troops. Direct fire used.
- 1456 - Fired 67 rds. on enemy troops and mortars at 804-880 using SFCP spot. Mission successful, area well covered.
- 1659 - Fired 46 rds. on enemy troops and command post at 754-937 using SFCP spot. Mission successful, area well covered.
- 2002 - Fired 38 rds. on enemy troops and vehicles at 746-943 using SFCP spot. Mission successful.

LUDLOW:

- 1727 - Fired 90 rds. on enemy troops and command post at 823-925 using SFCP spot. Mission successful.

CTF 86 issued following instructions to Commander Minesweeps:

In order to prepare a secure anchorage for combatant ships in fire support area and light craft prior to the onset of winter easterly gales request Golfe Juan be completely cleared of mines at an early date. Including Golfe Juan harbor and small boats

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

channel to safe water in Rade Cannes. Remove minefields East of Ile St. Marguerite and connect east and west passages to coastal channel sweeping white sectors of Vallauris Light. Cruiser planes will assist in reconnaissance as desired.

Commanding Officer U.S.S. BROOKLYN was ordered to act as deputy for CTF 86 in fire support area while PHILADELPHIA was in Toulon.

14 September 1944

No activity of human torpedo and explosive boats reported. Front lines approximately 804-870 northwest to 797-910 northwest to 794-963 north on 794.

BROOKLYN planes in patrol morning of 14 September reported a 300 ft. cargo ship lying off beach at latitude 43-55N, Long. 08-07.5E. LUDLOW and EDISON were assigned to sink this vessel assisted by PTs. Cruiser scout planes were to assist in this operation. Numerous small craft seen in the vicinity of the above ship, believed to be fishermen.

Fire support missions during the day:

EDISON:

- 1533 - Fired 72 rds. on self-propelled gun trucks and troops at 852-873 using cub plane spot. All destroyed; mission successful.
- 1912 - Fired 298 rds. on merchant ship at T29-98 using SOC spotting plane. Several hits scored.

LUDLOW:

- 0557 - Fired 52 rds. on enemy troops at 806-806. STCP reported area well covered, counter attack stopped.
- 1253 - Fired 203 rds. on troops and vehicles at 878-871 using air spot. Area well covered; mission accomplished.
- 1326 - Fired 27 rds. on troops and truck column at 814-870 using direct fire. Area well covered.
- 1915 - Fired 113 rds. 11 Common and 49 rds. Illumination. Target was small ships in Oneglia Harbor, twelve hits were scored on two of these craft. Plane spot was used.

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Destroyers operating in Cape Nero area reported floating mines.

Counter battery fire against bombardment ships was light and ineffective.

Minesweepers enlarging the fire support area off of Cap Martin exploded two mines found adrift and cut 8 more. Whole area declared unsafe, particularly after dark, due to danger of drifting mines. BROOKLYN's planes searched Golf de Juan - Cannes area for mine fields with negative results.

15 September 1944

During the night 14-15 September PTs 305, 311 and 313 operating under SOIS and patrolling between Portofino and Spezia attacked 3 southbound F lighters one mile North of Point Mesyba. One F lighter was sunk. PTs were engaged by starshell and heavy fire from remaining F lighters and escorting R boat. PT-311 received superficial damaged.

There was no human torpedo or explosive boat action reported.

Morning SOC patrol observed no enemy activity on roads as far east as San Lorenzo, no effort being made to reinforce or evacuate on right flank by the enemy. Afternoon flight in same area reported no vehicular traffic on roads or surface craft at sea. Plane was subjected to intense light flak fire from Oneglia and San Remo.

Minesweeping off Menton still in progress, additional contact mines swept. Sweeps being supported by EDISON and JONES.

During morning of 15 September the JONES and EDISON approached Imperia Harbor to examine damage done to merchant ship at T-2998 which had been fired on the evening before. Before they could get into position they were driven off by accurate fire from an unlocated multi-gun battery, probably 88 mm., whose range exceeded 20,000 yards. Plane reported this ship abandoned, showing gunfire damage, and as being down by the bow, probably aground.

Gunfire support missions during day. (Front lines unchanged).

EDISON:

1453 - Fired 24 rds. on bridge and enemy vehicular traffic at 814-873 using direct fire. Several hits on either side of bridge were made, bridge was damaged.

H.P. JONES:

1352 - Fired 9 rds. on troops concentration at 817-897 for SFCP 15. Three vehicles and one ammunition dump destroyed.

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1604 - Fired 58 rds. on troops at 748-937 using SFCEP spot.
Target area reported well covered.

NGLO with 45th Division requested two destroyers for fire support same area on the 16th September.

16 September 1944

Approximate front lines this date on the right flank were 80-87 to 80-89 to 79-90 to 77-1 to 87-92 to 75-92 to 74-93 to 74-95 to 71-98.

No human torpedoes sighted on the 16th but PT boats on patrol line Able two miles off shore in Long. 07-35E at 160230 sighted by radar at 4500 yds one half mile off Cape Mortola one craft similar to PT on westerly course. As PT speeded up to intercept enemy altered to southwest towards destroyers, who were warned, and retired. Four explosive boats discovered trailing mother which appeared to be larger than in former attacks and to have a mast and speed in excess of that of PT boats. It seemed more sensitive to alteration by PTs, indicating possibility of radar. None returned gunfire or employed smoke. Two bursts of gunfire delivered at mother, hits believed made. Boats scattered and escaped. Lost contact off Cape Ferrat at 0530.

Other PT action during the day follows:

- 1130 - PTS 55, 553 and 563 operating under SOIS, engaged 4 enemy lighters off Portofino sinking one. PTs were heavily engaged but suffered no damage or casualties.
- 2130 - PTs 305, 312 and 313 operating under SOIS, patrolled between Vado and Genoa attacked 2 SW bound F lighters off Finalmerina sinking one with torpedo, the other escaping to protection of harbor. PTs were heavily engaged one suffering superficial damage as a result of a 20 mm. hit.

Minesweepers continued sweeping in fire support area off Menton were fired on quite accurately by shore batteries suffering two minor casualties to personnel. Destroyers EDISON and JONES supported sweeps firing at gunflashes on shore with unknown results. Spotting planes unable to locate firing batteries. Thirteen contact mines were swept, Commander Minesweepers believing that fields were being relaid nightly and requested heavier caliber surface support and overhead bombing to prevent loss of sweepers by gunfire. CTF 86 ordered minesweeping activities in this area suspended.

Fire support missions 16 September:

H.P.JONES:

0839 - Fired 14 rds. on road traffic at 878-871 using cub spot. Traffic stopped temporarily.

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- 0910 - Fired 32 rds. on guns at 887-871 using cub spot. Area well covered.
- 0953 - Fired 36 rds. on German headquarters at 853-873 using cub spot. Building badly damaged.
- 1310 - Fired 20 rds. direct fire at gun flashes in support of minesweeps. Area well covered, guns ceased firing.
- 1348 - Fired 48 rds. on bridge at 815-873 using cub spot. Result 2 hits.
- 1510 - Fired 7 rds. on bridge at 815-873 using cub spot. Army headquarters ordered cease firing; results unknown.

EDISON:

- 1042 - Fired 93 rds. using direct fire at guns in position 857-890 which were firing on minesweeps. Results unknown.
- 1334 - Fired 36 rds. on troops and vehicles at 846-879 using SFCP spot. Area well covered, no movement seen.
- 1402 - Fired 78 rds. on supply warehouse at 826-897 using SFCP spot. Three direct hits, target well destroyed.
- 1740 - Fired 14 rds. on storage tank using direct fire. Results unknown, target obscured by smoke.
- 1855 - Fired 91 rds. on enemy battery, trucks and personnel at 835-910 using SFCP spot who reported "Completely destroyed battery, every round counted, men and trucks all dispersed."

Preliminary arrangements made today to move PT base from San Maxine forward to Golfe Juan.

PHILADELPHIA ordered to launch reconnaissance flight at first light 17 September to investigate reported enemy activity around Cape Mele.

17 September 1944

There was no change in front line coordinates today.

Cruiser patrol planes early morning 0600-0730A reported following:

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Approximately three or four small craft San Remo Harbor 002-889 possibly drones. One block ship approximately 250 feet long North side of quay of San Remo Harbor 004-905. Two small motor boats inside Imperia Harbor at 202-944 and 202-945, possibly MAS boats. Blockship across entrance Imperia Harbor 203-944 but small boat passage possible. One 200 foot merchant vessel anchored at 208-947, possibly Fox lighter. One barge vessel outside of West quay at Oneglia at 216-952. One 200 foot merchant vessel inside West quay 217-953 and one motor boat possibly MAS boat alongside at 217-952. Five boats all smaller than PT boats inside East quay at Oneglia alongside each other from 217-950 to 220-952, possibly drones. One skiff off Capo Berta 245-956, possibly fisherman. Three-hundred foot merchant vessel formerly 290-980, now at 265-975. Large pier above Laigueglia at 320-048, but no craft there.

Second flight at 0700-1100 located MAS boat proceeding westward at high speed one mile off Capo Verde Arma at 037-874. It was headed for San Remo and possibly same one reported by first flight at 103-950. The MAS boat reported at 073-904 by first flight probably reached San Remo before second flight arrived. Upon returning westward plane reported two MAS boats observed at North quay San Remo Harbor at 003-890. H.P.JONES opened fire on MAS boats plane spotting. Large explosion and dense cloud of smoke on quay at 002-891 followed by several ~~str~~ raddles and near misses. Third flight at 1100 took over spotting. Accurate spotting impossible due to 88 mm. fire and light flank. No activity was observed along highway or railroad as far as Laigueglia.

No human torpedo or explosive boat actions reported by ships.

Destroyer firing vicinity Ventimiglia reported enemy counter battery fire heavier than usual. No casualties resulted.

Fire missions 17 September:

H.P. JONES:

1011 - Fired 162 rds. at small boats in San Remo Harbor using SOC spot. One hit reported with explosion some damage by near misses; 2 fuel storage fire started.

1326 - Fired 106 rds. on gun position at 880-864 using cub plane spot. Area covered.

EDISON:

1339 - Fired 33 rds. on trucks and troops at 859-910 for SFCP. Trucks left burning in the road.

1459 - Fired 34 rds. on bridge at 842-911 for SFCP. Results unknown.

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1533 - Fired 48 rds. on enemy battery at 845-887 using SFCEP spot. Area well covered.

1809 - Fired 44 rds. on enemy battery at 824-895 using SFCEP spot. Area well covered.

1821 - Fired 58 rds. on enemy battery at 824-899 using SFCEP spot. Area well covered; one gun hit, several explosions caused.

Minesweepers reported Golfe Juan 100% swept and 25% maintenance coverage of Nice channel. Results negative.

NCWTF sent following despatch to CTF 86:

At present due to distance from Operating Base, U.S. PTs with NCWTF operate to the West of Imperia. In cases of hot pursuit these forces go to Eastward of this point notifying SOIC of their activities. During daylight hours if any known enemy forces are to the East of Imperia your forces may operate in that area. SOIS and CTG 80.5 are to keep you informed of the disposition and operating hours of their forces thereby mutually coordinating all efforts to destroy the enemy.

18 September 1944

PHILADELPHIA planes were ordered to make a recon flight at first light on the 19th extending to Cape Mele. MADISON ordered to be in position 7 miles South of Cape Mele at 0630 and H.P. JONES 5 miles South of Cape Nero at 0600 prepared to take action against enemy vessels sighted.

Following is a report of the action of the H.P. JONES off San Remo using Seagull spotting:

H.P. JONES with Seagull spotting conducted disastrous bombardment of San Remo 180707 to 0940 which was interrupted at 0740 to silence four light flak batteries vicinity of 015-902 and 015-905 and two heavy batteries at 024-910. Results one ship size PC at South Mole burned and exploded violently as did ammunition dump on North seawall. Five smaller craft at South Mole burned or detonated. At southwest corner three small craft set afire, detonated violently believed to be drones, two boats at North Quay resembling MAS type fired and exploded. Small coaster recently moved to West seawall fired and stern aground. Alongside block ship small craft destroyed and tug damaged by direct hit. Fuel storage tank fired and left burning. Consider all previously serviceable craft fired, sunk or damaged. Violence and extent of explosions indicate concentration of ammunition and explosives in port area. Total ammunition expended 223 rounds.

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Report of MADISON shooting and 2nd PHILADELPHIA plane follows:

Seagull survey at first light disclosed two small craft in Lazzaretto 989-885. Porto Maurizio small coaster inside block ship at 204-944 and six small craft probably fishing at 205-948. Oneglia three small craft at East Mole 220-953. Two small coasters on West Mole 218-952 one of which afire amidships. Off mouth of river 273-987 rafts or ramps not previously noted. Fire inland area 28-01. Heavy barrage of light and heavy flak and counter fire unlocated against MADISON which bombarded and set fire to merchant ship stranded and moored astern at 278-983.

MADISON expended 59 rounds on above ship before being forced to retire by very accurate counter battery fire. Straddled repeatedly up to range 22,000 yards. Plane spotting for MADISON had difficulty due to heavy flak.

Later in the day CTF 86 ordered the H.P. JONES and MADISON to conduct a bombardment of Port area and defenses at Porto Maurizio and Oneglia at 1730 using seagulls from PHILADELPHIA for spotting.

H.P. JONES had the following to report as a result of her firing on Porto Maurizio:

Time 1727 to 1800: Original coordinates 200-924 flak battery firing at spotter.

Results:

- (A) Flak battery several 88 mm. destroyed, battery silenced.
- (B) Ammunition dump blown up.
- (C) Five fires started along beach.
- (D) At least two small boats destroyed; another left burning.
- (E) Several hits on jetties from position 150°T from Porto Maurizio 15,000-17,000 yards. Expended 190 rounds. Heavy and accurate return fire during first half of shoot.

From 1830 to 1900: Direct fire on boat San Remo Harbor from position 145°T from Cap Nero 14,000 yards. Results undetermined due to poor visibility. Several small and one large explosion observed vicinity target. Expended 60 rounds on last target.

MADISON as her part in this bombardment sent the following despatch to CTF 86:

Harbor area 217-931 rounds 70 at 1748A to 1826A, SOC spotting plane. Effectiveness doubtful due extreme ranges and accurate enemy

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counter fire which outranged us necessitating use of smoke and radical high speed maneuvers. Numerous fragment hits on ship; few holes in superstructure, none serious. No personnel casualties. Only call for fire support in bombardment area cancelled when cub unable to spot due to low ceiling.

Fire support missions fired for Army on right flank today follows: Front lines coordinates 803-870 to 790-906 to 779-907 to 775-916 to 750-917 to 735-945 to 714-950 to 711-964 to 718-975 to 700-980 to 704-988.

LUDLOW:

1815 - Fired 50 rds. on enemy guns at 847-885 using SFCEP spot. Target neutralized if not destroyed. Accurate counter battery fire, battery not located.

This was the extent of the firing in the bombardment area. No human torpedo or explosive boat action reported today. Following PT patrol action took place:

PT-557 with MTBs, operating under SOIS and patrolling between Spezia and Sestri Levante attacked 2 northbound Fox lighters off Sestri Levante at 182105A. Two Mk. 13 and 3 British torpedoes were fired. One torpedo hit, estimate Fox lighter sunk. Patrol heavily engaged upon retirement. PTs 552 and 553 patrolling between Genoa and Sestri Levante attacked northbound KT off Portofino at 181130A. No results observed. PTs moderately engaged. No damage or casualties to our forces in either action.

CTF 86 requested that Army take photographs to determine location of defenses (A) Italian border to eastward 10 miles, depth 8 miles and (B) Area centered on Porto Maurizio Oneglia with coastal front of 10 miles, depth 5 miles.

19 September 1944

Bad weather this date cancelled proposed Seagull reconnaissance and seriously restricted PT boat activity. Front lines on East flank substantially unchanged. One call for fire support today assigned to USS LUDLOW which fired 52 rounds on enemy troops and mortars at 807-878 beginning at 1405. SFCEP reported one mortar definitely destroyed, area well covered. USS MADISON made a sweep around Cape Mele on the lookout for enemy shipping, results negative.

Enemy counter battery fire in bombardment area increasing in quantity and accuracy. Minesweeps completed 50% coverage of Nice channel.

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20 September 1944

Bad weather precluded operations again today, no operation of cruiser planes or PT boats.

One call for fire support was made and responded to by USS LUDLOW. No change in front lines. LUDLOW fired 72 rds. on trucks at 875-872 at 1101. SFCP reported hits on railyards and vehicles, area well covered. Accurate counter battery fire encountered.

No torpedo boats or human torpedo boat activity reported.

Photo recco as requested by CTF 86 indicated following coastal batteries Ventimiglia to Cape Mele:

S-840/880	Guns	4	Medium
S-843/886	Guns	4	Light
S868/888	Guns	4	Medium
S-870/885	Guns	4	Light
S-882/894	Guns.	3	Light
S-964/878	Guns	4	Light
S-129/932	Guns	4	Medium
T-155/922	Guns	4	Medium
T-199/967	Guns	4	Medium
T-205/951	Guns	2	Light
T-238/958	Guns	4	Light
T-242/958	Guns	4	Medium
T-324/028	Guns	Single	Heavy

Admiral Jaujard acting as deputy for CTF 86 during temporary absence of latter.

21 September 1944.

Very little activity today, bad weather cancelled PT and plane patrols. One mission fired for the army on the East flank by LUDLOW as follows: LUDLOW fired 70 rounds on supply dump at 875-880 using air spot from 1548 to 1612. Area well covered. Return fire experienced apparently coming from 900-730.

Minesweepers completed 100% sweep of Golfe Juan up to five fathom curve within which obstructions, largely of explosives loaded concrete, with projecting electrodes prevented further sweeping.

There was no change in front line coordinates.

22 September 1944.

No human torpedo or explosive boat activity reported. No change in front lines.

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Fire support missions:

EDISON:

- 1405 - Fired 72 rounds on enemy storage dumps at 860-889 using air spot. Area well covered, explosions occurred.
- 1517 - Fired 12 rounds on enemy truck park at 825-899 using SFCP spot. No observation, mission cancelled by SFCP.

WOOLSEY:

- 1420 - Fired 32 rounds on rail head at 864-870 using SFCP spot. Area well covered.
- 1430 - Fired 36 rounds on railhead at 869-873 using SFCP spot. Area well covered.
- 1800 - Fired 6 rounds on enemy batteries at 861-884 using air spot. Area well covered, ammunition explosions set off.
- 1830 - Fired 16 rounds counter battery direct fire on enemy battery at 864-870. Results not observed, visibility getting poor.

WOOLSEY was fired at quite accurately by battery believed to be located at 864-870, receiving shrapnel hits that caused no damage or casualties. Fading light prevented accurate direct fire. This battery believed to be the one causing much annoyance to ships in fire support area.

Photo reconnaissance of Italian ports on the 22nd shows activity of F boats and S barges, 6 former and 22 latter at Genoa, 3 former and 2 latter at Spezia. One KT ship arrived at Spezia from Genoa also a schooner and 2 S/R boats. Small passenger vessel noted at Imperia. Savona inactive since 17th. Demolition of quays and cranes proceeding.

23 September 1944.

Information was received from French source on the morning of the 23rd that the enemy was planning a surprise assault on allied shipping in Toulon and Marseilles Bays. Italian MAS and German submarines operating out of La Spezia were to carry out the attack. Counter measures were ordered by NCWTF as follows:

- (a) Examine hulls of all ships for presence of limpet mines prior departure ships from alongside berths.
- (b) Where harbor gates are installed make arrangement for closure during dark periods.
- (c) Explode as necessary depth charges in harbor as guard against placement of limpet mines.
- (d) Two PTs assigned to each patrol off Toulon and Marseilles plus additional patrol craft as practical to minimize probability of attack.

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- (e) Established dirigible patrol off Toulon harbor from last light until 0900 daily.
 - (f) All shipping and forces notified of imminence of attack and countermeasure arrangements made.
- This attack did not develop.

Fire support missions on 23 September.

WOOLSEY:

- 0837 - Fired 21 rounds on enemy guns at 864-870 which were suspected of harassing ships in fire support area. Direct fire was used, results negative.
- 1245 - Fired 46 rounds direct fire on fort and observation post at 853-874 as requested by SFCP. Target hit many times, harassing fire effective.

EDISON:

- 0828 - Fired 48 rounds on enemy bridge at 850-900 using SFCP spot. Results unknown.
- 1255 - Fired 24 rounds on railroad yard and personnel at 878-868 using SFCP spot. Ceased fire and evacuated area due to accurate fire from shore battery. Two cub planes sent out by Army to locate position of shore batteries were unsuccessful. Both WOOLSEY and EDISON were fired on very accurately as were PT patrols. Front lines very static. Army was informed by CTF 86 that unless targets were extremely urgent fire support ships could no longer be allowed to enter bombardment area until offensive shore batteries had been located.

Admiral HEWITT reported to CinCMed that the assignment for operation DRAGON as prescribed in the directive for CWNTF had been completed but that the following activities still remain:

- (1) Support of army right flanks in vicinity of Italian border.
- (2) Prevention of small craft raids from enemy held territory to the eastward.
- (3) Protection of shipping in the approaches of Port du Bouc, Marseilles and Toulon.
- (4) Operation of intra theatre convoys for maintenance and build up including escort and the assignment of naval amphibious ships and craft to such movements.

Admiral HEWITT suggested that (1) and (2) above continue under Admiral DAVIDSON and Task Force 86; that (3) be the responsibility of Commander Advanced Bases (CTG 80.8) to whom necessary patrol, screening and minesweeping units would be assigned; and that (4) would continue to be handled directly by CWNTF. CinCMed concurred.

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24 September 1944.

At 0250 morning of the 24th PTs 212 and 216 operating under SOIS engaged an F-Lighter or coastal barge close to beach at Cape Lena. Two torpedoes were fired at target which was stationary, large explosion followed.

No change reported in front lines coordinates, patrols were active. Some opposition to fire support ships was encountered but it was considerably less than usual. Fire support missions as follows:

EDISON:

- 1105 - Fired 51 rounds on enemy artillery at 865-877 using cub spot. Firing effective.
- 1247 - Fired 44 rounds on enemy troops concentration and motor park at 811-878 using SFCP spot. Area well covered.

MADISON:

MADISON's operation confined to screening EDISON with smoke. PT patrols cancelled due to bad weather. With the expected closing of CAMEL beach on the 25th patrol craft and minesweepers were reassigned or released as suitable. Large part of patrol and sweeping activity to be turned over to the French Navy using such U.S. YMSs and SCs as necessary. C.T.F. 86 to retain control of sufficient sweepers and patrol craft for immediate needs of fire support ships.

25 September 1944.

No activity of midget subs, explosive boats, or human torpedoes reported. Ships received no counter battery fire in fire support area today. FORBIN sank a floating mine at Lat. 48-37 N., Long. 07-38E.

Fire support missions.

MADISON:

- 1007 - Fired 200 rounds on supply train at 865-877 using cub spot. Direct hit on locomotive and car tracks well covered.
- 1348 - Fired 11 rounds on enemy observation post at 830-896 using SFCP spot. Target destroyed, mission successful.

FORBIN:

- 1253 - Fired 34 rounds on mortar platoon and personnel at 811-878 for SFCP. Area well covered.

There was no change in the front line coordinates today and no PT boat patrols night of 25-26 September due to weather. CTF 86 in PHILADELPHIA returned to support area.

COMMENTS ON NAVAL GUNFIRE

The naval gunfire support for Operation DRAGOON was the heaviest that has been provided and used in any operation thus far in the African and Mediterranean theater. This heavy support was necessary for two reasons namely:

- (1) The front being assaulted reached initially from the Iles D'Hyeres to Cap Roux.
- (2) The sea coast defenses were very strongly built and heavily gunned. As soon as the initial assault phase was over it became necessary to commence the reduction of the defenses of Toulon, one of the most heavily fortified sea coast defense positions in Europe.

The defenses of Toulon included two twin turrets each containing two 340mm guns, located on the Peninsula of San Mandrier, which easily outranged any of the warships which were available in the Mediterranean and which could be brought against them. The Germans also shifted the ex F.S. STRASBOURG and ex F.S. GALLISSIONERE to the oil pier on the northwest side of San Mandrier to use their gun batteries. In order to bombard the heavily fortified peninsula of San Mandrier it was apparent that the Iles D'Hyeres and the Giens Peninsula would have to be captured as soon as possible in order that

- (1) The Rade D'Hyeres could be swept for use as gunfire support area and
- (2) The gunfire support ships taken position in the Rade D'Hyeres and in the lee of Giens and Ile D'Porquerolles.

By taking these positions ships were in large degree sheltered from German radar and optical observation. It was further contemplated and carried out that as soon as practicable long range ships were to take station to the southwest of Cape Sicie for the same reasons. In addition the placing of ships to the east southeast and southwest of San Mandrier permitted placing that position under a very heavy crossfire with the idea that guns in turrets and shields would be hit from the rear and the Germans at the same time denied a concentrated gunfire support group as target.

Air spotting using carrier based planes was an absolute necessity since this attack area was, for all practical purposes, outside of the range of land based fighter planes. Fighter planes had to be used because the AA defenses on San Mandrier, Cape Sicie and in Toulon were exceeded in strength only by the AA defenses of Berlin in the opinion of several aviators. This air spotting was provided by the carriers operating under Rear Admiral TROUBRIDGE, R.N. and Rear Admiral DURGIN, U.S.N. At times this consisted of five spotting missions at a time and consistently ran to three missions over the target area from early morning until dusk. This supply of spotting planes and pilots by the carriers must have entailed exceptional hardship on the aviation personnel, but every mission called for was supplied promptly and without question. The spotters knew their

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

business and I cannot be too loud in my praise of the Carrier Force for its magnificent assistance in the operation. With this naval aviation, both British and U.S., our task was made immeasurably easier and our fire very much more effective. In addition the carriers proved the fighter cover of 4 planes continuous from first light until dusk for this force.

Naval gunfire was very accurate. It is still a fact that as a general rule a well designed and constructed gun position will be neutralized by gunfire but is very difficult to destroy.

The basic Shore Fire Control Party organization was as follows:

(a) The Shore Fire Control Parties operated in their divisional organization. The Naval Gunfire Liaison Officers with Division, Corps and Army Headquarters correlated requests for gunfire for the succeeding day. These requests were transmitted to Commander Support Force who assigned ships to Shore Fire Control Parties and stationed them so that they could reach the targets requested, arranged air spot and assigned it to the ships requiring it. Each evening an estimated of probable additional requirements was made and the available ships were disposed so as to be able to quickly link up with a Shore Fire Control Party confronted with need for naval gunfire. The bombardment calling wave which could be used by all ships, NGLOs with Corps and Division and Shore Fire Control Parties was guarded continuously by the Support Force Flagship and the Support Group Flagships and by all ships unassigned to a specific Shore Fire Control Party. As soon as a request was received for fire in support of a given Shore Fire Control Party Commander Support Force assigned the ship most suitable and in the best position to link up with the Shore Fire Control Party needing support. In addition Commander Support Force maintained one transmitter and two receivers monitoring the Shore Fire Control Party Spotting frequencies in order that assignments of ships to SFCPs be made quickly if communication became difficult between a SFCP and its assigned ship. A monitoring watch was maintained on the spotting Plane Frequencies for the same purpose.

Difficulty was experienced at times, principally caused by the high rugged country between NGLOs and ships coincident with the very rapid advance of these troops which were by passing Toulon. The SCR 609 and SCR 608 voice radios proved their superiority again over the SCR 284. In the latter stages communications with the Senior Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer were only possible using SCR 608. Details of the Support Force - SFCP organization are covered in Commander Support Force Operation Plan 5-44 "Flare One".

The training of the U.S. SFCPs had been carefully supervised by the officer who was detailed as Senior Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (Commander D. D. SCOTT, U.S.N.). They knew what was needed and expected from them in order that Naval Gunfire Support could be quickly and efficiently delivered. It is strongly recommended that such a program be carried out in the preparation for any future

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amphibious operations. The principal difficulty experienced by this command was in obtaining definite information from the FOO Parties as to the situation ashore and the approximate location of the SFCP or the area on which the SFCP will require fire. In addition type of targets to be engaged should be given. With this information suitable ships both as to type, number and position can be laid on so that the different types of targets can be most to extract from the FOO Parties.

For the proper handling of a large Gunfire Support Force, especially on a rapidly expanding front it is strongly recommended that the Commander Gunfire Support Force be furnished with a ship having complete communication facilities and an up to date operations room. The use of a cruiser as flagship, once the shooting starts, is not satisfactory for the following reasons.

(a) There is not suitable operations room.

(b) The cruiser either is tied down to one small area in active gunfire support thus not permitting the Commander to go to trouble spots or if the cruiser is given freedom of movement then one powerful unit of the Gunfire Support Group is not available for specific assignment to a given target or SFCP in advance.

This operation has again shown that on our ships the flag bridge and flag plot are absolutely inadequate for handling amphibious operations. As soon as the initial assault is over and the advance inland and along the coast begins, an operations room similar to those on the AGCs becomes an absolute necessity. The Commander of the Support Force should normally however fly his flag in a battleship or cruiser in order that he and his staff keep up to date and thoroughly conversant with not only the theoretical but with the practical aspects of Naval gunnery especially the specialized art of shore bombardment.

UNITED STATES EIGHTH FLEET
Commander Support Force
(Commander Cruiser Division Eight)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Part VI

Chronology.

At 0930B on 9 August, Naval Commander Western Task Force placed his operation order No. 4-44 (ANOR-1) into effect. In accordance with Annex F (Assembly and Approach Plan) to ANOR-1, vessels of the SITKA Force were dispersed as follows:

- CASTELLABATE - PRINCE HENRY, PRINCE BAUDOUIN, ROPER, GREENE, TATTNALL, OSMOND INGRAM, BARRY.
- AGROPOLI - PRINCE DAVID, PRINCESS BEATRIX, PRINCE ALBERT. These groups with CARMICK and THEMISTOCLES as escorts, to sail at 1200, 11 August for PROPRIANO.
- NAPLES - AUGUSTA; DIDO, SOMERS, GLEAVES, LOOKOUT - to sail at 2100, 12 August for PROPRIANO.
- MADDALENA - Minesweeping Group - to depart on the 12th, arriving at PROPRIANO on 13 August. Leave PROPRIANO 1330, 14 August to arrive Assault Area first light, 15 August.
- BASTIA - ARB Diversion Group - Arrive 9 August and install RCM equipment. Depart for PROPRIANO on 13 August.
- AJACCIO - HACKBERRY and PEPPERWOOD. HACKBERRY to depart 12 August for PROPRIANO and depart from that port with Minesweeping Group for assault area. PEPPERWOOD to depart 16 August with light indicator net and equipment for assault area.

13 August 1944

1300 - Commanding Officers, Task Group and Unit Commanders of ships and forces present at PROPRIANO reported aboard AUGUSTA for conference and final briefing. Represented at this were:

U.S.S. AUGUSTA	H.M.S. DIDO
U.S.S. SOMERS	H.M.S. LOOKOUT
U.S.S. GLEAVES	H.M.S. PRINCE BAUDOUIN
U.S.S. TATTNALL	H.M.S. PRINCE HENRY
U.S.S. BARRY	H.M.S. PRINCE DAVID
U.S.S. GREENE	H.M.S. PRINCE ALBERT
U.S.S. ROPER	H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX
U.S.S. OSMOND INGRAM	H.M.S. LARNE
U.S.S. HACKBERRY	H.M.S. CLINTON
U.S.S. PT's 202; 203; 207;	H.M.S. OCTAVIA
213, 214, 215, 216,	H.M.S. WELFARE
218 and 211	H.M.S. STORM CLOUD
ASRB 11, 25, 12, 26	G. S. THEMISTOCLES
ML's 559, 560, 562, 567	H.M.S. KINTYRE

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd).

First Special Service Force of the United States Army.

Groupe de Commandos of French Army "B".

Commanders of Assault Units (1) Sitka ABLE, (2) Sitka BAKER and ROMEO.

Commanders of Screening, Diversion and Net Tender Groups.

F.S. LORRAINE, with Alpha Convoy and U.S.S. PEPPERWOOD at AJACCIO and were not represented at the conference.

14 August 1944

- 1031 - TASK FORCE 86 less F.S. LORRAINE, Net Tender, Mine Sweeping and Screening Group departed PROPRIANO enroute to SITKA Assault Area. Steaming in cruising formation No. 1, Speed 13 knots, using zigzag plan No. 10.
- 1104 - Sighted numerous convoys of LST's and LCI's enroute to Assault areas.
- 1500 - Screening Group consisting of PTs from CALVI joins formation.
- 1835 - Screening Group left formation to proceed to assigned screening station off Toulon.
- 1950 - Enemy radar signals noted. Jammed by U.S.S. AUGUSTA. Jamming of enemy signals also noted from CORSICA.
- 2024 - Increased speed to 18 knots.
- 2030 - Changed from cruising formation to approach formation.
- 2059 - Enemy radar station in vicinity of TOULON ranged on this force; counter measures successfully carried out.
- 2101 - Set convoy course 347° T. Conditions at this time were: Barometer - 29.91, temperature - 79° F, wind 4-5 knots from 200° T, sea - smooth, sky - clear with few cumulus clouds at about 8,000 feet. No moon.
- 2124 - Picked up Island of PORQUEROLLES on PPI screen bearing 284° T, range 34,600 yards. Units of Task Force proceeded to assigned areas. One radar station in TOULON area continued coastal search; beamed on this force occasionally and countermeasures were taken.
- 2154 - Arrived at Point "BC". Units 86.3.1, 86.3.2 and 86.3.3 proceeded to their respective transport areas; Gunfire support ships proceeded to assigned support, patrol and screening areas.

C-O N F I D E N T I A L

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

2255 - German voices heard on 2610 Kcs.

2335 - First waves of landing craft left transports enroute to assault beaches.

Note: Between 2200 and 2400 numerous explosions were noted on shore believed to be bombing.

15 August 1944

Fighter cover over area consists of six night fighters.
No enemy surface vessels sighted in vicinity.

0012 - First waves of landing craft almost three-fourths of way in to landing beaches.

0021 - Three waves of landing craft in water.

0033 - Scouts who have landed on LEVANT reported no enemy movements.

0130 - Zero-hour; assault waves hit assigned landing areas. No opposition encountered.

0130 - Transports departed from unloading areas for assigned rendezvous South of LEVANT.

0246 - Large convoys of landing craft picked up by radar to Southward headed toward ALPHA unloading areas.

0315 - Moonrise; fourth (last) quarter.

0450 - SOMERS fired one salvo at an unidentified vessel attempting to pierce the screen; first shot fired by this force.

0505 - Vessel, later identified as German ship (Schnell Gelcit) SG21, Fire was started and vessel burned fiercely. Numerous explosions noted.

0510 - SOMERS opened fire on second enemy vessel later identified as Italian Corvette COMOCIO. Vessel was repeatedly hit and dead in the water. Crew abandoned ship. Boarding party from SOMERS secured papers, charts, and signal book which were forwarded to NCWTF.

0537 - Commander Task Force 86 ordered SOMERS to close enemy ships to pick up survivors immediately after daylight.

0550 - Shore Fire Control Parties at PORT CROS, LEVANT and le RAYOL reported landings were successfully made; very little opposition met.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0550 - Informed NCWTF and CTF-84 that battery on LEVANT inactive.
- 0550 - First waves of bombers attacked prearranged targets ashore employing pathfinder technique. Endangered First Groupe de Commandos in vicinity Cape NEGRE.
- 0610 - Commander Minesweeping Flotilla 5 in H.M.S. LARNE reported for duty; ordered to sweep area ABLE in accordance with prearranged plan.
- 0625 - SOMERS, assisted by PT boats and other craft in area, picked up survivors of destroyed enemy ships, and transferred them to PRINCE BAUDOUIN and PRINCESS BEATRIX and TATTNALL. Many badly burned.
- 0629 - Red alert.
- 0637 - Sunrise. Light airs, haze, visibility two to four miles.
- 0650 - Shore Fire Control Party 34 assigned to French Groupe de Commandos reported slight enemy opposition; in general landing effective and ahead of schedule. LCMs after being partly discharged in ROMEO Area were reloaded and returned to PRINCE DAVID and PRINCESS BEATRIX.
PRINCE HENRY with Rear Admiral Chandler aboard and loaded with casualties and POWs, left Assault Area for Ajaccio.
- 0710 - F.S. LORRAINE arrived with Task Force 84 and reported for duty.
- 0730 - Air bombings ceased.
- 0742 - DIDO opened fire on Command Post at 317034 (Cape NEGRE section)
- 0755 - Enemy pocket on CAVALIERE beach not cleared; held up unloading of LCM with ammunition. LCMs returned to PRINCE DAVID and PRINCESS BEATRIX.
- 0800 - Planes overhead reported no enemy aircraft in vicinity.
- 0835 - SOMERS reported that enemy vessel COMOCIO not salvable had been sunk and that important documents had been removed.
- 0850 - ROMEO LCMs with 57mm ammunition were discharged at ALPHA Red Beach.
- 0910 - AUGUSTA opened fire on enemy strong point on PORT CROS.
- 0945 - BARRY, GREENE, OSMOND INGRAM, ROPER left Assault Area for Ajaccio.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0950 - SFCP 34 reported a counter attack in progress with strong point at 330030; AUGUSTA ordered to furnish gunfire support. LOOKOUT reported having fired at enemy troops at coordinates 355891 in accordance with request of SFCP 28 on island of LEVANT.
- 0953 - Four (4) PT's attempted to enter PORT D'LAVIS but were driven off by mortar fire.
- 1000 - PRINCE DAVID, PRINCE ALBERT, PRINCE BOUDOUIN, PRINCESS BEATRIX left Assault area for Ajaccio.
- 1020 - Planes reported no enemy activity to the Westward of Cape Bonat.
- 1055 - First Special Service Force on LEVANT reported capture of that island with exception of one enemy strong point held by about 80 enemy troops. 240 prisoners of war taken. There were few casualties.
- 1120 - Commandos reported at 335035, counter attack beaten off, 50 POW, three killed, two wounded and requested supply of 57mm ammunition by air drop.
- 1128 - AUGUSTA fired on enemy troops on CAVALIERE Beach. Two salvos fired and cease firing order given as shells were endangerin allied troops. SOMERS and LOOKOUT fired on enemy strongpoint on PORT CROS.
- 1142 - HACKBERRY and MLs (S.O. in #560) ordered to carry out pre-arranged plan to enter PORT CROS. Colonel Walker, Commanding Special Service Force on LEVANT reported Island of no value and batteries dummy. He recommends to Army command that islands be evacuated. POWs approximately 240.
- 1143 - DIDO firing at enemy troops on CAVALIERE Beach reported excellent results.
- 1200 - ML 559 struck mine while sweeping off PORT MAN; under own power left area and proceeded to MADDALENA, CORSICA.
- 1319 - LST 32 with radar equipment stopped from entering PORT CROS as the harbor was still under enemy control. MLs under fire in Channel North of PORT CROS.
- 1400 - NEVADA reported for duty.
- 1440 - 7th Regiment contacted French Commandos.
- 1500 - LORRAINE and NEVADA departed Assault Area for Ajaccio.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1521 - AUGUSTA opened fire on enemy strong point Chateau Fort on PORT CROS.
- 2023 - The Honorable James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, came aboard from U.S.S. PLUNKETT.
- 2036 - Sunset. Light airs. Visibility six to eight miles.
- 2045 - SecNav., accompanied by Lt. Col. Baxter, U.S.A., and Capt. Bartlett from 7th Army Headquarters went ashore at Orange Beach to investigate conditions on LEVANT, as Col. Walker after making report of no opposition had later encountered an enemy strong point at PORT a la VIS and had sustained several casualties.
- 2100 - One JU 88 reported bearing 065° T, distance 20 miles.
- 2105 - A.A. fire in ALPHA Area.
- 2106 - Countermeasures taken against possible glider bomb attacks.
- 2140 - In view of prospective return of Secretary of Navy to AUGUSTA, that vessel did not cruise in night retirement area, but screened by GLEAVES, PLUNKETT and MCCOOK steamed to the Southward of LEVANT inside the A/S Screen.
- 2234 - Received report that all of LEVANT had been captured by First Special Service Force; 50 prisoners taken at enemy strong point.
- 2245 - Secretary Forrestal, Lt.Col. Baxter, U.S.A., and Secretary's party returned aboard AUGUSTA and reported that LEVANT, with the exception of enemy pocket of resistance along North coast, was in the hands of the Special Service Force.

Note: Status of vessels attached to Task Force 86 was as follows:

Enroute AJACCIO - BARRY, GREENE, OSMOND INGRAM, ROPER,
PRINCE DAVID, PRINCE ALBERT, PRINCE BAUDOUT
PRINCESS BEATRIX.

PT's - Released to Commander Task Group 80.5.

ASRB's - Released to Commander Task Group 80.4.

PEPPERWOOD - at AJACCIO.

THEMISTOCLES - Released to Commander Task Group 80.6.

PRINCE HENRY - ALPHA Area. TATTNALL - off LEVANT.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

Minesweepers plus ML's and HACKBERRY cruise in night retirement area to the Southward of LEVANT.

DIDO, LOOKOUT in SITKA night retirement areas.

SOMERS in patrol areas to support PORT CROS.


16 August 1944

0000 - Task Force 86 operating as noted above. Landings on assigned assault beaches had progressed very well; light enemy opposition encountered. Island of LEVANT captured; Island of PORT CROS occupied except for small enemy pocket of resistance located at an old Chateau Fort, French Groupe de Commandos had worked inland as planned and control of Cape NEGRE had passed to the 6th Corps.

0123 - Commander Western Naval Task Force alerted all vessels in area to possible E-boat attacks. No attacks reported.

0412 - Noted A/A fire in vicinity of GIENS Peninsula.

Note: Assignments of vessels for gunfire support ordered as follows:



0850 - Secretary of the Navy left AUGUSTA and boarded U.S.S. PLUNKETT for return to CATOCTIN.

0908 - HACKBERRY reported no net between Point Galere on PORT CROS and Cape BENAT on mainland; minefield located in that vicinity.

1605 - Task Group 85.12 reported for duty.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

1800 - Sixteen dive bombers attacked fort on PORT CROS and dropped thirty-two 1,000 lb. bombs scoring six direct hits.

1835*- AUGUSTA bombarded PORT CROS.

1900 - TEXAS, ARKANSAS, EMILE BERTIN and DUGUAY TROUIN ordered to sail to PALERMO; later changed orders for last two to sail PROPRIANO.

Note:* Throughout this day this fort was fired on by SOMERS with a total of 24 white phosphorus and 658 rounds of common shells having been expended.
GLEAVES expended 155 rounds in support of French Army troops.
DIDO fired 19 rounds against machine gun positions to Westward of Cape BENAT.

Night cruising as follows:

GLEAVES in patrol area two, SOMERS in patrol areas three and four, AUGUSTA South of Levant, DIDO and LOOKOUT in Night Retirement area, M/S inside Rade BORMES.

17 August 1944

- 0000 - SITKA Assault plan still in effect. Island of LEVANT completely occupied, beachheads and commanding ground on mainland strongly held by units of the Sixth Corps after initial landings by French Group de Commandoes were successfully carried out as planned. On PORT CROS enemy resistance in vicinity of old Chateau Fort at coordinates 302869 continued despite repeated air and gunfire bombardments. Units of Task Force 86 operated in assigned night retirement and anchorage areas.
- 0700 - Released F.S. JEANNE D'ARC which had been in reserve in ALGIERS to CinC, Med.
- 0740 - Shore Fire Control Party 29 on PORT CROS requested 8" gunfire on Chateau Fort. Assaults of First Special Service Forces, made after bombings by planes and gunfire support of AUGUSTA during late afternoon of 16 August, failed to dislodge enemy.
- 0800 - Commanding General, 7th Army established headquarters at San TROPEZ.
- 1000 - H.M.S. SIRIUS released to CinC, Med.
H.M.S. DIDO released to CinC, Med; relieved by F.S. EMILE BERTIN.
- 1105 - Chateau Fort on PORT CROS under attack by dive-bombers. Several direct hits reported and activity noted in vicinity of fort.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1111 - AUGUSTA opened fire on Chateau Fort on PORT CROS; 42 rounds of main battery expended, numerous direct hits observed. Due to construction of fort, A.P. was fired by AUGUSTA, but even this was found to be ineffective.
- 1130 - H.M.S. RAMILLIES reported to Commander Task Force 86 for duty. Service of this vessel had been requested in order to carry out plans for complete destruction of Chateau Fort with 15" gunfire.
- 1138 - Vice Admiral H.K. Hewitt, U.S.N. (Commander Naval Western Task Force) came aboard for conference with Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S.N.
- 1145 - PHILADELPHIA, GEORGES LEYGUES, and MONTCALM ordered to PROPRIANO.
- 1214 - Brush fires in the vicinity of the fort on PORT CROS started by enemy troops for camouflage purposes.
- 1255 - H.M.S. RAMILLIES opened fire against Chateau Fort on PORT CROS using A.P.
- 1311 - White Flag appeared over Fort. RAMILLIES expended 12 rounds of main battery ammunition.
- 1325 - Allied troops entered fort. All resistance on Isle de PORT CROS ceased.
- 1609 - H.M.S. RAMILLIES released to Commander Task Force 84.
- 1900 - AUGUSTA proceeded to vicinity of San TROPEZ in order that Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S.N., could board CATOCTIN for conference with Vice Admiral Hewitt, U.S.N.
- 2000 - With completion of SITKA Assault phase, Commander Task Force 86 Post Assault Gunfire Support Plan, Operation Plan No. 5-44, was placed in effect.
- 2030 - H.M.S. ORION, BLACK PRINCE, DIDO and AURORA ordered to sail to PROPRIANO.
Vice Admiral Hewitt was not aboard CATOCTIN, Rear Admiral Davidson returned to AUGUSTA and latter vessel proceeded to vicinity of LEVANT.
- 2054 - Considerable A/A fire in San TROPEZ harbor; red alert. No planes or bombs noted.
- Note: Numerous red alerts were sounded during the day; no hostile planes seen in vicinity of flagship.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

Assignment of night retirement and anchorage areas made as noted below:

South of Island of LEVANT - AUGUSTA (Flagship, CTF 86).

North of Island of LEVANT - LARNE (M/S 5):
ML's 560, 562, 567.

Rade de BORMES - GLEAVES.
PORT CROS - TATTNALL.

Other units of Task Force 86 present steaming in night retirement areas Southeast of LEVANT.

18 August 1944

0000 - Commander Task Force 86 Operation Plan 5-44, Short Title FLARE ONE, effective. Gunfire Support forces made available by Commander Western Naval Task Force distributed as follows:

86.2 (Left Flank Support Group) Rear Admiral Davidson, USN

AUGUSTA (F)
PHILADELPHIA (4 VOS)
LORRAINE
GEORGES LEYGUES (F) (Deputy - Contre Amiral Jaujard, F.N.)
MONTCALM
GLOIRE
LE MALIN
MC COOK
GLEAVES
SOMERS
PLUNKETT
Plus 2 more DD's.

86.3 (Assault Group) Rear Admiral Chandler, U.S.N.

OMAHA (F)
TATTNALL

86.4 (Center Support Group) Rear Admiral Chandler, U.S.N.

OMAHA (F)
*MARBLEHEAD
*CINCINNATI
QUINCY
EBERLE
MADISON

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

86.5 (Right Flank Support Group) Rear Admiral Deyo, U.S.N.

TUSCALOOSA (F)
BROOKLYN (4 VOS)
EMILE BERTIN (F) (Deputy - Contre Amiral Auboyneau, F.N.)
DUGUAY TROUIN
LE TERRIBLE
LE FANTASQUE
BOYLE
CHAMPLIN
WOOLSEY
EDISON

86.6 (Security Group) Captain Maynard (HACKBERRY)

MS Flotilla 5 (LARNE) S.O.
HACKBERRY
*PEPPERWOOD
*Net Unit

86.7 (Battleship Group) Rear Admiral Bryant, U.S.N.

*TEXAS
*ARKANSAS
#NEVADA
#RAMILLIES

Note: * Reserve
Forward Reserve.

In addition to vessels listed above, following ships and units assigned to Task Force 86 for specific duties as noted:

M/S Flotilla 5 consisting of HMS LARNE, CLINTON, OCTAVIA, WELFARE and STORM CLOUD and ML's 560, 562, and 567 plus KINTYRE - sweeping prearranged channels in vicinity of Rade de BORMES and as necessary to permit gunfire support ships to maneuver in furnishing support to army troops.

BARRY and OSMOND INGRAM ordered to report with garrison troops for Island of PORQUEROLLES.

LST 32 stood by to be taken through swept channel to PORT CROS for unloading of Radar equipment.

0040 - Report received from Commander Destroyers, EIGHTH Fleet that enemy E-boats attempted to break screen in vicinity of CANNES-NICE. Four E-boats reported destroyed by A/S screen; damage to vessels of screen confined to one torpedo hit (a dud) which struck FRANKFORD.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0830 - Conference held aboard AUGUSTA attended by following officers:
Contre Amiral Auboyneau, F.N., Commander THIRD Cruiser Division,
Commanding Officer; U.S.S. MC COOK.
Commanding Officer, PT 215.
Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S. Navy and members of his staff for discussion of plan for occupation of PORQUEROLLES Isle.
- 0900 - Major General CHIDLAW, USA, and Army Air Force Reserve Unit which had been on AUGUSTA as standby Air Force Control Force during operation DRAGOON, transferred ashore under orders to return to 111th Tactical Air Force Command Headquarters.
- 0955 - M/S Flotilla 5, operating in Rade de BORMES area fired on by batteries located on GIENS Peninsula. QUINCY ordered to take gun positions under fire.
- 1330 - PT 215 took "white flag party" consisting of Lieut. Col. Baxter; USA, Capitaine de Fregate Bataille, F.N., Lieut. Comdr. Graham, U.S.N., and Lieutenant Neulsen, U.S.N.R. to PORQUEROLLES to demand surrender of that island.
- 1519 - PT 215 forced to retire from vicinity of PORQUEROLLES after having approached to within 6,000 yards of GIENS Peninsula and having been fired at heavily by batteries located there.
- 1530 - AUGUSTA ordered to fire on batteries on CAPE ESTEREL which had taken PT 215 under fire.
- 1613 - AUGUSTA ceased firing having expended 39 rounds. Plane reported numerous hits in target area.
- 1740 - LST 32 unloaded Radar Equipment on PORT CROS and reported to Commander Task Force 84.
- 2046 - Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S.N., left ship for conference with Vice Admiral Hewitt, U.S.N., aboard CATOCTIN; Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S.N. returned at 2100.
- 2101 - Ships and shore batteries in San TROPEZ area opened up with heavy A/A fire; no planes noted. Area quickly covered with smoke. AUGUSTA stood out of locality and headed for sea. Enemy planes dropped numerous anti-personnel fragmentation bombs four of which struck CATOCTIN killing four and injuring forty personnel.

Note: During the day, the following vessels reported:
H.M.S. LOOKOUT - Assigned to AUGUSTA as screen.
Following vessels departed:
TUSCALOOSA, WOOLSEY and EDISON for AJACCIO.
H.M.S. AJAX to PROPRIANO.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

19 August 1944

0000 - Task Force 86 operating in night retirement and anchorage areas.

0200 - EMILE BERTIN departed Assault Area for PROPRIANO.

0700 - Vessels of Task Force 86 assigned to gunfire support as follows:

Right Flank - BROOKLYN, DUGUAY TROUIN, BOYLE, CHAMPLIN.

Center Group - OMAHA, QUINCY, EBERLE, MADISON.

Left Flank - AUGUSTA, PHILADELPHIA, LORRAINE, GEORGES LEYGUES, MONTCALM, GLOIRE, LE MALIN, MC COOK, GLEAVES, SOMERS, PLUNKETT, LE TERRIBLE, LE FANTASQUE.

0805 - Commanding Officers, Gunnery Officers and Communication Officers of PHILADELPHIA, MONTCALM, GEORGES LEYGUES, NEVADA, GLEAVES, EBERLE, KEARNY, MCCOOK, PT 204, LORRAINE as well as Contre Amiral Jaujard and Rear Admiral Chandler came aboard to attend conference with Rear Admiral Davidson. Plans for the attack on Saint MANDRIER discussed.

1115 - M/S Flotilla 19, Senior Officer in H.M.S. RINALDO, reported to Commander Task Force 86 and ordered to sweep area Southwest of Cape BENAT to permit entry of gunfire support ships. M/S Flotilla 5 ordered to sweep area "A".

1400 - H.M.S. AJAX sailed for PROPRIANO.

1410 - Following changes made in gunfire support ship allocations:

PHILADELPHIA relieved QUINCY.

LE TERRIBLE reported to right flank support group.

NEVADA which had reported in Assault Area assigned to left flank support force.

GLOIRE, QUINCY and MC COOK ordered to proceed PROPRIANO.

Left flank support ships consisted of: GEORGES LEYGUES, PHILADELPHIA, OMAHA, MONTCALM, LE FANTASQUE, MADISON, LE MALIN, SOMERS and PLUNKETT in direct support with AUGUSTA, NEVADA, and LORRAINE with KEARNY, ERICSSON, GLEAVES and EBERLE in reserve.

1440 - Sailing of QUINCY, GLOIRE and MC COOK to PROPRIANO cancelled.

1450 - Left Flank reserve force steamed to Westward to bombard targets on Saint MANDRIER and in Toulon. Targets assigned were as follows:

AUGUSTA - K-20 and observation post to Eastward.

NEVADA - French Battleship STRASBOURG.

LORRAINE - K-20 and K-21 (2 2-gun 340mm batteries on Saint MANDRIER).

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1609 - AUGUSTA commenced long range bombardment.
- 1617 - NEVADA opened fire.
- 1630 - LORRAINE which had closed range commenced firing. QUINCY with LOOKOUT and MC COOK as screen steamed to the South-westward of GIENS Peninsula during this bombardment to furnish counterbattery fire as necessary.
- 1721 - Firings against enemy defenses in Saint MANDRIER-TOULON area completed. No enemy opposition noted. Task force returned to assigned area South of LEVANT.
- 1950 - Gunfire support vessels of Task Force 86 ordered to rendezvous AUGUSTA; conference called for 2000 aboard flagship.
- 2000 - Commanding Officers of AUGUSTA, NEVADA, LORRAINE, QUINCY, PHILADELPHIA, OMAHA, MONTCAIM, GEORGES LEYGUES, LE MALIN, LE FANTASQUE, GLEAVES, LOOKOUT, ERICSSON, KEARNY, EBERLE, MC COOK, MADISON as well as Contre Amiral Jaujard, and Rear Admiral Chandler attended conference called by Rear Admiral Davidson aboard AUGUSTA.
- 2200 - Conference ended.

Note: Night retirement areas as indicated:

Rade d'HYERES - DIDO, DUGUAY TROUIN, LE FANTASQUE.
South of GRANDE PASSE - AUGUSTA, EMILE BERTIN.

20 August 1944

- 0000 - General situation ashore ahead of schedule. Army plans for capture of TOULON completed. H-hour for attack that city set for 200800B. C.T.F. 86 called up DIDO, DUGUAY TROUIN, EMILE BERTIN and LE FANTASQUE from PROPRIANO. Gunfire support ships ordered to be on stations indicated below at 0530 to furnish support as necessary:

Rade d'HYERES - DIDO, DUGUAY TROUIN, LE FANTASQUE; to support advance on HYERES and Westward.

S.E. GRANDE PASSE - PHILADELPHIA, LE MALIN; surveillance of GIENS and PORQUEROLLES.

South of GRANDE PASSE - MONTCAIM, GEORGES LEYGUES, LORRAINE, GLEAVES, EBERLE; on call with three air spotting missions.

South of GRANDE PASSE - AUGUSTA, EMILE BERTIN, ERICSSON; on call.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

South of CAPE SICIE - QUINCY, LOOKOUT; one spotting mission continuously.

South of CAPE ALON - OMAHA, NEVADA, KEARNY, MC COOK; one spotting mission continuously.

GLOIRE ordered to PROPRIANO for fuel.

- 0335 - Received word that BLACK PRINCE and AURORA would arrive SITKA area vice DIDO and DUGUAY TROUIN which had not yet fueled.
- 0755 - NIBLACK reported and assigned to NEVADA as screening vessel.
- 0750 - PHILADELPHIA opened fire. Other vessels commenced bombardment in answer to calls of Shore Fire Control Parties.
- 0815 - LE FANTASQUE received 138mm shell from battery L 30 on Cape ESTEREL; shell struck center torpedo tube demolishing same. Personnel casualties: 1 man seriously injured, several wounded.
- 0853 - Golfe Hotel at coordinates 103997 held up advance of Allied forces ashore. PHILADELPHIA and AUGUSTA fired on this target.
- 0854 - 340mm batteries on Saint MANDRIER commenced firing on gunfire support vessels.
- 0900 - Strong enemy radar signals noted; immediately jammed by AUGUSTA..
- 0916 - PHILADELPHIA opened fire on L-30, battery which had hit LE FANTASQUE.
- 0949 - LORRAINE commenced slow fire against K-20 on Saint MANDRIER.
- 1045 - BLACK PRINCE and AURORA reported for duty; ordered to take assigned fire support stations. BLACK PRINCE ordered to take GOLFE HOTEL under fire.
- 1046 - Requested bombing missions to work over observation station on PORQUEROLLES at coordinates Z-170853.
- 1114 - LORRAINE reported one spotting plane shot down over Saint MANDRIER..
- 1159 - ML 562 sweeping in Rade d'HYERES holed by enemy projectile of approximately 6" size.
- 1221 - K-20 and K-21 fired at gunfire support ships.
- 1236 - QUINCY fired on ammunition dump.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1428 - TOULON heavily bombed by B-26's. One plane noted to be hit by flak and crew bailed out.
- 1601 - K-20 and K-21 opened up with accurate fire; no ships hit.
- 1900 - K-20 and K-21 fired and prevented AURORA from carrying out support mission.
- Allied troops reported entering TOULON.
- 2000 - Conference of all Commanding Officers of vessels of Task Force 86 aboard AUGUSTA. Ships rendezvoused 5 miles East of LEVANT.
- 2241 - Conference aboard AUGUSTA ended. Vessels departed for night retirement areas as indicated below:

OMAHA, QUINCY, NEVADA, PHILADELPHIA, AURORA, MADISON, KEARNY, NIBLACK, MACKENZIE, LE MALIN, LOOKOUT, MC COOK - in North-South lane South of Lat. 42-55 N and between Long 06-28 E and 06-35 E.

MONTCALM, GEORGES LEYGUES, EMILE BERTIN, FANTASQUE, LORRAINE, EBERLE and GLEAVES - South of Lat. 42-55 N and between Long. 06-21 E. and 06-28 E.

AUGUSTA, ERICSSON - vicinity of LEVANT inside A/S screen.

Note: Following ships reported to Task Force 86 in Assault Area:
AURORA, BLACK PRINCE, EMILE BERTIN, GLOIRE, SOMERS, MCLANAHAN, NIBLACK, EDISON, WOOLSEY, TUSCALOOSA.
Following ships departed from Assault Area:
BLACK PRINCE.

21 August 1944

- 0000 - Army approaching TOULON. Continual air bombings and gunfire support by vessels of Task Force 86 softening defenses. Orders issued to gunfire support vessels for shoots as follows. Due to fluid situation ashore, little shooting scheduled:

FANTASQUE and GEORGES LEYGUES	Rado BORMES	On call
MONTCALM	Rado d'HYERES	FC 37
AUGUSTA	3 miles South of GRANDE PASSE	On Call.
AURORA	South of PORQUEROLLES	FC 40
EMILE BERTIN	Same	FC 36
LORRAINE and PHILADELPHIA	Same	Counter-battery Giens & PORQUEROLLES.
QUINCY	15 miles South of GIENS	On call.
NEVADA and OMAHA	Off CAPE SICIE Plane	

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0130 - Enemy E-boats attempted to break A/S screen in vicinity of CANNES-ANTIBES Area. BOYLE, CHAMPLIN and C.F. HUGHES attacked E-boats with following results: 1 sunk, 1 destroyed, 1 escaped.
- 0225 - Due to urgent need of vessels to supplement screen-during E-boat attack, PLUNKETT ordered to report to CTG 80.6; returned at 0453.
- 0900 - Vessels of Task Force 86 ordered to fire only at targets requested by Shore Fire Control Parties so as not to endanger own troops.
- 1040 - 340mm batteries on Saint MANDRIER commenced firing on gunfire support vessels.
- 1450 - EBERLE reported "white flag", flying on PORQUEROLLES. Boat sent in; received report that Armenians on that island ready to surrender.
- 1545 - PHILADELPHIA reported loss of one SOC plane piloted by Lt. F.A. CAHILL, U.S.N.R., with W.H. RYAN, ARM2c, USNR, as radio-man. Plane brought down by flak over GIENS Peninsula.
- 1650 - PT 553 with Lieut. Comdr. S. H. Graham, USN; Lt. J.L. Nuelsen, USNR and Ens. J. H. Babyak, USN, on board shoved off from alongside AUGUSTA to investigate and interrogate prisoners surrendering on PORQUEROLLES. Investigation revealed 150 Germans unwilling to give up and located in strong points on island; 130 Armenians (White Russians) ready to surrender. 58 Armenians removed by EBERLE boat. Charts and location of land mines and observation points obtained.
- 2030 - EBERLE fired on German-held strong points on PORQUEROLLES; many hits in target area. 3 small boats in which enemy had planned to escape destroyed.
- 2050 - PT's 553 and 556 ordered to patrol PETITE PASSE to prevent escape of Germans to mainland; patrol proved uneventful.
- Note: Following ships arrived Assault Area: DUGUAY TROUIN.
Following ships departed Assault Area:
To PROPRIANO - NEVADA, MADISON, LOOKOUT, EMILE BERTIN,
DUGUAY TROUIN.
Screening assignments ordered as follows:
QUINCY - MC COOK and NIBLACK.
LORRAINE - GLEAVES and EBERLE.
PHILADELPHIA - LE MALIN and MACKENZIE.
Remainder of Support Force - KEARNY and ERICSSON (Operated
in area South of ILES D'HYERES.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

22 August 1944

0000 - Situation ashore not clarified by latest reports; indications that allied troops have bypassed TOULON and headed toward MARSEILLES to the Westward. Assignment of gunfire support ships and shore fire control parties for 22nd as follows:

MONTCAIRM	Rade d'HYERES	FC 44	SW of Square 0502
GEORGES LEYGUES	Rade d'HYERES	FC 37	SW of Square 0502
AURORA	3 miles South of		West of Ville
	PORQUEROLLES	FC 40	d'HYERES.
PHILADELPHIA	8 miles South of	Own planes	GIENS and
and LE MALIN	GIENS	On Call	PORQUEROLLES counterbattery.
AUGUSTA	3 miles South of		
	GRANDE PASSE	On Call	On call
QUINCY	15 miles South of		
	CAPE SICIE	On Call	On Call
OMAHA and	Rade BORMES	On Call	On Call
FANTASQUE	Rade BORMES	On Call	On Call
LORRAINE	8 miles South of		
	GIENS	On Call	On Call

0540 - PT's 553 and 556 reported that no attempt made by enemy to evacuate from PORQUEROLLES during night.

0730 - EBERLE on station South of PORQUEROLLES to take off surrendered enemy troops.

1130 - Total of 250 prisoners removed from PORQUEROLLES; 80 Armenians reported holding out.

During forenoon EBERLE was forced to shift berth due to activities of 340 mm batteries of Saint MANDRIER which had taken her under fire. Numerous large caliber shells also bracketed other vessels of gunfire support force.

1220 - "White Flag party" from OMAHA landed on PORQUEROLLES, no opposition.

1450 - C.T.F. 86 received urgent call from SFCP in vicinity of Cape SICIE to furnish gunfire support. AUGUSTA and GLOIRE screened by SOMERS and PLUNKETT approached Cape SICIE-LA CIOTAT area; no activity noted. Both vessels fired on designated targets and scored numerous hits.

1850 - OMAHA supported landings of 190 Sengalese troops on PORQUEROLLES. Troops transported by TATTNALL which had reported to C.T.F. 86 for duty. No resistance encountered; 154 prisoners rounded up and delivered to TATTNALL. Counterbattery fire furnished by PHILADELPHIA against batteries on GIENS which had fired on HACKBERRY.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

057 - "White Flag" noted by PHILADELPHIA plane on GIENS Peninsula.

Note: 340mm batteries on Saint MANDRIER (K-20 and K-21) very active throughout the day. Despite smoke screens, guns repeatedly straddled gunfire support ships. Maximum range reported by AUGUSTA which vessel straddled when approximately 39,000 yards from Saint MANDRIER.

Following ships reported to Task Force 86 in Assault Area:

DUGUAY TROUIN, EMILE BERTIN, MADISON, SOMERS.

NIBLACK released to CTG 80.6.

NEVADA, MADISON and LOOKOUT ordered depart PROPRIANO 222300 for Assault Area.

Screening assignments as indicated below:

NEVADA - LOOKOUT and GLEAVES (GLEAVES to be relieved by KENDRICK).

LORRAINE - EBERLE and MADISON.

QUINCY - MC COOK and PLUNKETT.

PHILADELPHIA - SOMERS and LE MALIN.

AUGUSTA - KEARNY and ERICSSON.

MONTCALM - FANTASQUE.

23 August 1944

0000 - Situation ashore very vague. Considerable gunfire encountered by vessels of Task Force 86 from batteries on GIENS Peninsula and Saint. MANDRIER. Heavy air bombings on these targets did not put batteries out of commission. Plan to neutralize or destroy batteries by Commando unit under Commander Serriet disapproved by Commander Western Naval Task Force and Army leaders. Assignment of ships to gunfire support as follows:

NEVADA	15 miles South of CAPE SICIE	Plane Spot	Targets on St. MANDRIER
QUINCY	15 miles Southwest of CAPE SICIE	Plane Spot	Active enemy batteries to west of SICIE
PHILADELPHIA and LE MALIN	7 miles South of GIENS	Own Planes	Neutralize GIENS
LORRAINE	5 miles South of PORQUEROLLES	On call	On call
GEORGES LEYGUES	5 miles South of PORQUEROLLES	On call	On call
MONTCALM and GLOIRE	Rade d'HYERES	FC 35	Area South of 00 East of 93 West of 97
	Rade d'HYERES	FC 43	
FANTASQUE	Rade d'HYERES	On call	On call
OMAHA	Rade BORMES	On call	On Call
AUGUSTA and AURORA	South of PORQUEROLLES	On call	On call

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

0742 - 340mm batteries on Saint MANDRIER commenced firing on gunfire support vessels.

1302 - PHILADELPHIA plane reported white flags on GIENS Peninsula and American troops in charge of POWs. Ordered Rear Admiral Chandler, U.S.N. (ComCruDiv 2 in OMAHA) to send party to GIENS with terms of surrender; to land troops and support same as necessary. Plan executed without opposition.

2103 - Rear Admiral Chandler reported aboard AUGUSTA for conference with Rear Admiral Davidson.

Note: Gunfire support furnished Army troops as called for. QUINCY, LORRAINE and NEVADA heavily bombarded enemy batteries on Saint MANDRIER during the day.
Assignment of screen as follows:

Minesweepers (PORT de BOUC Area) - SOMERS and RODMAN.
QUINCY - PLUNKETT and KEARNY.
NEVADA - FITCH and LOOKOUT.
LORRAINE, AURORA and MONTCALM - LE FANTASQUE and KENDRICK.
OMAHA and PHILADELPHIA - LE MALIN and EBERLE.
AUGUSTA - ERICSSON.

Plans formulated for emergency sweeping of Port de BOUC in GULF of FOS (to Westward of MARSEILLES). M/S Flotilla 13 (S.O. in ROTHESAY) and LCI(L) 596 (as smoker) reported to C.T.F. 86 to carry out plan.

Following vessels reported to Task Force 86 in Assault Area:
KENDRICK, FITCH, RODMAN and GREENE.
Following vessels released to CTG 80.6 by C.T.F. 86:
GLEAVES, MADISON and MC COOK.

24 August 1944

0000 - Assignment of gunfire support ships and shore fire control parties for 24th as follows:

LORRAINE	Under lee of Giens	Plane on	From St. MANDRIER
		call	to grid 92.
LE FANTASQUE	" " " "	Plane on	" "
		call	
MONTCALM	" " " "	FC 37	On call
G. LEYGUES	Rade d'HYERES	FC 36	TOULON outskirts.
GLOIRE	" "	FC 39	TOULON outskirts.
PHILADELPHIA	Southwest Cape SICIE	Own plane	TOULON outskirts.
		FC 35	
OMAHA	" " "	FC 43	TOULON outskirts.
QUINCY	" " "	Plane	St. MANDRIER- CAPE SICIE area.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

AURORA	South of GIENS	FC 43	TOULON outskirts.
NEVADA	10 miles South of	Plane	Counter battery in
	F 19		vicinity MARSEILLES
			and GOLFE DE FOS
AUGUSTA	South of GRANDE PASSE		On call

- 1335 - Cap. de Frog. M.J.G. Bataille, F.N. (French Naval Liaison Officer attached to staff of C.T.F. 86) and Lt. B. Walker, U.S.N.R., departed AUGUSTA in PT 555 for PORT DE BOUC to determine if that port was in Allied hands and, if so, to what extent it could be used.
- 1400 - LORRAINE opened fire on K-27.
- 1415 - PHILADELPHIA ordered to open fire on D-06, which had been firing on RODMAN.
- 1417 - QUINCY, KEARNY and PLUNKETT being fired on by shore batteries. Believed to be K-20 in addition to other smaller batteries in the Cape SICIE area. Numerous close misses noted. Destroyers commenced making smoke, and firing continued until 1425 at which time vessels were ordered to clear area.
- 1655 - Plane reported PT 555 sinking in GOLFE DE FOS, due to mine explosion. PHILADELPHIA directed send SOC to investigate and report.
- 1705 - PHILADELPHIA plane reported some PT personnel in rubber boat, some still on hull.
Note: See Narrative of Events in this Report for account of PT casualty.

Screening assignments as indicated below:

Minesweepers - SOMERS and RODMAN
QUINCY - PLUNKETT and KEARNY.
NEVADA - FITCH and LOOKOUT.
LORRAINE, AURORA and MONTCALM - LE FANTASQUE and KENDRICKS.
OMAHA and PHILADELPHIA - LE MALIN and EBERLE.
AUGUSTA - ERICSSON.

Following ships reported to Task Force 86 in Assault Area:
None

Following ships sailed from Task Force 86 Assault Area:
BROOKLYN and BOYLE - To AJACCIO.
NEVADA and LE MALIN - To ALGIERS.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

25 August 1944

0000. - Army plans proceeded ahead of schedule with respect to capture of MARSEILLES and territory to the westward of TOULON. At latter place considerable resistance encountered from enemy forces on Saint MANDRIER and harbor area. Advance units and patrols located in TOULON and MARSEILLES. Repeated gunfire support and air bombings resulted in reduction of enemy held strong points but pockets of resistance present.

Sweeping of GULF de FOS area proceeded according to plan.

Assignment of gunfire support ships as follows:

LORRAINE	Lee of GIENS	Fighter Plane	St. MANDRIER
MONTCAIM	Lee of GIENS	Calling Wave	On call
GEORGES LEYGUES	Lee of GIENS	On Call	On call
GLOIRE	Rade d'HYERES	Calling Wave	On call
FANTASQUE	Lee of GIENS	On Call	On call
AURORA	Lee of GIENS	Calling Wave	On call
		Assign Targets	
		GIENS' Group	
OMAHA	5 miles S.W. of CAPE SICIE	Calling Wave	On call
AUGUSTA	10 miles South CAPE CROISSETTE	Fighter Plane	MARSEILLES Area
PHILADELPHIA and QUINCY	Entrance to Swept channel Golf de FOS	Own Plane	Support of M/S in Gulf de FOS.

1000 - Commander Mine Sweeper Group (CTG 80.10) in PREVAIL plus escort sweeper group arrived in MARSEILLE Area to commence sweeping of channels South of CAPE CROISSETTE. Batteries on CAPE CROISSETTE very active and were taken under fire by AUGUSTA.

Planes reported considerable enemy activity South of MARSEILLE in vicinity of CAPE CROISSETTE and LA CIOTAT. CAPE SICIE area also under heavy bombardment.

1100 - Commander Western Naval Task Force (Vice Admiral Hewitt), Captain English, U.S.N. (Chief of Staff), Lieutenant Commander Griswold, U.S.N. (Flag Lieutenant) and Lieutenant James, U.S.N.R. (Flag Intelligence Officer) reported aboard AUGUSTA for conference with Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S.N.

1345 - Vice Admiral Hewitt and members of staff left AUGUSTA to board LIVERMORE.

1355 - Batteries on CAPE CROISSETTE opened up on AUGUSTA and LIVERMORE.

1400 - LUDLOW, LIVERMORE, RODMAN and AUGUSTA opened fire on guns located on CAPE CROISSETTE.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1457 - AUGUSTA ceased firing on batteries on CAPE CROISSETTE, targets reported neutralized by spotting plane.
- 1600 - AURORA (designated Deputy by Commander Task Force 86) with GLOIRE, LORRAINE and SIRIUS commenced bombardment of Saint MANDRIER.
- 1639 - RAMILLIES, LOOKOUT, KENDRICK, GEORGES LEYGUES, GLOIRE, OMAHA, ordered to support AURORA as practicable in bombardment of Saint MANDRIER.
- 1800 - Bombardment of Saint MANDRIER continued. Plans formulated to continue gunfire support against strong point until 1900 and then have Army demand surrender of garrison. Bombarding vessels, led by AURORA, closed to within 7 miles of MANDRIER. Counterbattery fire from enemy positions very negligible.
- 1900 - Ceased bombardment of Saint MANDRIER.. Later revealed that Army Headquarters were unacquainted with plans to demand surrender of garrison. Plans approved for continued bombardment of Saint MANDRIER following day with demand for surrender.
- Note: M/S flotillas operating in MARSEILLE and GULF DE FOS areas were under repeated attacks by shore batteries. Excellent progress reported by sweepers and enemy gun positions - successfully neutralized. PORT DU BOUC to be opened on 26th.

Following ships reports to Task Force 86 in Assault Area:
LUDLOW and MADISON.

Following vessels departed from Assault Area:

PLUNKETT, ERICSSON - released to CTG 80.6..

WOOLSEY - To AJACCIO and return to CAMEL Area.

QUINCY and MC LANAHAN - To ALGIERS and return to TOULON area.

AURORA - released to Cinc, Med.

Night cruising and screen assignments as noted below:

LORRAINE, MONTCALM, GLOIRE, GEORGES LEYGUES, LE FANTASQUE,
KENDRICK and MACKENZIE - South of Lat. 42-55 N on Long
06-35 E.

RAMILLIES, SIRIUS, JONES and LOOKOUT - South of Lat. 42-55 N
on Long. 06-28 E.

OMAHA, PHILADELPHIA, FITCH and KEARNY - South of Lat.
42-55 N, on Long. 06-21 E.

AUGUSTA and LUDLOW - Southwest of CAPE SICIE.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

26 August 1944

- 0000 - Night cruising of PHILADELPHIA and FITCH changed to enable that group to furnish gunfire support to M/S groups operating in Gulf de FOS area, and to act as communication link with SCR 609 unit landed at PORT DU BOUC by PHILADELPHIA. SOMERS and RODMAN screening M/S in inner channels. Gunfire support assignments as indicated below:

GLOIRE	Rade d'HYERES	Calling Wave	On Call
MONTCAIM	Lee of GIENS	Calling Wave	On Call
LORRAINE	Lee of GIENS	Calling Wave	St.MANDRIER
LE FANTASQUE	Lee of GIENS	Calling Wave	On Call
OMAHA	Southwest of CAPE SICIE	Calling Wave	On Call
RAMILLIES	Southwest of CAPE SICIE	St.MANDRIER and FORT SIX FOURS	On Call
SIRIUS	Southwest of CAPE SICIE	Calling Wave FOUR SIX FOURS	On Call
AUGUSTA	10 miles South of CAPE CROISSETTE	MARSEILLES Area	On Call
PHILADELPHIA	10 miles South of CAPE CROISSETTE	MARSEILLES Area	On Call
RODMAN	South of Gulf de FOS	Support M/S	On Call

Gunfire against Saint MANDRIER during 25 August failed to result in surrender of enemy. Army "B" did not undertake measures to demand surrender; continued gunfire bombardment scheduled for 26 August.

- 0819 - Bombardment of Saint MANDRIER to be resumed at 1230. M/S 13 sweeping Gulf de FOS area and PORT DU BOUC opened. PREVAIL (CTG 80.10) sweeping MARSEILLES area.
- 1037 - Formation of B-26 planes returned from bombing of MARSEILLES: plane No. 78 crashed into water. Co-pilot, 2nd Lieut. Everett J. Liebendorfer, 444th Bomber Squadron, 320th Bomber Group, picked up from water by LUDLOW. No other survivors. Plane crash not incident to enemy activity.
- 1106 - Minesweepers in MARSEILLES area under fire of shore batteries on CAPE CROISSETTE; batteries neutralized by AUGUSTA.
- 1230 - LORRAINE, MONTCAIM, GLOIRE, RAMILLIES, SIRIUS opened up on Saint MANDRIER closing to within 10,000 yards of enemy batteries.
- 1617 - Received report that FORT SIX FOURS had surrendered.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1630 - Bombardment of Saint MANDRIER ceased; numerous fires and explosions noted. No enemy activity seen.
- 1642 - Batteries on CAPE CROISSETTE commenced shelling minesweepers. AUGUSTA silenced shore batteries; one gun destroyed, one damaged and two batteries intact.
- 2100 - Four large shells from Saint MANDRIER landed in vicinity of LORRAINE, MONTCALM and GLOIRE which were approximately 9 miles out at sea; one shell landed 50 yards from LORRAINE.

Note: Situation on right flank (CANNES Area) quiet; little gunfire support requested. NICE vicinity reconnoitered, enemy movement noted eastward indicated withdrawal toward ITALY. Planes encountered only slight flak during patrols.

Following ships of Task Force 86 left assault area:

EMILE BERTIN and LE TERRIBLE - to AJACCIO.

H.M.S. BRECON and KEARNY - Released to CTG 80.6.

GEORGES LEYGUES - To NAPLES.

RODMAN and LOOKOUT - To ALPHA area for fuel and return.

Screening assignments for night cruising and 27 August as listed below:

Minesweepers - SOMERS.

LORRAINE - KENDRICK.

RAMILLIES - HILARY P. JONES and MACKENZIE.

PHILADELPHIA - FITCH.

OMAHA - RODMAN.

AUGUSTA - LUDLOW and MADISON.

GLOIRE - LE FANTASQUE.

SIRIUS - LOOKOUT.

27 August 1944

- 0000 - Situation ashore very fluid. Army troops well entrenched in TOULON and MARSEILLES but enemy pockets of resistance still active. Gunfire support ships less LORRAINE and LE FANTASQUE ordered to take same support areas as on 26 August. Army requested no support except for two ships to be on call to open up on batteries on Saint MANDRIER which had fired into allied troops in the city of TOULON.
- 0600 - M/S in Gulf de FOS and MARSEILLES Areas continued sweeping.
- 0651 - CHAMPLIN (on right flank) engaged 4 enemy tanks in vicinity of NICE with excellent results.

~~C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L~~

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0830 - Rear Admiral Chandler, U.S.N. (ComCruDiv 2) reported aboard AUGUSTA for conference with Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S.N. ComCruDiv 2 departed at 1035 and boarded his Flagship, OMAHA.
- 0914 - MACKENZIE received aboard 13 prisoners who came out from Saint MANDRIER in small boat to surrender; POW's included: 4 Germans, 8 Poles and 1 Czechoslovakian.
- 1400 - PORT DU BOUC reported clear and capable of handling one cargo ship of 22 feet draft and one tanker of 26 feet draft.
- 1630 - FC party in MARSEILLE reported one enemy submarine tied up along pier in harbor.

Note: Activity on this day was very scarce. Situation on Saint MANDRIER unknown to Commander Task Force 86. Detailed information relative to front lines and gunfire support requirements throughout day requested of Army and Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer.

Enemy movement on Saint MANDRIER not noted; majority of gun positions appeared to have been destroyed.

Batteries on CAPE CROISSETTE and in vicinity of CARRY to the Westward still active against M/S.

Following ship reported to Task Force 86 in Assault Area:
LORRAINE.

Following vessels of Task Force 86 left assault area:

MONTCALM - To PROPRIANO.

TUSCALOOSA and EDISON - to PROPRIANO.

OMAHA (ComCruDiv 2) - To NAPLES.

RAMILLIES - PROPRIANO

HILARY P. JONES - As escort for RAMILLIES to PROPRIANO
then to pick up mail for TF 86 ships
at AJACCIO and return assault area.

Night screening and retirement assignments as follows:

EMILE BERTIN, LORRAINE, GLOIRE - LE FANTASQUE, KENDRICK
and MACKENZIE.

RAMILLIES, SIRIUS - LOOKOUT and HILARY P. JONES (RAMILLIES
and HILARY P. JONES later sailed for
PROPRIANO).

QUINCY - McLANAHAN.

AUGUSTA - LUDLOW.

Minesweepers (Gulf de Fos Area) - SOMERS.

DUGUAY TROUIN - RODMAN

PHILADELPHIA - FITCH.

BROOKLYN - WOOLSEY.

PREVAIL and M/S in MARSEILLES Area - MADISON.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

28 August 1944

0000 - No gunfire support requested by Army troops. Orders issued to all Task Force 86 vessels not to fire on mainland or Saint MANDRIER without clearance from Senior Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (6th Corps) or Liaison Officer 66 (French Army B).

Gunfire support ships assigned as follows:

EMILE BERTIN	South of GIENS	FC 34	Deputy - reassign ships and SFCPs as necessary TOULON area.
LORRAINE	South of GIENS	On call	On call
SIRIUS	South of GIENS	On call	On call
GLOIRE	South of GIENS	On call	On call
DUGUAY TROUIN	South of GIENS	On call	On call
QUINCY	South of MARSEILLES	FC 36	Railway Guns Squares T4022 and T4122
AUGUSTA	South of MARSEILLES	On call	On call
PHILADELPHIA	Fueling ALPHA Area To return MARSEILLES Area		On call upon return
BROOKLYN	Entrance to swept channel FORT DU FOS	On call	On call
		FC 37 & FC 41	
SOMERS	Swept Channel South of CARRY	FC 41	Support M/S
MADISON	Swept Area South of MARSEILLES	FC 42	Support M/S

0400 - SOMERS and MADISON, relieved of gunfire support for Minesweepers, took anti-submarine patrol stations off Gulf de FOS and MARSEILLES respectively (to prevent escape of German Commandant of MARSEILLES via submarine).

0925 - Senior Naval Gun Liaison Officer, 6th Corps, notified CTF 86 that arrangements for surrender of garrisons in MARSEILLES and islands off city under way. Surrender to take place at noon 28 August.

0932 - Report received from Liaison Officer attached to French Army that Saint MANDRIER had surrendered. Senior Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer, 6th Corps, reported the previous information in error in that exact time of surrender and units agreeable to giving in not yet fully known. Islands did not yet agree to terms of surrender. Situation reported by Commander Task Force 86 to Commander Naval Western Task Force and units of Task Force 86.. "No gunfire order" issued to vessels of this force.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0955 - Reconnaissance planes over MARSEILLES failed to see any enemy activity. Submarine previously reported in MARSEILLES harbor not present.
- 0956 - Senior Gunfire Liaison Officer with 6th Corps reported that terms of surrender to take effect at 1300 28 August accepted by German Commander of MARSEILLES garrison; question existed as to whether all enemy units would abide by General's action. Enemy batteries North and West of city complied with "no fire agreement" during previous night. French officer ordered to report to islands to determine attitude of forces stationed there.
- 1142 - Ordered CTG 80.10 in PREVAIL to sweep entrance into MARSEILLES Harbor.
- 1220 - Guns crews of batteries on CAPE CROISETTE could be seen sitting outside of gunpits. Plane flew low over gun positions and reported that no activity visible.
- 1755 - Boatload of eight (8) Germans under command of Army Captain, second in command of Island D'IF Flying "Flag of Truce" drew alongside PREVAIL. That vessel ordered to have Germans report to MADISON.
- 1930 - MADISON reported that German Army Captain desired discuss terms of surrender for garrison of 850 officers and men stationed on Islands of RATONNEAU, POMEGLIES and D'IF. Germans would surrender but not to the French; if necessary, would take up arms against French.
- 2025 - To facilitate matters and avoid possible menace and delay to minesweeping channel to MARSEILLES, Commander Task Force 86 ordered MADISON to accept surrender. Conditions of terms to be discussed on following day. Naval Commander Western Task Force requested to send four LCI(L) to remove prisoners of war.
- Note: HILARY P. JONES reported to Task Force 86 in assault area. MACKENZIE released to CTG 80.6; HICKBERRY released to CTG 80.9.

Cruising and night retirement assignments as for preceding night except that HILARY P. JONES delivered mail to vessels of Task Force 86.

29 August 1944

- 0000 - Situation quiet. No gunfire support requested. AUGUSTA placed "On Call" to furnish support as necessary. Report received from MADISON that if final terms of surrender accepted by island garrisons signal "OK" would be flashed at 0800.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0120 - Naval Commander Western Task Force ordered three (3) LCI(L)'s to report at first light to remove prisoners from islands.
- 0800 - Commander Task Force 86 issued plan to land marine guards of AUGUSTA and PHILADELPHIA on islands to ensure carrying out of provisions of surrender; Captain W. ANSEL, USN, of the PHILADELPHIA to act as Deputy for Rear Admiral Davidson, USN.
- 1200 - Landing party of 103 marines from AUGUSTA and PHILADELPHIA boarded YMS's to enter swept channel for landings on islands.
- 1630 - Surrender party landed on RATONNEAU.
- 1816 - Terms of surrender signed. Last enemy resistance in MARSEILLES area terminated. Commanding General 7th Army notified Naval Commander Western Task Force and Commander Task Force 86 that no further gunfire support by naval vessels required.

Note: Screening and night retirement assignments as noted:

AUGUSTA - LUDLOW and HILARY P JONES.
Minesweepers in MARSEILLES area - MADISON
Minesweepers in Gulf de FOS area - SOMERS.

PHILADELPHIA - FITCH.
Remainder of Task Force 86 present - in San TROPEZ area.

Following vessels reported to Task Force 86 in assault area:
LE TERRIBLE, MONTCALM, GEORGES LEYGUES and LE MALIN.

Following ships of Task Force 86 departed from assault area:
GLOIRE - To ALGIERS.

EMILE BERTIN - To AJACCIO for conference with Rear Admiral DEYO, USN, and turning over duties of CTG 86.5.

QUINCY and MC LANAHAN - To PALERMO.
BROOKLYN and WOOLSEY - PROPRIANO.

30 August 1944

- 0000 - Marine Detachments of AUGUSTA and PHILADELPHIA on islands of RATONNEAU, POMEQUES and D'IF carrying out provisions of surrender terms.
- 1420 - Ordered marines, in charge of prisoners of war, to board LCI(L)'s and report to ALPHA area. Upon transfer of prisoners to Army control, marines to report to respective duty ships. Plans made for transfer of Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S.N., and flag personnel to U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA; transfer to be effected during forenoon of 31 August.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

2147 - Commander Task Force 86 Operation Plan 5-44 (Post Assault Gunfire Support Phase) ended. Operation Plan Flare Two effective.. Following ships detached from Task Force 86 in Assault Area:

BOYLE, CHAMPLIN, KENDRICK and LOOKOUT - CTG 80.6.
DUGUAY TROUIN - ORAN.
SIRIUS - To CinCMed.

31 August 1944

0000 - Ships of Task Force 86 anchored in San TROPEZ Harbor.
0930 - Rear Admiral Davidson, U.S.N., transferred from AUGUSTA to PHILADELPHIA in company with flag personnel and records.
1100 - Marine Detachment of PHILADELPHIA returned aboard.

1 September 1944

0000 - ComCruDiv 8, (Commander Support Force) in PHILADELPHIA at San Tropez. BROOKLYN at Propriano, F.S. MONTCALM, LORRAINE, GEORGES LEYGUES, FANTASQUE, TERRIBLE and GERUNDIA (Cinc French Naval Forces aboard), CATOCTIN (CWNTF aboard) and CTF 85 on board BISCAYNE, MADISON, H.P. JONES, LUDLOW, HMS DELHI anchored in San Tropez, France. GLOIRE at Algiers, EMILE BERTIN at Ajaccio ordered to sail to San Tropez. Admiral AUBOYNEAU, F.N. aboard. WOOLSEY and EDISON right flank fire support for 1st ABTF. TUSCALOOSA at Palermo. Admiral JAUIARD, FN called on CTF 86. AUGUSTA released from TF 86, 0101301B Sept. and sailed to Propriano, FITCH escort.

0805 - EMMONS, HAINES, MACOMB, FLUNKETT and MAINSTAY stood in to St. Tropez and anchored. CTF 86 ordered CBD-5, CCD-7, CDS-16 to prepare to leave Mediterranean Area. EMILE BERTIN advised CTF 86 she had a defective turbine; estimated time of completion 15 days. SOMERS ordered to sail from Palermo to San Tropez and report to PHILADELPHIA. 1st ABTF reported Nice harbor could accommodate 3 liberty ships. CTF 86 planned to provide two DD remain on right flank for fire support; one cruiser to be on immediate call at St. Tropez with French Naval Forces to work in gradually. Spotting by SFCTs or Cubs, 12th TAC to provide P-51s. Front line situations Nice described as fluid. Germans reported in general withdrawal toward Swiss and Italian borders.

1040 - MADISON underway and stood out to Propriano to escort BROOKLYN to Naples. CTF 86 ordered CCD-25 to relieve EDISON with LUDLOW and is sail EDISON to Propriano for fuel and

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

ammunition.

1636 - MACOMB underway and stood out.

BROOKLYN ordered to sail to Naples 011800 to pick up mail and publications. RODMAN released from duty with TF 86 and ordered to report to CTG 80.6..

CWNTF reported CTG 80.8 communication parties established at Toulon and Marseilles.

2 September 1944

0000 - CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; CWNTF in CATOCTIN at San Tropez; CTF 85 in BISCAYNE anchored at San Tropez. WOOLSEY and EDISON provided F/S on right flank. EMMONS on A/S patrol off Sant Tropez.

H.F. JONES, LUDLOW, RODMAN, DE HAINES, and DDS MACOMB, PLUNKETT and MAINSTAY anchored in San Tropez.

BROOKLYN enroute for Naples escorted by MADISON. SOMERS at Palermo.

FS LORRAINE, MONTCALM (FCCD 4), GEORGES LEYGUES, FANTASQUE, TERRIBLE and GERUNDEL (Cinc French Naval Forces aboard) anchored San Tropez. DUGUAY TROUIN at Oran. GLOIRE at sea enroute to San Tropez.

0516 - JOUETT, CTG 80.6 on board, underway and stood out.

0730 - Admiral Auboynea, FN called on CTF 86. CTU 86.5.2 reports NGLO 45th Div. has special firing mission for cruiser immediately. 12 TAC advises CTF 86 one mission of 225 Squadron Spitfires based at Bysteron Canube on call for observation for east flank. Daily firing missions on east flank increased. LUDLOW and WOOLSEY remained in F/S area.

Due to communication failure, French cruiser did not arrive in F/S area, to answer NGLO, 45th Div. request. NGLO asked cruiser to standby on 1 hour notice.

1530 - EMILE BERTIN reported to CTF 86 at San Tropez.

CWNTF in Toulon-Marseilles area on PLUNKETT.

AUGUSTA escorted by FITCH departed Naples 030001 for Palermo detached from CTF 86.

CTU 86.5.2 reported little change in front lines eastern flank.. LUDLOW and WOOLSEY in F/S area.

CTF 86 made following changes to FLARE THREE (effective Task Force 86).

(a) TG 86.1 PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN, H.F. JONES, MADISON, WOOLSEY, EDISON, LUDLOW, LORRAINE.

(b) TG 86.2 MONTCALM, GEORGES LEYGUES, GLOIRE.

(c) TG 86.3 EMILE BERTIN, DUGUAY TROUIN.

(d) TG 86.4 TERRIBLE, FANTASQUE, MALIN.

(e) TG 86.5 Cruiser and/or destroyer assigned in bombardment area.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

All units guard N-4, N-8, N-26-N-27 --A. Ready cruiser guard N-24C. CTG 86.5 guard N-24C. Units at sea guard N-12 in addition to the above. Group Commanders may arrange guards within their group on N-4 - N-27A. PT patrol between Cape Ferrat and Cape Martin.

- 1908- RODMAN underway and stood out on patrol; detached from TF 86, ordered to report to CTG 80.6.
Severe electrical storm San Tropez.

3 September 1944

- 0000 - CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA anchored at San Tropez. WOOLSEY & EDISON in F/S area. DD's H.T. JONES, JOUETT (CTG 80.6 on board), LUDLOW, MACOMB, HOBSON, DE HAINES and MAINSTAY anchored in San Tropez. BROOKLYN escorted by MADISON at Naples. SOMERS at Palermo. CCD-7 and CBD-5 at Palermo. FS DUGUAY TROUIN at Oran. GLOIRE at sea en-route to San Tropez. LORRAINE, MONTCALEM (CCD-4 aboard), GEORGES LEYGUES, TERRIBLE and GIRUNDAL (Cinc French Naval Forces aboard) anchored at San Tropez. CWNTF in CATOCTIN, CTF 85 in BISCAYNE anchored at San Tropez.
- 0120 - FANTASQUE underway for Ajaccio.
- 0235 - CATOCTIN underway for Toulon.
- 0200 - NLO, 45th Div. requested cruiser in Monaco area at 030530B. CTF 86 designated PHILADELPHIA and informed NGLO.
- 0335 - PHILADELPHIA escorted by LUDLOW and JONES underway for Monaco area to provide fire support to 45th Div. Estimated 5000 enemy troop concentration and enemy artillery in that vicinity. GLOIRE and SOMERS arrived at San Tropez. PHILADELPHIA ETA Monaco area 0830. CTF 86 requested air cover for one cruiser and 4 DDs in Monaco area from 12th TAC. CTF 86 requested Rade Hyeres and Golfe Juan be cleared of mines to provide sheltered anchorage for support force.
- 1342 - PHILADELPHIA fired 16 rounds at light guns, Cub plane spotted; target beyond maximum range.
- CTF 86 has 6 destroyers assigned to TF 86; SOMERS, MADISON, H.T. JONES, EDISON, LUDLOW, WOOLSEY.
GLOIRE at San Tropez.
- 1434 - PHILADELPHIA launched two planes for spotting mines and A/S patrol.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1455 - WOOLSEY relieved LUDLOW at screening station. LUDLOW remained in F/S area with EDISON.
- 1500 - AJAX with CinCMed and PLUNKETT with CWNTF arrived San Tropez.
- 1730 - PHILADELPHIA, WOOLSEY H.P. JONES anchored in San Tropez Bay.
- 1758 - BENSON, HMBLETON underway and stood out on patrols. Received warning from CWNTF of possibility of human torpedo attack from direction of Italian coast night of 3/4 Sept; passed to TF 86.
MONTCAIM on 1 hours notice and EMILE BERTIN on 6 hours notice from 032359 to 062359.
- 1900 - BROOKLYN escorted by MADISON departed Naples 1900 for San Tropez. CWNTF direct CTF 86 to order Java Mine Disposal Unit to proceed to Nice area and report to CTU 80.10.9 for temporary duty.
- 2200 - DUGUAY TROUIN sailed for San Tropez.

4 September 1944

- 0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; SOMERS, WOOLSEY, H.P. JONES anchored in San Tropez. BROCKLYN escorted by MADISON at sea enroute from Naples to San Tropez. EDISON and LUDLOW at Monaco Area to provide F/S for 1st ABTF. FS GLOIRE, MONTCAIM, CCD-4 aboard, GEORGES LEYGUES, CCD-3 aboard LORRAINE, TERRIBLE, FANTASQUE and GRUNDAL (Cinc French Naval Forces aboard) anchored in San Tropez. CATOCTIN (CWNTF), BISCAYNE (CTF 85), PLUNKETT, JOUETT (CTG 80.6), MACOMB, HOBSON anchored in San Tropez.
- 0514 - JOUETT stood out.
- 0650 - HOBSON underway and stood out.
- 0821 - MALIN underway and stood out.
- 0920 - SATTERLEE stood out; fueled and departed San Tropez.
- 1020 - PLUNKETT and HOBSON underway.
- 1154 - TERRIBLE and FANTASQUE stood out for Naples.
HARDING, BALDWIN stood in and anchored.
MALIN relieved EDISON in F/S area. EDISON proceeded to San Tropez.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1304 - EDISON stood in and anchored.
- 1425 - BROCKLYN, MADISON, HAMBLETON stood in and anchored San Tropez. GLOIRE placed on 4 hours notice. Furnished maps and charts and officers briefed on east flank fire support area.
- 1440 - EDISON underway from San Tropez to Ajaccio to refuel and for ammunition to return to San Tropez. COMTF closed all U.S. Naval activity at Propriano.
- 1637 - DUGUAY TROUIN stood in and anchored; placed on 6 hours notice. Lt. A. Dulles, USNR, Liaison Officer on FANTASQUE reported to CTF 86 for duty. COMTF ordered CTF 86 to release FANTASQUE & TERRIBLE from TF 86 and to report to CTG 80.6 at Naples.
- 2307 - AJAX (CinCMed) underway and stood out for Naples.

5 September 1944

- 0000 - CTF 86 and members of staff accompanied by Contre Amiral Jaujard left on trip to inspect enemy fortifications and guns destroyed by Allied Naval gun fire.
- 0805 - MACOMB, MACOCK, EMONS & ELLYSON stood in San Tropez from A/S patrol.
EMILE BERTIN Duty Cruiser.
Due to human torpedo action in bombardment area CTF 86 provided air reconnaissance until last light. PHILADELPHIA transferred one plane temporarily to BROCKLYN. Belgium Liberation Day; all US ships displayed Belgium Flag.
LUDLOW fired.
MALIN fired 103 rounds at concrete emplacements; results successful.
- 835 - ENDICOTT & NELSON stood out.
- 1120 - PLUNKETT & JOUETT underway and stood out.
MALIN and LUDLOW off Monaco sank 10, probably 11 human torpedoes; captured three German POWs.
USNGLO 45th Div. requested cruiser for Monte Carlo area.
MONTCALM designated.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1330 - MONTCALM underway and stood out for Monaco area. POWs brought aboard USS PHILADELPHIA for interrogation by Captain Ansel, USN.
- 1445 - ELLYSON, HAMBLETON and ELMONS stood out. SATTERLEE, MACOMB, McCOOK stood out on A/S patrol. 4 PT on patrol off Ampiglio-San Remo area. CTF 86 and members of staff returned aboard. CTF 86 ordered cruiser seaplanes to patrol and search for human torpedoes off Menton 060530. MACAF and 12 TAC informed.
- 2325 - MONTCALM stood in from Monaco Area and anchored San Tropez.

6 September 1944

- 0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ConSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; BROOKLYN, WOOLSEY; MADISON, SCHERS, H.F. JONES anchored in San Tropez. FS MALIN and USS LUDLOW in Monaco F/S area. French ships in TF 86, EMILE BERTIN, GLOIRE, MONTCALM, CCD-3 aboard GEORGES LEYGUES, CCD-4 aboard DUGUAY TROUIN and LORRAINE anchored in San Tropez. EDISON enroute from Ajaccio. Other ships present, CATOCTIN (CANTF), BISCAYNE (CTF 85), JOUETT (CTG 80.6), PLUNKETT, MACOMB, HOBSON, DOYLE, HARDING, SATTERLEE, EBERLE, anchored in San Tropez. GERUNDIA (CinMed French Naval Forces).
- 0153 - CTF 86 ordered EMILE BERTIN to bombardment area to sail at 0500. CTF 86 passed to CTF 85 requisitions for provisions for PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN, MADISON, H.F. JONES, WOOLSEY, LUDLOW, and EDISON from Tarazed 7 Sept.
- 0448 - Two enemy E-Boats reported in Port Gofino by Radio Naples. Cruiser planes launched at first light to search and patrol for human torpedoes in F/S Area. NGLO 45th Div. East Flank requested one cruiser for fire support.
- 0800 - EDISON arrived St. Tropez from Ajaccio. CANTF ordered PT204 and 214 depart San Tropez to proceed Cape Martin at night as PT screen and remain until 0900. DRAGON fuel and ammunition ships shifted from Propriano to Ajaccio. Flare Three CTF 86's Operation Plan 6-44 issued to TF 86; effective on receipt.
- 1500 - BROOKLYN escorted by WOOLSEY, departed for Ajaccio to replenish fuel and exchange ammunition. ETA Ajaccio 2030. Due to heavy weather PT patrol cancelled.
- 2059 - PHILADELPHIA departed for Ajaccio to replenish and to exchange ammunition.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

7 September 1944

- 0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) is PHILADELPHIA; BROCKLYN, HALLIN, WOOLSEY at Ajaccio. MADISON, EDISON, SOMERS, H.F. JONES anchored in San Tropez. French Ship ILLIN at sea from Ajaccio to bombardment area F/S in TF 86 at San Tropez. EMILE BERTIN duty cruiser. DUGUAY TRCUIN standby cruiser until 072359B then assume duty cruiser. GLOIRE, MONTCAILL, GEORGES LEYGUES, and LOPRAHE anchored in San Tropez. LUDLOW and HALLIN at bombardment area. Ships present at San Tropez, CATOCTIN (C-ETTF), BISCAYNE (CT 85), EBERLE and BOYLE.
- 0500 - HALLIN sailed for Ajaccio for fuel and ammunition.
- 0700 - EMILE BERTIN sailed to bombardment area.
- 0820 - PHILADELPHIA alongside NITRO exchanged ammunition. WOOLSEY in inner harbor.
- 1300 - MADISON & JONES ordered to proceed to F/S area by CTF 86.
- 1515 - WOOLSEY completed refueling and stood out.
- 1534 - PHILADELPHIA completed exchange of ammunition and away from alongside NITRO. 1550 - PHILADELPHIA anchored.
- 1645 - LUDLOW stood in San Tropez to provision. DUGUAY TRCUIN ordered to arrive fire support area at 080630B.
- 2200 - CTF 86 in PHILADELPHIA, BROCKLYN escorted by WOOLSEY underway stood out of Ajaccio enroute for San Tropez to provision.
- 2300 - HALLIN sailed to San Tropez MFR 080700. SOMERS released from CTF 86 and ordered to proceed to Ajaccio to refuel. Return to San Tropez and report to CTU 80.6.7. DRAGON A/S screen DDS JOUENT, HUGHES, H.F. JONES, F.C. DAVIS, H. HILF, ENDICOTT, TUCKERSON, S. WINTERLEE, B. LDWIN, HARDING, SOMERS.
- CTF 86 ordered MADISON and JONES to proceed to bombardment area after completion of provisioning and relieve HALLIN and LUDLOW. HALLIN to sail to Ajaccio to refuel and replenish ammunition. LUDLOW to sail for San Tropez to provision thence to Ajaccio to refuel thence to San Tropez. CTG 86.5 asked for air patrol and FT patrol to continue until 0900 September 8th.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

8 September 1944

- 0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; BROOKLYN escorted by JOOLSEY at sea steaming for San Tropez to take provisions from Tarazail. MADISON and H.P.JONES at bombardment area. DUGUAY TROUIN duty cruiser; EMILE BERTIN, GLOIRE, MONTCAILL, MALIN, GEORGES LEYGUES and LORRAINE anchored at San Tropez. EDISON, LUDLOW anchored at San Tropez. CATOCTIN (CATF), BISCAYNE (CTF 85), PLUMBERT, LIMBLETON, DOYLE, BALDWIN, HARDING, EDICOTT MACCOCK, SATTERLEE and THOMPSON in DRAGOON area.
CTF 86 requests blocks of six convoy code words and W/T calls signs be allocated CTF 86 to assign to TF 86 movements when originator is sailing authority.
CATF directs CTU 80.6.7 to order French destroyers FORTUNE LILPTE and FORBIN to report to CTF 86 on arrival so they can participate with French Naval Units at Toulon.
- 0758 - TF 86 provisions from TARAZED at St. Tropez.
- 1050 - BROOKLYN recovered 2 planes. CTF 86 requested fire support channel be swept in bombardment area. TG 86.5 to support sweepers. PTs will continue to operate nightly from Cap Ferrat to Bardighera and will contact cruiser seagulls at first light.
Western limits of operating area for PTs and MTBs moved to line bearing 135 degrees from Imperia.
MADISON assigned no firing missions for 8 September.
- 1445 - NIBLACK stood in and reported for duty.
- 1923 - EDISON alongside DEMEBOLL for availability to repair 5" gun.
- 2312 - DUGUAY TROUIN stood in from Ajaccio.

9 September 1944

- 0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; BROOKLYN, JOOLSEY, EDISON anchored San Tropez. LUDLOW at Ajaccio. MADISON and H.P.JONES at bombardment area. DUGUAY TROUIN duty cruiser, EMILE BERTIN, GLOIRE, MONTCAILL, GEORGES LEYGUES, LORRAINE and MALIN anchored at San Tropez.
- 0003 - LUDLOW sailed for Ajaccio for fuel and ammunition.
- 0130 - H.P.JONES engaged by explosive boat 5 miles South of Cape Anpeglio. FT engaged boat.
- 0520 - DUGUAY TROUIN underway and standing out for Menton area.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0610 - PHILADELPHIA launched 2 seaplanes to patrol Menton area and search for human torpedoes and explosive boats. Day fighter coverage requested from 63rd fighter wing.
- 1000 - CATOCTIN (CANTF) sailed for Toulon.
- 1015 - PHILADELPHIA recovers two planes.
- 1040 - CATOCTIN informed air wings it is planned to fly seagulls in vicinity of St. Tropez intermittently during daylight without signal and to fly a patrol of two seaplanes each morning from daylight to 1000 in Menton area. Requested that fighters be briefed to cover the latter patrol against sneak attacks.
- Nice harbor swept and considered safe by MAINSTAY. CANTF directed all minesweepers that CTF 86 must be advised of all operations of minesweeping on the right flank. CTU 80.10.9 commenced sweeping fire support channel Menton area, results negative although sweeper group was under enemy fire from shore batteries.
- 2000 - DUGUAY TROUIN sailed for Ajaccio to replenish fuel and ammunition and to return to St. Tropez at 110600 September.
- 2300 - LUDLOW sailed from Ajaccio to St. Tropez. All U.S., French and British ships taking part in parade at Toulon assigned berths at Toulon for 13 September.

10 September 1944

- 0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; BROOKLYN, WOOLSEY, EDISON, LUDLOW anchored in St. Tropez. MADISON and H.P. JONES at bombardment area. EMILE BERTIN, GLOIRE, GEORGE LEYGUES, MONTCALM, MALIN and LORRAINE anchored in St. Tropez. BROOKLYN duty cruiser, PHILADELPHIA standby cruiser. DUGUAY TROUIN enroute to Ajaccio. French ships not assigned duties may be sailed by Admiral Lemonnier to visit French ports for liberty.
- 0700 - DUGUAY TROUIN arrived Ajaccio.
- 0718 - MADISON attacked by human torpedo; avoided attack. One survivor recovered. H.P. JONES picked up 3 Italian Patriots in boat. PT brought these men to PHILADELPHIA for interrogation. Italians reported 8 human torpedoes on dock. Fire support channel swept off Menton. CTF 86 ordered area cleared from centerline to 100 fathom curve to facilitate ship handling under fire.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

1st ABTF requested BB LORRAINE bombard enemy in vicinity Sospel. CTF 86 sent 3 Italian Patriots to Commanding General, 1st Airborne Task Force, Nice. CTF 86 ordered the LORRAINE, MALIN to be on station in fire support area at 11 September 0800, to support 1st ABTF; retiring to St. Tropez at 1600.

Ten human torpedoes destroyed and one probably destroyed by PT boats and destroyer 10 September. 3 POWs recovered.

CTF 86 ordered LUDLOW to fire support area at 110700 to assist WOOLSEY; MADISON to retire to St. Tropez at 111800 or upon exhaustion ammunition.

Two human torpedoes sighted by PHILADELPHIA plane on beach at Cape Martin. MADISON requested Army to recover if possible.

11 September 1944

0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; BROOKLYN, EDISON, WOOLSEY, LUDLOW, MADISON and JONES in F/S area. LORRAINE, and MALIN to arrive F/S area 0800. French Ships GLOIRE, DUGUAY TROUIN, GEORGES LEYGUES, MONTCALM and EMILE BERTIN anchored in San Tropez. East flank, heavy fighting east of Menton.

MADISON to sail 112300 to Ajaccio, ETA 120700 to replenish fuel and ammunition; on completion to return to St. Tropez. PT boat 203 detached to call at Nice and obtain prisoners from Army and deliver same to CTF 86.

GLOIRE on 6 hours steaming notice 111100B/September.

1010 - LORRAINE commenced firing; expended 12 rounds at target.

CTF 86 established 4 PT patrol along lines: "Able" 2 to 3 miles off Menton extending NE as far as 5 miles, "Baker" 2 to 3 miles off St. Ampeglio extending NE 5 miles.

1630 - H.P. JONES sailed from Ajaccio to St. Tropez, ETA 2300.

LORRAINE & MALIN anchored in St. Tropez.

MADISON fired 30 rounds at enemy troops. MALIN fired 34 rds. at white house and 14 depth charges to forestall attempted attacks by human torpedoes. WOOLSEY fired 419 rds. enemy troops guns and strong points. LUDLOW fired 433 rounds at enemy troops, guns and strong points. 3 POWs brought aboard U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA and interrogated by Captain ANSEL, U.S.N.

Three human torpedo POWs captured by army on Cape Martin; Names: AVER BAUER, FRITZ HARSTMAN and BENJAMIN WILL were transferred to custody of 6619 M.P. Adm. Company St. Maxine. Two POWs GEORGE DRESEL and STANISLAUS ADAMONSKI delivered to CTF 85 who arranged for their transfer to CincMed, Naples for further questioning.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

12 September 1944

0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; BROOKLYN, JONES EDISON anchored in St. Tropez. WOOLSEY and LUDLOW in fire support area. French ships, GLOIRE, GEORGES LEYGUES, MONTCAIM, EMILE BERTIN, DUGUAY TROUIN, MALIN and LORRAINE anchored in San Tropez. MADISON at sea. N.G.L.O. requested cruiser to fire same area as LORRAINE for 12 September. GLOIRE ordered by C.T.F. 86 to proceed to bombardment area 120730 B/Sept. LUDLOW escorted GLOIRE east of Cape Martin.

0500 - GLOIRE sailed for fire support area.

Minesweeping maintenance continued by CTG 80.10.PT patrols for night 12/13. Patrol Able PT's 303 and 306, Patrol Baker PT's 206 and 215.

Little change in front lines on eastern flank. Cruiser planes reported torpedoes beached in shallow water at Cape Martin believed to be double and a single torpedo at Menton. MAINSTAY and JONES mine disposal party ordered to recover these torpedoes. Cruiser plane on search, results negativs. Flak encountered Cape Nero Area.

FORTUNE and FORBIN reported to CTF 86 for Fire Support duty.

Several floating mines sighted in area Lat 43-21.3 N and in Long 06-50E to 07-30E warning sent to all ships.

Enemy vessels sighted 22 miles above San Remo. WOOLSEY ordered to sink and destroy. Results negative. WOOLSEY to depart Monaco area for Ajaccio 140830 to replenish fuel and ammunition.

13 September 1944

0000 - C.T.F. 86 (Commander Support Force) in PHILADELPHIA, BROOKLYN, EDISON, H.P. JONES, and MADISON anchored in San TROPEZ. French ships GLOIRE, GEORGES LEYGUES, MONTCAIM, DUGUAY TROUIN, EMILE BERTIN, MALIN and LORRAINE anchored in San TROPEZ. WOOLSEY and LUDLOW in fire support area. 2 PT's on patrol "Able", 2 PT's on patrol "Baker".

0630 - French ships GLOIRE, GEORGES LEYGUES, MONTCAIM, DUGUAY TROUIN, EMILE BERTIN, LE MALIN, FORBIN, FORTUNE and LORRAINE underway for Toulon. C.T.F. 86 in PHILADELPHIA steamed 5 miles asterr French forces enroute Toulon. During C.T.F. 86's period in Toulon Commanding Officer, BROOKLYN acted as deputy for gun-fire support duties. BROOKLYN ordered by C.T.F. 86 to

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

proceed to bombardment area by 0800.

4 PT's to be on patrol east flank two each on Able and Baker patrols.

Channel into NICE harbor completed. Now considered safe.

C.T.F. 86 orders CTG 80.10 to sweep Golfe Juan to provide winter anchorage for fire support ships.

Two human torpedos reported at Cape Martin and Menton recovered by British and taken to Toulon. EDISON ordered by BROOKLYN to relieve WOOLSEY on station 141500.

14 September 1944

0000 - C.T.F. 86 (Commander Support Force) in PHILADELPHIA at Toulon participating in French Naval Ceremonies. BROOKLYN (deputy for C.T.F. 86 on right flank), H.P. JONES, EDISON and MADISON anchored in San TROPEZ. LUDLOW and WOOLSEY in Menton fire support area supported 1st ABTF.

GLOIRE, GEORGES LEYGUES, MONTCALM, EMILE BERTIN, DUGUAY TROUIN, LORRAINE, MALIN, FORTUNE, and FORBIN at Toulon for French celebration.

BROOKLYN arrived in fire support area; no missions. Fire-support channel off San MARTIN closed, dangerous due to mines; suspected enemy mining at night.

Cruiser planes made preliminary air reconnaissance of Golfe Juan for presence of mines.

Admiral Lemonnier requested F.S. EMILE BERTIN and F.S. MALIN proceed to Bizerte for repairs upon completion ceremonies at Toulon.

EDISON gave close support to sweepers sweeping fire support channel (San MARTIN).

2330 - JONES relieved LUDLOW in fire support area. LUDLOW proceed to Ajaccio ETA 150800, to replenish fuel and ammunition and return to San TROPEZ.

PHILADELPHIA designated ready ship Sept. 16 and 17.

Front lines and shore situation unchanged. BROOKLYN anchored San TROPEZ 2330. BROOKLYN planes made 8 sorties search, reconnaissance and spotting for LUDLOW and EDISON.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

15 September 1944.

0000 - C.T.F. 86 (Commander Support Force) in PHILADELPHIA at Toulon. BROOKLYN, MADISON anchored at St. Tropez. EDISON in Juan in fire support area. LUDLOW, WOOLSEY at Ajaccio replenishing fuel and ammunition. F/S at Toulon participating in French ceremonies.

EDISON ordered to provide fire support for minesweepers off San Martin.

Cruiser planes made search of east flank, no enemy activity. No mines spotted by planes in Cannes-Juan area.

2000 - EMILE BERTIN and MALIN departed Toulon for Bizerte for repairs. Released from TF 86.

CTF 86 ordered TF 86 not to operate east of Imperia at night as planes under MACAF, PTs and MTBs under SOIS would operate east of Imperia.

2300 - WOOLSEY, LUDLOW sailed Ajaccio for St. Tropez, ETA 160700.

16 September 1944

0000 - TF86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA anchored Toulon, France. BROOKLYN, MADISON anchored St. Tropez. EDISON and JONES in F/S area. WOOLSEY and LUDLOW at sea enroute to St. Tropez. French Ships at Toulon participating in French ceremonies.

IT engaged control explosive boat plus four drones off Martin Area - none claimed. CTF 86 passed information to Bastia, SOIS.

0400 - PHILADELPHIA duty ship.

0658 - PHILADELPHIA underway for San Tropez.

1020 - PHILADELPHIA anchored St. Tropez.

1140 - Four planes hoisted aboard PHILADELPHIA.

17 September 1944

0000 - TF 86, CTF 86, (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; BROOKLYN, WOOLSEY, MADISON and LUDLOW anchored at St. Tropez. H.F. JONES and EDISON in F/S area. French Ships at Toulon for French ceremonies.

CWNTF approved moving PT bases; CTG 80.5 (ops) from St. Maxime to Golfe Juan.

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CTF 86 ordered minesweeping of fire support channel of San Martin to be discontinued until further orders. Planes returned to base.

Golfo Juan swept and declared safe for anchorage outside 3 fathom curve.

GEORGES LEYGUES anchored in St. Tropez.

18 September 1944

0000 - TF 86, CTF 86 (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; LUDLOW, WOOLSEY anchored at St. Tropez. MADISON and JONES in F/S area. EDISON enroute to Ajaccio to replenish fuel and ammunition. LORRAINE at sea enroute to Oran. GEORGES LEYGUES at St. Tropez - Duty Cruiser. GLOIRE at sea enroute to Algiers; MONTCALM at Toulon.

19 September 1944

0000 - TF 86, CTF 86, (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA and LUDLOW anchored in St. Tropez. BROOKLYN at Palermo. JONES enroute to Palermo. MADISON and WOOLSEY at F/S arca. EDISON enroute to St. Tropez. MONTCAIM, DUGUAY TROUIN at Toulon. LORRAINE enroute to Oran; GLOIRE at Algiers.

1900 - FORTUNE sailed from Oran for St. Tropez.

20 September 1944

0000 - TF 86, CTF 86, (ComSupFor) in PHILADELPHIA; BROOKLYN at Palermo. WOOLSEY, EDISON anchored in San Tropez. H.P. JONES enroute to Palermo; MADISON and LUDLOW in F/S area. GEORGES LEYGUES enroute to Algiers. MONTCALM at sea for the night. DUGUAY TROUIN at Toulon; GLOIRE enroute to Toulon. Weather stormy, plane flights cancelled and PT operations cancelled.

1100 - PHILADELPHIA sailed from San Tropez for Palermo to return 24th. Admiral Jaujard in MONTCALM-deputy for CTF 86 and upon his departure this duty devolved upon Commanding Officer, DUGUAY TROUIN.

WOOLSEY to relieve MADISON in F/S area at 201830.
MADISON to sail to Ajaccio to replenish fuel and ammunition
at 202300.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

1052 - MONTCALM ordered to fire support area.

21 September 1944

0000 - T.F. 86, C.T.F. 86 (Commander Support Force) in PHILADELPHIA enroute to Palermo. BROOKLYN, JONES at Palermo. MADISON enroute to Ajaccio. WOOLSEY and LUDLOW at fire support area. MONTCALM at San TROPEZ. GEORGES LEYGUES at ALGIERS for 10 days repairs. EDISON at San TROPEZ. DUGUAY TROUIN at TOULON.

Weather overcast with rain. Wind 32 knot from N.E.

1800 EDISON relieved LUDLOW in fire support area.
LUDLOW departed bombardment area for Palermo.

22 September 1944

0000 - T.F. 86, C.T.F. 86 (Commander Support Force) in PHILADELPHIA and LUDLOW steaming to Palermo. BROOKLYN, JONES at Palermo. EDISON, WOOLSEY in fire support area. MADISON enroute Ajaccio. MONTCALM, FORTUNE at San Tropez. GEORGES LEYGUES at Algiers; DUGUAY TROUIN, GLOIRE at Toulon.

0700 - MADISON departed Ajaccio for San Tropez.
FORBIN arrived San Tropez.

0800 - PHILADELPHIA moored at Palermo.

C.T.F. 86, assisted by Staff and Commanding Officer and officers of BROOKLYN, conducted material inspection of PHILADELPHIA.

Received information from French source, enemy planning surprise assault on allied shipping in Toulon and Marseille. Bays from La. Spezia to be carried out by Italian MAS boats, human torpedoes.

23 September 1944.

0000 - T.F. 86, C.T.F. 86 (Commander Support Force) in PHILADELPHIA enroute to Toulon; BROOKLYN at Palermo. EDISON, WOOLSEY, in fire support area. MADISON at Ajaccio. JONES enroute for Oran.

FORTUNE, DUGUAY TROUIN at San Tropez. GEORGES LEYGUES at Algiers. MONTCALM, GLOIRE at Toulon.

0700 - FORBIN arrived at San Tropez at 0700.

MURPHY designated destroyer to make distribution of publications to T.F. 86.

0700 - PT 310 strafed by friendly plane off Capo Ampeglio.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

1100 - MONTCALEM sailed about 251100 to Algiers for revictualling. GLOIRE to sail to relieve DUGUAY TROUIN as duty cruiser.

EBERLE ordered to report to C.T.F. 86 for temporary duty.

Contre Admiral Auboyneau hoisted his flag in DUGUAY TROUIN 25 September.

CWNTF issued orders placing CTG 80.5 (ops) while operating on right flank, FTs and ARBs, to be under operational control of C.T.F. 86.

Upon departure NCWTF, C.T.F. 86 will maintain following channels of communication: 7th Army Command, T.F. 86, Rear to Ajaccio, Port wave, T.F. Commanders, Rear link to ComNavNAW MACAF, 12th TAC Command.

1200 - C.T.F. 86 conferred with NCWTF.

1730 - CATOCTIN (NCWTF) departed Toulon for Naples.

No PT patrol tonight.

Task Group 80.10 dissolved. New temporary task units constituted consisted of same forces as follows: TU 81.4.2 vice 80.10.2; TU 81.4.3 in lieu 80.10.3; TU 81.4.4 in place 80.10.4; TU 81.4.9 instead of 80.10.9.

26 September 1944

0000 - T.F. 86, C.T.F. 86, CCD 8, (Commander Support Force) in PHILADELPHIA, EDISON and MURPHY anchored in Marseilles Bay. BROOKLYN at San Tropez. JONES at Palermo. WOOLSEY and LUDLOW at Oran. MADISON and FORBIN in bombardment area. EBERLE at sea escorting LST convoy. PLUNKETT at sea escorting convoy.

F.S. DUGUAY TROUIN, GLOIRE, FORTUNE at San Tropez. MONTCALEM, GEORGES LEYGUES at Algiers. LORRAINE at Oran.

FORBIN with sound contact 0640 at Lat. 43-30, 07-26 several patterns dropped, surfaced and sank a midget submarine at 0755. Two survivors to be brought aboard flagship for interrogation.

CAMEL beach closed.

1100 - PHILADELPHIA and EDISON underway for San Tropez.

1400 - EMPIRE GAT sailed from Palermo to Ajaccio. (Ammunition ship for T.F. 86).

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

MADISON to be relieved about 1830 to return to St. Tropez. CTG 80.6 orders sail Oran and NIBLACK to arrive St. Tropez 271800 and to report to CTF 86 for duty.

- 1630 - Launched two planes for reconnaissance mission along the coast in the fire support area.
- 1645 - SC-1030 stood in.
- 1800 - Recovered two planes.
YMS-355 underway.
- 1810 - U.S.S. KEARNY stood in.
- 1845 - USS KEARNY stood out to establish night A/S patrol
- 1847 - USS MADISON stood in.
- 1944 - ARB-31 alongside.
- 1950 - USS MADISON anchored bearing 231° T.
- 2200 - ARB-31 cleared the side.
- 2230 - USS MADISON's boat brought over 3 German POWs to be questioned.
- 2250 - USS MURPHY underway and standing out to carry out sailing orders to Ajaccio.

27 September 1944.

- 0000 - EIGHTH Fleet Op-Plan ANOR-1 (modified). CTF 86 (ComSupFor) and ComCruDiv 8 in USS PHILADELPHIA at anchor in Golfe de St. Tropez, Southern France. CTF 86 Op-Plan 6-44 (Flare Three) in effect. GLOIRE (ready cruiser), BROOKLYN (stand-by cruiser), MADISON, EDISON and FORTUNE at anchor in Golfe de St. Tropez; DOUGAY TROUIN at anchor in Toulon harbor; GEORGES LEYGUES and MONTCALM at anchor in Algiers; EMILE BERTIN at anchor in Bizerte harbor; GLEAVES on anti-submarine patrol outside Golfe de St. Tropez harbor; H.P. JONES and FORBIN in fire support area; LORRAINE and NIBLACK at Oran; BENSON at Marseilles; PT patrols Able and Baker on station.
- 0015 - USS EDISON underway and stood out enroute to Oran.
- 0536 - PHILADELPHIA launched two planes for coastal patrol to Cape Mele and for spotting for H.P. JONES.

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PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0550 - French DD FORTUNE underway and standing out to relieve French DD FORBIN in fire support area, who will then proceed directly to Ajaccio for fuel and ammunition.
- 0610 - LST's 238 and 265 standing in.
- 0635 - U.S.S. KEARNY and U.S.S. GLEAVES standing in after completion night patrol.
- 0650 - U.S.S. KEARNY proceeding to St. Maxine harbor.
- 0700 - GLEAVES anchored.
- 0930 - LST 526 underway to shift berths.
- 0931 - U.S.S. BROCKLYN launched two planes to continue patrol and spotting in fire support area.
- 0950 - PHILADELPHIA recovered two planes.
- 1045 - U.S.S. GLEAVES underway to shift berths.
- 1110 - ARB 21 alongside to bring aboard CTU 80.6.10.
- 1130 - CTU 80.6.10 left the ship.
- 1140 - SC 524 standing in.
- 1140 - SC 1210 standing out.
- 1143 - PC 621 standing in.
- 1245 - For reconnaissance over fire support area, U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA catapulted 2 planes.
- 1400 - 3 German POWs, Johannes MUHL, Werner JACOB, Joseph ESTERES, crew of midget submarines sunk by FORBIN 43-30N - 07-26E at 260755A transferred to LST 265 at St. Tropez for transportation and delivery to CinCmed, Naples.
- 1550 - U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA hoisted two planes aboard.
- 1755 - GLEAVES stood out for A/S patrol outside harbor.
- 2000 - See H.T. JONES 272046A and FORTUNE's 272015A for report of missions fired 27th September.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

28 September 1944

- 0000 - EIGHTH Fleet OpPlan ANOR-1, (modified). Commander Task Force EIGHTY-SIX, (ComSupFor) and ComCruDiv 8 in U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA, Flagship, Rear Admiral L.A. DAVIDSON, U.S.N. at anchor Golfe de St. Tropez, Southern France. CTF 86 Op-Plan 6-44 (Flare Thrée) in effect. GLOIRE (duty cruiser), BROOKLYN (standby cruiser), MADISON at anchor Golfe de Tropez. DOUGAY TROUIN at anchor Toulon harbor; FORTUNE and H.P. JONES in fire support area; LORRAINE at Oran; FORBIN at anchor Ajaccio harbor; BENSON and NIBLACK enroute to St. Tropez to report for duty. St. Raphael patrol night 27-28 Sept. PC 1173 between lat. 43-21N 06-46E and 43-21N 06-50E. KEARNY between 43.25.5N 06-55E and 43.20N 06-55E. PT patrols able and Baker on station.
- 0030 - Coastal Force operations carried out between Cape Noli and La Spezia from 280030 to first light.
- 0600 - GLEAVES departed A/S patrol outside Golfe de Tropez 0620A for Toulon totreplensih fuel.
- 0630 - Two cruiser planes from U.S.S. BROOKLYN launched (reconnaissance patrol fire support area) at first light.
- 1000 - CTG 80.5 shifted base from San Tropez to Golfe Juan. CTF 85 called on CTF 86.
- 1020 - Two cruiser planes from U.S.S. BROCKLYN secured.
- 1145 - JOUETT 80.6.7 aboard, standing out of San Raphael.
- 1155 - MADISON underway Golfe de Tropez for Gulf Juan as escort for EMPIRE FAY. 100 octane tanker for IT Base.
- 1200 - KEARNY - DesDiv 21 aboard standing out of San Raphael (Canel Beach closed) CTF 85 sailed for Naples, LCI 19 (KEARNY sailed for Oran).
- 1300 - GLOIRE underway for Toulon. PHILADELPHIA launched 2 planes for patrol East Flank. (Mission to observe for midjet submarines returning to base).
- 1400 - Recovered two PHILADELPHIA planes. WOOLSEY and EDISON released from TF 86 ordered to report to CTG 80.6. Received word coastal forces would be operating between Genoa and Spezia night of 28-29 Sept. CTF 86 send dispatch to CG 7th Army and CG 6th Corps informing both parties CTF 86 now SOFA Southern Coast of France and is

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

28 September 1944

responsible for gunfire support on right flank, offensive and defensive operations against enemy shipping and naval forces. That CTG 80.8 is responsible for convoy movements and protection of approaches of Southern French ports. SC 515 standing San Tropez bouy and reported for duty. SC 515 assigned A/S patrol duty Golfe San Tropez. MADISON to remain at anchor in San Tropez. JONES ordered to retire to Golfe Juan and form A/S patrol for Golfe Juan on completion firing mission. 1st ABTF request two destroyers remain in F.S. area to observe flashes of guns on beach who are firing on troops and take batteries under fire. CTF 86 advises request impossible at present but orders "Able" and "Baker" IT patrols to observe and plot locations of enemy guns firing.

- 2106 - FS FORTUNE standing in San Tropez radio repaired and FORTUNE ordered to proceed to fire support area. CTF 86 sent message to CG 1st ABTF, Nice his flagship would arrive Nice 29 Sept. and to come aboard for conference. Lt-Cond. RESSLER, CTG 80.5 and NGLO to 1st ABTF, Lt(jg) ROSENSTIEN received same message.
- 2316 - FS FORTUNE standing out for fire support area.

29 September 1944.

- 0000 - CCD-8 (CTF 86) on board PHILADELPHIA (F), BROOKLYN, GLEAVES, MADISON anchored San Tropez Bay. Rear Admiral L.A. DAVIDSON, CCD-8 and CTF 86. H.T. JONES, during night until first light patrolling A/S patrol Golfe Juan then to resume a fire support to 1st ABTF on right flank. FS FORTUNE in Fires Support area. SC 515 on A/S patrol San Tropez. BENSON reported to CTF 86 and enroute to San Tropez. GLOIRE at Toulon, EMILE BERTIN at Berzerte. MONTCAIM and GEORGES LEYGUES at Algiers LORRAINE at Oran. DUGUAY TROUIN at Toulon. CTU 81.4.9 has not reported to CTF 86. Com8thFlt (COMTF) OpPlan ANOR-1 and CTF 86 OpPlan 6-44 (Flare 3). Weather clear, wind force 4, visibility good.
- 0536 - PHILADELPHIA launched two planes for patrol East Flank.
- 0630 - SC 515 anchored in San Tropez.
- 0743 - U.S.S. BENSON stood in San Tropez and reported for duty.
- 0815 - CO BENSON, Gunnery, Communications and Navigating Officers reported aboard for briefing.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 0900 - Two PHILADELPHIA planes recovered. PHILADELPHIA escorted by GLEAVES underway for Nice, France by standard route speed 20.
- 1100 - PHILADELPHIA standing to in Bay Nice. IT 303 in Nice to pick up Colonel Walker, Col. Evans and Lt(jg) Rosegarten. GLEAVES on A/S patrol seaward. H.I. JONES in sight bombarding eastward on right flank. Colonel WALKER, EVANS and Lt(jg) ROSEGARTEN came aboard.
- 1200 - Steaming as before in company with U.S.S. GLEAVES as A/S screen at various courses and speeds enroute to Gulf de Juan. IT 303 following astern.
- 1330 - U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA anchored in Gulf de Juan; GLEAVES steamed to seaward as A/S screen NIBLACK departed Toulon for St. Tropez.
- 1400 - HMS EMPIRE FAY came alongside to port side PHILADELPHIA to receive water. Two SOCs from BROOKLYN enroute to relieve PHILADELPHIA planes on spotting missions on right flank. H.I. JONES firing on camouflaged box cars at coordinates C-891 731. GLEAVES departed St. Tropez for Toulon.
- 1435.- Both PHILADELPHIA's SOC planes returned and were taken aboard.
- 1455 - Col. WALKER, Col. EVANS and Lt(jg) ROSENGASTEN left ship via IT 303 for Nice.
- 1520 - CO EMPIRE FAY, CO PHILADELPHIA and members of staff of Rear Admiral DAVIDSON, USN, held conference.
- 1525 - Exchanged calls with BENSON proceeding to gunfire support area on right flank as relief for FS FORTUNE.
- 1545 - H.I. JONES reported having forced 4 MAS boats behind breakwater in San Remo.
- 1655 - Ordered GLEAVES to proceed gunfire support area on right flank as relief for H.I. JONES.
- 1715 - PHILADELPHIA launched two planes as relief for BROCKLYN spotting planes.
- 1730 - PHILADELPHIA underway, unescorted, to St. Tropez. Lt-Cond. BROWN, USN left ship having completed conference with CTF 86. FS FORTUNE ordered to proceed from fire support area for Ajaccio to refuel, take on stores and ammunition. Departed at 1930.

PART VI Chronology (Cont'd)

- 1852 - PHILADELPHIA anchored in Gulf of St. Tropez. CTF 86 ordered SC 515 to maintain A/S patrol of S. Tropez.
- 1925 - H.I. JONES reported in vicinity of S. Tropez ordered to remain on patrol to seaward of SC 515.
- 20 - CO BROOKLYN came aboard for conference with CTF 86.
- 215 - Commanding Officer, Gunnery Officer and Communications Officer of NIBLACK reported aboard for conferences and briefing. PLUNKETT and EBERLE due to arrive in Toulon with convoy during daylight. Ordered to fuel and provision and sail to St. Tropez tomorrow. Received despatch that due to weather arrival scheduled at 010800 October. CTF 86 ordered CTG 80.5 to maintain PT patrols Able and Baker. BENSON and GLEAVES patrolling to southward of Antibes to a line 20 off shore.

30 September 1944.

- 0000 - CTF 86 in U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA which is anchored in Gulf St. Tropez. Ship present; BROOKLYN, MADISON, MORENO, NARROGANSETT, assignments of vessels of TF 86 as follows: BENSON and GLEAVES in fire support area in right flank, on patrol during night south of Antibes; PT patrols Able and Baker off fire support area on right flank; EMILE BERTIN enroute Leghorn, MONTCAIM and GEORGES LEYGUES in Algiers, FLOIRE, FORBIN at Toulon, LORRAINE at Oran. SC 515 on A/S patrol off San Tropez; H.P. JONES on A/S patrol to seaward of SC 515. FORTUNE enroute to Ajaccio weather clear, conditions normal. No enemy activity reported.
- 0559 - PHILADELPHIA departed San Tropez for Toulon.
- 0603 - Exchanged calls with H.P. JONES ordered that vessel to secure from A/S patrol and anchor San Tropez.
- 0906 - DUGUAY TROUIN (CTG 86.3) stood out of Toulon enroute to Oran.
- 1020 - PHILADELPHIA moored to Buoy #2 in Toulon Harbor. 1030 Communication officers of CTG 80.8, 81.4 and CTU 80.6.7 came aboard PHILADELPHIA for conference. Captain Messmer, U.S.N. (CTG 80.10), Capt. Williams, U.S.N., and Comdr. Reville reported on board for conferences.
- 1140 - PHILADELPHIA commenced fueling from VAR which came alongside to port.
- 1200 - Anchored as before.
- 1300 - Captain of FS FORBIN came aboard.
- 1500 - EMILE BERTIN stood in. 1545 - PLUNKETT reported for duty.
- 1656 - French Tanker VAR underway from alongside for anchorage.
- 1745 - ARBs 21, 22, 24, 34 moored alongside.

UNITED STATES EIGHTH FLEET
Commander Support Force
(Commander Cruiser Division Eight)

Part VII

Report of Casualties and Battle Damage

1. F.S. FANTASQUE on 20 August 1944 while in RADE D'HYERES was struck by one (1) 138 mm shell believed to have been fired by battery L-30 located on GIENS Peninsula. Projectile landed on and demolished center torpedo tube on port side mount. FANTASQUE suffered five men wounded, two of whom were transferred to a hospital ship in the ALPHA area. Damage did not prevent FANTASQUE from remaining in area to furnish gunfire support. Entire new torpedo mount required as a result of this damage. No estimated date of completion of repairs available. FANTASQUE will require availability at Navy Yard to affect necessary repairs.
2. GEORGES LEYGUES on 20 August 1944 was taken under heavy fire of enemy artillery at ST. ELME. Straddled on numerous occasions, the GEORGES LEYGUES was struck by two projectiles believed to be of 138 mm or 150 mm size. One of these shells landed on the starboard quarter completely demolishing the Bofors quadruple 40 mm mount. The second projectile hit and carried away a strut on the after stack which held up the antenna. As a result of the hit on the 40 mm mount, fires were started and all ready service ammunition was lost. Sixteen (16) men were wounded, one (1) of whom later died. Vessel remained in gunfire support area and carried out gunfire support duties. New 40 mm mount required. Estimated date of completion of repairs unknown as ship would have to obtain complete mount and wiring installations in a navy yard.
3. H.M.M.L 559 while sweeping off PORT MAN (between PORT CROS and CAPE BENAT) on 15 August 1944 was severely shaken by two exploding mines. No actual report of damage received from that vessel. ML 559 was sent to MADDALENA under her own power the same day. No personnel casualties reported. No further report of damage to this craft received by Commander Task Force 86.
4. PT #555 while on return trip from PORT DE BOUC on 24 August struck a shallow water mine which resulted in the loss of the craft aft of the forward bulkhead of the engine room. Five men were killed and one suffered a broken leg. Forward part of boat remained afloat and was towed to safety. In view of danger of loss of entire boat, it was deemed advisable to destroy all radar and other secret equipment on board; this plan was subsequently carried out. Boat was at first believed to be salvageable but later this view was changed and it was recommended that she be stricken from the navy list of vessels.

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Part VII (Cont'd)

Report of Casualties and Battle Damage

5. H.M.M.L 562 on 20 August 1944 while sweeping in RADE D'HYERES was struck by a 6" projectile which landed and exploded in the officers' quarters. No serious damage resulted. Vessel proceeded under own power after making temporary repairs to MADDALENA. No personnel casualties were received as a result of this hit. Estimated completion date of repairs unknown.
6. PHILADWLPRIA SOC-3 Plane No. 1083 was shot down on 21 August while on spotting mission over GIENS Peninsula. No enemy planes noted in area and SOC believed to have been brought down by flak. Plane was found and reported a total loss. Pilot and aviation radioman reported missing. Body of aviation radioman later recovered from water and definitely identified (by identification tag).
7. TUSCILDOSA SOC-3 Plane No. 9873 on 26 August 1944 was struck by enemy flak while on mission over CANNES-ST. RAFAEL. Damage was slight with piece of metal penetrating plane and exploding ABK radio set. The aviation radioman received slight wounds on finger as a result of this explosion. Repairs completed upon return to BROOKLYN from which ship plane was operating.

ENCLOSURE (D)

A-L

PART VIII

REPORT OF AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

Ammunition expenditure by Sitka forces during the assault phase of operation DRAGOON 15-17 August.

	<u>15"</u>	<u>8"</u>	<u>5.25"</u>	<u>5"</u>	
RAMILLIES	46				
AUGUSTA		313			
DIDO			495		
SOMERS				712	
GLEAVES				265	
	46	313	495	977	Total 1831 Rounds.

Ammunition expenditure by entire support force (T.F.86) during the post assault phase of operation DRAGOON 18-30 August on the left flank.

	340	155	138		90	75	40	20
<u>15"</u>	<u>14"</u>	<u>mm 8"</u>	<u>mm 6"</u>	<u>mm 5.25"</u>	<u>5"</u>	<u>4.7"</u>	<u>4"</u>	<u>mm mm mm mm</u>
RAMILLIES	145							
ALABAMA	837							
ALABAMA		468		172				222
AUGUSTA		606						
QUINCY		913						
D. TROUIN		658						
AURORA		1120				186		
E. BERTIN		64						
GLOIRE		1543						448
G. LEYGUES		588						
MONTCALM		1582						575
PHILADELPHIA		846						
OMAHA		266						
Le FANTASQUE			432					
Le LALIN			278					212 400
Le TERRIBLE			186					
BLACK PRINCE				76				
GENIUS				223				
GENIUS					404			
GENIUS					160			
GENIUS					47			
GENIUS					348			
GENIUS					181			
LOCKOUT						630		
LUDLOW					52			
COOK					76			
MARKETT					64			
	145	837	468	1519	658	6009	1068	299 630 186 1023 222 212 400
								1332

Tota l: 15,008.

PART VIII

REPORT OF AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES (Cont'd)

Ammunition expenditure by support force (Task Force 86) during the post assault phase of operation DRAGOON 18-30 August on the RIGHT Flank.

	<u>8"</u>	<u>6"</u>	<u>5"</u>	<u>20</u> <u>mm</u>	
TUSCALOOSA	114		66	247	
BROOKLYN		614			
BOYLE			558		
CHAMPLIN			683		
EDISON			1473		
WOOLSEY			1100		
	<hr/> 114	<hr/> 614	<hr/> 3880	<hr/> 247	Total 4,855.

Ammunition expenditure by support force (C.T.F. 86) during the post assault phase of operation DRAGOON August 30th to September 25th 1944. These operations were entirely on the right flank.

	<u>340</u> <u>mm</u>	<u>155</u> <u>mm</u>	<u>152</u> <u>mm</u>	<u>6"</u>	<u>138</u> <u>mm</u>	<u>130</u> <u>mm</u>	<u>5"</u>	<u>40</u> <u>mm</u>	<u>20</u> <u>mm</u>
COBBRAINE	58								
P. TEQUIN		822							
L. BEE LIN			238						
PONTCAIN			443						
PHILADELPHIA				16					
Le MALIN					329			440	250
FORBIN						34			
EDISON								1916	
H.P. JONES								3851	
LUDLOW								3211	
BRADISON								1523	
WOOLSEY								708	
Totals	<hr/> 58	<hr/> 822	<hr/> 681	<hr/> 16	<hr/> 329	<hr/> 34	<hr/> 11209	<hr/> 440	<hr/> 250

Total 13,839

GRAND TOTAL OF ALL PHASES:- 35,533 Rounds.

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PART IX

PERSONNEL, PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. The personnel performance on all ships was excellent. Recommendations for awards are being submitted by separate correspondence.
2. In view of the strength of enemy installations and the amount of opposition encountered from sustained gunfire, mines, human torpedoes, midget submarines, explosive boats and occasional air attacks, the personnel casualties sustained by this Task Force are considered to have been extremely light.
3. Assault Phase. Only one personnel casualty has been reported. During the initial landings on CAP NEGRE during the night of 14-15 August an LCA from H.M.S. PRINCESS BEATRIX grounded on the rocks of LAYET Point. Acting Leading Seaman Edward SMITH, C/JX 176875 CO helped to push the boat off the rocks but was unable himself to climb aboard before the boat retired under heavy machine gun fire and illumination. SMITH was reported missing in action.
4. Post-Assault Phase.
 - (a) On 18 August the U.S.S. BOYLE, while assigned to draw fire from shore batteries at CANNES, was several times straddled. A piece of shrapnel passed through an open sight and wounded the trainer, RANILOVICH, Andrew R., RM3c, USNR, in the hand. Fourteen small pieces of shrapnel were removed by the ship's doctor.
 - (b) The F.S. FANTASQUE, while in RADE DES SALINS on 20 August, sustained a hit on her port torpedo tube mount from a battery of GIENS Peninsula. Five men were wounded, two of them seriously.
 - (c) The F.S. GEORGES LEYGUES was engaged by a coastal battery, presumed to have been a 138mm battery located at SAINT ELME, on 20 August, while five miles south of CAP SICIE. A shell impact on her after starboard 40mm mount, resulting in fire and explosion of ready ammunition, wounded 15 men, two of them critically. One of the wounded, Le THIES, Jean, 1475-L-38, Matelot Cannonier, died in the hospital of Ajaccio on 27 August.
 - (d) On 21 August an SOC observation plane from the U.S.S. PHILADELPHIA was lost over GIENS Peninsula as a result of flak, and is believed to have been seen crashing in flames. The pilot, Lieut. Francis A. CAHILL, A-V(N), USNR, #112597, and the aviation radioman, RYAN, William Henry, 244-16-72, ARM2c, U.S. Navy, were reported missing in action. The body of the latter was subsequently recovered and conclusively identified.

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(e) On 22 August the U.S.S. EDISON, while on a mission to draw fire from the enemy batteries of CANNES, was sprayed with shrapnel when several medium to large caliber shells landed within fifty yards of the ship. A member of one gun crew was wounded in the shoulder by a shell fragment.

(f) On 24 August, while returning to U.S.S. AUGUSTA from a special mission ashore in PORT DE BOUC, the P.T. #555 struck a mine, and nearly everything aft of the forward bulkhead of the engine room was carried away. Five men were killed and a sixth suffered a broken leg. The names of the casualties are not known to this command since no report has been received from the P.T. #555.